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PART OWE UNITED KINGDOM
CHAPTER I - Introduction
In recent years much attention has "been demoted to
the legal problems arising out of the ever increasing
range of governmental activities: problems of delegated
legislation, administrative jurisdiction and the limitation
of administrative discretion generally. The difficulty in
maintaining a reasonable balance between the needs of the
administration and the legal security of the individual has
been aptly described by Professor Friedmann as "the cardinal
problem of administrative law."
For the public lawyer an increasingly important
aspect of this problem concerns the legal status of those
employed by the various instrumentalities of government.
The extension of the role of government has brought an ever¬
growing number of people into an intimate legal relationship
with the state as their employer; in central government,
the public corporations and local government, the multitude
of officials and employees pose a wide variety of questions
all of which involve the delicate and difficult task of
limiting the legal and political freedom of the individual,
because of the nature of his employment.
It cannot be denied that man in society has duties
and obligations which limit his individual liberty; that
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certain types of employment carry additional restrictions
on personal freedom seems equally undeniable. But public
administration is most exacting in the limitations it
imposes on its servants; and the conduct, both public and
private, of many officials, occupying posts of relatively
humble status, is subject to numerous restrictions.
"There is," the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council
recently stated, "a fundamental distinction between the
domestic relationship of servant and master and that of
the holder of a public office and the state which he is
said to serve. This "fundamental distinction" manifests
itself in a great variety of legal restrictions and
limitations on the conduct of governmental employees
relating to: tenure of office, right to salary, super¬
annuation or compensation terms, capacity to contract and
rights to inventions as well as to political liberties like
the freedom to associate in trade unions, to strike and to
participate in the activities of a political party.
•1
Attorney-General for New South Wales v. Perpetual Trustee
Co. .Ltd. L*1955U A.C. U57 at Lf.89. Of: "These people
[governmental employees] ... occupy a status entirely
different from those who carry on a private enterprise.
They serve the public welfare and not private purpose."
Norwalk Teachers' Association v. Board of Education of
the City of Norwalk 138, Conn. 269 (1951) 276.
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With regard to tenure of office the main disability
relates to the protections, if any, possessed "by the
governmental employee against arbitrary dismissal. In the
United Kingdom and the Commonwealth this question has
arisen most acutely in connection with servants of the Crown
to whom the rule of "dismissal at pleasure" has been said
to be applicable even although there may be in existence
some kind of agreement to the contrary.^ The obvious
injustice of this rule has been the subject of much
discussion in recent years but so far no completely
2
satisfactory answer appears to have been given. In the
United Kingdom moreover, it is only in comparatively
recent times that it has been possible for a local govern¬
ment employee to be employed on terms other than at the
pleasure of the employing council.3
1See: De Dohs& v. The Queen (1886) 3 T.l.R. 11Ul Dunn v.
The Queen (p 896,3 1 Q.B. 116; Gould v. Stuart fc89SJ"A.C.
575, at p. 577; Denning v. Secretary of State for India
(1920) 37 T.L.R. 138; Kynaston v. Attorney-General (1955)
i+9 T.L.R. 300; The Commonwealth v. Quince (19UU) "£>8 C.L.R.
227» at pp. 24l, 2i|.2j The Commonwealth v. Welsh (19U7) Ik
C.L.R. 22+5; Allpike v. The Commonwealth (19^8) 77 C.L.R. 62.
^See, for example: J.D.B.Mitchell, The Contracts of Public
Authorities. G. Bell & Sons, (1 952+); I.M.L. Richardson,
"Incidents of the Crown-servant relationship," Canadian
Bar Review. Vol. XXXIII, April, 1955, p.^2i+; B. Beinart
"The Legal Relationship between the Government and its
Employees," Butterworth's South African Law Review,(1955)b.21.
3Local Government Act 1933, S. 121 (1).
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For some time, too there was considerable doubt as to
whether a servant of the Crown had any right to salary^ and
while this doubt has not en'tirely disappeared, there are
signs that the courts would now admit such a right.2 But
assignability of the salary of a Crown servant is still
specifically prohibited by statute.
The Superannuation rights of government servants are
safeguarded by statute in Australia; in Britain super¬
annuation is also governed by Act of Parliament, but for
the civil servant it remains a condition of service to which
no legal right exists.^
^Mulvenna v. The Admiralty [-1926] S.C. 81+2; Lucas v. Lucas
and the High Commissioner for India [ 191+3 J 68.
^See the remarks of Lord GODDARD C.J. in Commissioners of
Inland Revenue v. Hambrook [1956] 1 ALL E.R. 807 at 811
where his Lordship repeated the opinion he expressed in
the case of Terrell v. Secretary of State for the
Colonies [ 1953] 2 Q.B. 1+82 that a civil servant "could
recover his salary for the time during which he has
served."
3Crown Proceedings Act, 191+7 s. 27 (l)(a).
%n numerous decisions this has been held to be the correct
interpretation of s. 30 of the Superannuation Act of 183I+
taken together with s.2 of the Act of 1859; Edmunds v.
Attorney-General (1878) 1+7 L.J. Ch.1+5; Cooper v. R. (188O)
11+ Ch. D. 311; Yorke v. R. [ 1915] 1 K.B. 852; Re Trans¬
ferred Civil Servants (Ireland) Compensation [1929] A.C.
21+2; Mixon v. Attorney-General [ 1931 ] A.C. 1 81+
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In a wide variety of minor matters, also, the govern¬
mental employee is circumscribed in his private actions in
a way rarely encountered in private employment. The Grown,
for example, exercises strict supervision over inventions
made "by its servants; this is not surprising in cases
where the inventor has made use of official information and
where the invention may "be of interest to his particular
department. But the Treasury has made it clear that:
"the fundamental principle is that ownership of
an invention made "by a servant of the Crown
vests in the Grown. Where, however, the
invention is alien to the inventor's
duties the inventor may "be allowed ex gratia
complete freedom of commercial exploitation..."^
A Grown servant's capacity to contract is also
affected "by his employment. The conditions under which he
may make a contract with the government are strictly
regulated^ and restrictions are imposed on his right to
purchase government stores.3 This limitation is also
found in the conditions of service of local government
iTreasury Circular, June, 1955» And this is subject as
a rule to a royalty-free licence in favour of the Crown;
see D.H.N. Johnson, "Encouraging Inventions by Govern¬
ment Employees," 13 M. L. R. (1950) p. ijl+2 et. seq.
2Treasury Circular, 27th May, 19 22+; and see W.A.Robson
in British Government since 1918« Lord Campion (Ed.)
Allen & Unwin (1951) p. 102.
3a civil servant is forbidden to purchase any surplus
government stores if he intends to resell them:
Treasury Circular, 11th November, 19^+6.
employees. Acts of Parliament and numerous judicial
decisions aim at insuring that local government officials
have no personal interest in the contracts made "by the
local authority which employs them.''
For the governmental employee in the United Kingdom
and Australia the tradition of trade unionism and freedom
to participate in collective agreements is now well
established.2 In the United Kingdom this has "been
achieved almost entirely by "extra-legal" means except for
some provisions contained in a few of the Acts estabiisning
certain statutory corporations.-^ In Australia, on the
other hand, the place of trade unionism in governmental
employment is recognised by the existence of a highly
developed statutory system of conciliation and arbitration.^
^See, Municipal Corporations Act, 1835, s.28; Municipal
Corporations Act,1 882,s. 1 2; Local Government Act,l933»s.123»
and also, Edwards v. Salmon (l889) 21 Q.B.D.53U; Mutton v.
Wilson (188 ) 22 Q.B.D. 7UU; Barnacle v. Clark [1900Jq.B.279.
^Although only comparatively recently in the case of British
local government servants. See infra. Chap. IV.
3This is, of course, in keeping with British industrial
relations generally in the development of which the law has
played a minor role. See, infra pp. 22,23
^•For example: Public Service Arbitration Act 1920-57; Con¬
ciliation and Arbitration Act, 1901j.-57- In the United States,
although freedom to associate seems generally to be accepted,
there are still a few states which have legislated to prohibit
associations of governmental employees. See S.D. Spero:
Government as Employer, Eemson Press, New York (191+8); C.S.
Rhyne: Labor Unions and Municipal Employee Law, National
Institute of Municipal Law Officers, Washington (19I4.6); H.
Eliot Kaplan: "Le^al Aspects of Public Employee Relations,"
10 Public Personnel Review, (19U9)> P» 109-
But if it is clear that the question of the right to
associate has heenanswered in the affirmative for government
employees in the United Kingdom and Australia, it is equally
clear that the use of the strike weapon is forbidden, at any
rate to servants of the Crown. In Australia the prohibition
is a statutory one;^ in Brtain it exists by the tacit under¬
standing which was explained by the then Attorney-General
during the debate on the second reading of the Trade Disputes
and Trade Unions Act of 19U6:
"The 1927 Act did not forbid civilservants to
strike, and nothing that we propose to do now
will make it any more legal than it is today
for civil servants to take strike action ...
I take this opportunity of making it quite
clear that this Government like any Government
as employer, would feel itself perfectly free
to take any disciplinary action that any strike
situation that might develop demanded.
It is, however, with regard to his political activities
that the governmental employee is most restricted. The
reconciling of the political freedom of the individual
employee with the need to maintain the integrity and
impartiality of governmental service is an important
problem in present day public law. In the United Kindom,
as in Australia, questions of the political activities of
governmental employees have not come before the courts as
''of. Public Service Act 1922-57 sec. 66.
2 H.C. Debates
K (19^6) Vol.^Cols.SUl -3
has "been common in the United States,'' and the matter is
regulated "by statute and intra-service regulations and "by
the rules laid down "by various local authorities and public
corporations. These restrictions cover a wide field of
political activity "both national and local; for the Crown
"'in America the Hatch Act is a powerful prohibition against
participation in politics "by the government employee and
decisions like Oklahoma v. United States Civil Service
Commission, 330 U.S. 127, 91 L.Ed. 799 (19U7) and United
Public Workers v. Mitchell 330 U.S. 75, 91 L.Ed. 509~TT9U7)
have left no doubt as to the wide scope of the restrictions.
In the former case the extension of the provisions of the
Hatch Act to State ana local government employees whose
principle activity was partly financed by Federal funds was
held to be constitutional. In the latter case it was
observed (at pp. 9U-5) that "... the rights reserved to the
people by the Ninth and Tenth Amendments are involved. The
right claimed as inviolate may be stated as the right of a
citizen to act as a party official or worker to further his
own political views. Thus, we have the measure of inter¬
ference by the Hatch Act and the Pules with what otherwise
would be the freedom of the civil servant under the First,
Ninth and Tentb Amendments." It is interesting to contrast
the Mitchell Case with the narrow interpreation in Ex parte
Curtis 106 U.S. 371 (1882). Nor do State employees appear
to fare much better as seems clear from two recent cases
dealing with the application of the due-process clause of
the fourteenth amendmentfto the firing of State public
employees. The Suiapreme Court upheld the State's right to
dismiss a public employee on the basis of his refusal to
answer any relevant question (in the cases mentioned, the
questions related to Communist Party membership) and held
that the State courts' construction that a refusal to answer
was encompassed by the terms "incompetency" in one case and
"Trustworthiness and reliability" in the other was consti¬
tutional. See: Lerner v. Casey 357 U.S. Lj.68 (1958) and
Beilan v. Board of Public Education 357 U.S. 399 (l958)- From
these decisions it seems apparent that questions relating to
political belief are likely to be held relevant to "job fit¬
ness" and that dismissal for failure to answer would not be
deemed arbitrary even in the case of employees protected by
statute. And see, Garner v. Board of Public Works 3k1 U.S.
716 (1951 ).
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servant, they affect not only adoption as a Parliamentary
candidate, "but such activities as holding office in a
political party organisation, speaking in public on matters
of political controversy and canvassing onbehalf of a
candidate.^
The most recent aspect of government employment to
receive attention concerns the "loyalty" of the employee
and the security of the state to which he "belongs. Since
Viforld War II this has "become a major problem of the greatest
legal significance in the United States where the topic has
occupied the courts on many occasions.2
In the United Kingdom and Australia the problems
involved in testing the loyalty of governmental employees
have been dealt with by administrative action and no cases
''Treasury Circular, July 1 951+; in Australia no comparable
directions have been issued by the Public Service Board
although, in a training handbook, conduct in keeping with
the above mentioned provisions is strongly recommended.
In fact the governmental employee in Australia and New
Zealand enjoys an unusually high degree of political freedom;
since 1936 there has been no restriction on the political
activities of the latter other than that of resignation on
election to Parliament. Leave of absence to contest an
election is a right as is his return to appointment in the
event of his being unsuccessful. See, New Zealand Political
Disabilities Removal Act,1936; P. Campbell: "Politicians,
Public Servants and the People in New Zealand," Political
Studies. Vol. Ill No. 3 and Vol. IV No. 1.
2Bailey v. Richardson 31+ U.S. 918 (l95l); Washington v.
ivicGrath 31+1 U.S. 923 (1951); Garner v. Los Angeles Board
31+1 U.S. 716 (1951 ); Adler v. Board 31+2 U.S. 1+85 (1952);
Fitzgerald v. Philadelphia 376 Pa. 379 (1951+).
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have come before the courts. Nevertheless., these "security-
loyalty" cases are of vital significance for the public
lawyer and raise important questions regarding adequate
safeguards for the employee, the classes of official to "be
included and the type of tribunal to be used in these
investigations.Not the least important aspect of these
cases is that they make new demands not only upon the
employee himself, but upon members of his family, who may
find their political affiliations the subject of
p
investigation by the government.
It is obvious from the foregoing that the employment
relationship of the government employee differs from that
of the private employee in that the government as an
employer is rarely limited by the ordinary law of master
^Cf. the recent "statement of the Conference of Privy
Councillors on Security," Crnd. 9715.
p "The Conference recommended that an individual
who is living with a wife or husband who is a
Communistic or Communist sympathiser may, for that
reason alone, have to be moved from secret work ...."




This peculiarly restricted legal position is the
^Nor, in the United States, even "by the "fundamental rights"
guaranteed to all citizens by the Constitution. Holmes'
famous apophthegm has set the tone for judicial dis¬
cussions of the status of governmental employees: "the
petitioner may have a constitutional right to talk politics
"but he has no constitutional right to "be a policeman"
(McAuliffe v. Mayor of lie?/ Bedford 155 Mass. 216, 220 N.E.
517 (1892)). Governmental employment is "a privilege
revocable "by the sovereignty at will." (Crenshaw v. U.S.
131+ U.S. 99, 108 (l890)). This has important constitutional
consequences for governmental employees. When the govern¬
ment has extended a privilege, i.e. something to which one
is not entitled as of right under the Constitution, that
privilege may he withdrawn without complying with the
procedural requirements of the Due Process Clause (Weinstein
v» U«S. Ih F. Supp. 551+ (19^4-7))• Furthermore, the privilege
can he arbitrarily taken away without notice or hearing and
thus in the absence of a clear statutory remedy the party
concerned will be totally without recourse (U.S. v.
0'Shaughness.y 338 U.S. 538 (1950)). "Governmental employment
is not'property' ... nor a 'contract' ... nor 'liberty' ...
in terms, the due process clause does not apply to the
holding of a government office." (Bailey v. Richardson 182
F. 2d. 1+6 (1950) affirmed in 3k1 U.S. 918 (1951 ))^ CfT M.
Bontecou: The Federal Loyalty-Security Program. Cornell
University Press, 1*1932) quoting at p. 206 the first Civil
Service Loyalty Review Board: "No person has an inherent or
constitutional right to public employment; public employ¬
ment is a privilege, not a right." See also Professor
A. Dotson: "The Emerging Doctrine of Privilege in Public
Employment," Public Administration Review. Vol.XV Spring
1955, p.77. The case of Wiemann v. Updegraff 3kk U.S.
183 (l952) seemed to temper the harshness of the 'privilege'
doctrine (see especially the opinions of CLARK and BLACK
J.J.) But more recent cases like Lerner v. Casey 357 U.S.
1+68 (1958) and Beilan v. Board of Public Education 357 U.S.
399 (1958) indicate that the Wieman decision offers very




hallmark of governmental employees in most modern state®
and, moreover, is accepted as right and proper "by many of
2
those employees themselves. And, in this century, inter¬
national co-operation has added further to the list of
officials to whom the tenets of private employment are
alleged to "be inapplicable.-^
1 See The Legal Status of Staffs of Postal, Telegraph and
Telephone Services, (T95~1 ) a report prepared for the
Postal, Telegraph and Telephone International, Berne.
A survey of twelve European countries compiled from a
comprehensive questionnaire, this report provides
valuable information on the legal restrictions imposed
on the employees of the governments concerned.
^Discussing the possibility of introducing "benefits in
kind" into the British Civil Service the Priestley
Commission commented: "it was the general view of our
witnesses that it was not possible to go further in
relaxing the present Civil Service rules. Civil
servants were under Ministers; payments were made out
of voted moneys; civil servants had to do their busi¬
ness in the light of a good deal of publicity and r egard
must be had to public opinion ... differences between
the Civil Service and industry had to be accepted."
Report of the Royal Commission on the Civil Service.
1955-55. Cmd. 9613 p. 87, para. 373»
3"... we think it necessary for the proper discharge of
the functions of a world organisation of States, that
it should possess a power, if necessary to set aside
the vested rights of private individuals employed in
its administration. Only an excessively static legal
view would justify the conclusion that the League was
fettered in its own administrative organisation by the
rules of the private law of contract applicable to the
employees of a trading or commercial undertaking. "
Sub-Committee of the Finance Committee of the General
Assembly of the United Nations, Records of the 20th and
21st Assemblies 19^6, annex 23 p. k5 at p. 262. Quoted,
L.C.Green: (i95U) 7 Current Legal Problems, p. 202.
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It is clear that in certain circumstances the private
interests of governmental employees will have to he subor¬
dinated to the superior interests of the community for whom
the whole system of government exists. But to accept this
requires not only the existence of adequate safeguards for
the maintenance of efficient administration - it requires
also adequate guarantees of just treatment for the govern¬
ment employee.
Inevitably, therefore, the question becomes more
insistent: what is the justification for imposing upon a
large section of the population conditions of employment
markedly different from those of the rest of the working
c ommunity?
*
"The most universal public relation by which men are
connected together," says Blackstone, "is that of govern¬
ment; namely, as governors and governed, or in other words,
as magistrates and people.""' Because of the importance to
^Comm. Bk. 1, II, iU6.
- -
the community of the activities of government servants,
it is generally agreed that special conditions ought to
"be imposed upon them "in the public interest. "
A clear recognition of the interest of the community
in governmental employees is contained in an early thirteenth
century statute "by which it was ordained that the inhabitants
of every shire should have the right to elect their own
sheriffs, "that the commons might choose such as would not
"be a "burthen to them. Many early cases illustrate the
rules governing thegrant of public offices and the notion
of public interest is clearly behind much of the judicial
2
reasoning.
It is easy to see this public interest in terms of
the need to maintain the administrative efficiency of
^ 28 Edw. I c. 13; see also 12 Ric. II c.2. which decreed
that no man be appointed to office "that sueth either
privily or openly to be put in office, but such only as
they shall judge to be the best and most sufficient."
p
See: Mitchell, op,cit. pp. 32, 33; also Dunn v. The Queen
]1896[ 1 Q.3. 11o at 119; De Dohsl v. The Queen (1886)
3 T.L.R. 11 ip; Kynaston v. Attorney-General (1935) k9 T.L.R.
300 at 301. Cf. Butler v. Pennsylvania 10. Howe 1+02 (l850)
at 1+16 where, discussing the distinction between private and
public employment, it was stated: "the contracts designed to
be protected by the tenth section of the first article [of
the Constitution] are contracts by which perfect rights,
certain definite fixed private rights ... are vested.
These are clearly distinguishable from measures or engage¬
ments adopted or undertaken by the body politic or State
government for the benefit of all." See also: The Queen v.
Clarke [l95i+] A.L.R. 312; Bertrand v. The King [19U9]
A.L.R. 311 at 320.
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government."' One aspect of the need to ensure the efficient
functioning of government is illustrated in the rules
relating to contracts made by public authorities:
"In the last resort the law permits a
governmental agency to fulfil the
fundamental purposes for which it was
created, even though so doing may in¬
volve interference with the vested
contractual rights v/hich an individual
may have against that agency." 2
Thus, while the legal security of the individual is of
great importance, the public interest requires at the same
time the effective performance of governmental purposes.
The pre-eminence of private contractual rights therefore
must often be weighed againstthe danger of unduly inhibiting
governmental action.
It is true that, just as in its dealings with the
general public the government cannot realistically be con¬
fined within the rules of private law, so as an employer the
government cannot relinquish its inalienable duty to govern
effectively. In the last resort, therefore, unilateral
administrative action may have to be used to solve many
problems arising from the employer-employee relationship -
1See e.g. Lewis v. Weston-super-Mare (1888) 1+0 Gh.D. 55 at 62,
67; Vine v. national Dock Labour Board [1956] 3 All E.R. 939
espy. Lord COHEN at 9^-2. And cf. United Public Workers v.
Mitchell 330 U.S. 75 91 L.Ed. 509,"Tf947J7~art~570l "for the
regulation of employees it is not necessary that the act
regulated be anything more than an act reasonably deemed by
Congress to interfere with the efficiency of the public service
^Mitchell op. cit. p. 17.
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problems which, in the sphere of private employment, could
safely "be left to the processes of ordinary collective
"bargaining."' For the governmental servant, therefore,
public interest in the efficiency of government will often
necessitate the imposition of limitations and restrictions
(as well as privileges) on his conduct, both private and
public.
But, thus stated, the principle is too wide. The
test of the efficiency of government requires further
analysis before it can be used as a practical yardstick;
and moreover, the test of "public interest" itself needs
elucidation if it is to be of real assistance.
Whether or not public interest should always be treated
as superior to private interest is, of course, a matter of
political predilection and is a question to which an infinite
variety of answers can be given; indeed, any particular
answer will be applicably only to the particular circumstances
in which the question of public interest has arisen.
Certainly, public interest is not coincidental with
government interest^ which may, in many cases, be little
more than a form of private interest and may even be used to
1 There is a suggestion of this in the distinction drawn in
the British Civil Service between conditions of service which
are "arbitrable" and those which are not.
^Cf. Glasgow Corporation v. Central Land Board, 1956 S.L.T.
2+1, Lord RADCLIFFE, at p.2+9* ""the interests of Government
... do not exhaust the public interest.
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serve a private interest.-^ And again, legal issues may
arise not "between "public" and "private" interests, "but
"between different public interests. This can happen, for
example, in a dispute "between a local authority and a
central government department or, in a federal system of
government, "between the federal government and a state.
The test of public interest is, therefore, a vague
one and of little value unless regard is had to the
particular circumstances in which it arises; it is certainly
not sufficient justification for the wholesale application
of restrictions to governmental employees, as seems to
p
have "been too readily assumed.
And further, it is clear that the test of public
interest cannot be confined to governmental employment only.
Many types of employment are subject to restriction and
regulation in the public interest. Doctors, lawyers,
chimney sweeps and butchers to mention only a few.^ True,
^See: Repatriation Commission v. Kirkland (1923) 32 G.L.R.
1; Bank voor Handel en Scheepvaart N.V. v. Administrator
of Hungarian Property H95U1 A.C. 58U» Also G. Sawer:
"Shield of the Crown Revisited," M.U.L.R. Vol. 1, No. 2
(1957) p. 137 et seq.
2lt is difficult to see, for example, how the public
interest is safeguarded by the decision in Mulvenna v.
The Admiralty 1926 S.C. 8i+2
^See, e.g. Mullan v. Robertson. 1955 ff.C. p.
-18 -
the degree of' public interest involved in the activities of
governmental official is greater with regard to many more
employees than is the case with any single "branch of outside
private employment. The size of the modern administrative
machine ana its ever-expanding interest in the affairs of the
subject means that problems of the protection of the public
interest will arise much more frequently and often, though
not always, more acutely than in the field of private
employment. ^
But, it is suggested, the matter is one of degree only.
One cannot justify the r estrictions imposed on governmental
servants merely on the basis that they are governmental
employees; the test is not whether the occupation is
governmental or private^ but whether the duties involved in
1See Report of the Special Committee of the Association of
the Bar of New York - The Federal Loyalty-Security Program.
Dodd, Mead & Co. (195b) at pp.65 et.seq. where the appli-
cation of the programme to private employees is discussed.
^Indeed, it is well-nigh impossible to definite governmental
employment. It does not seem to be synonymous with public
employment (see Bater v. Great Western Railway Co. [1922]
2 A.C. 1, at 27); nor is it enough to say that it is
employment which has governmental purposes, for this takes
us no further (see Griffith: "Public Corporations as
Crown Servants," 9 Univ. of Toronto L.J. (1952) p. 169);
neither can we define governmental employment by reference
to the use of public funds since many individuals and bodies
which would not be considered governmental utilise public
funds - doctors under the National Health Service and Uni¬
versities for example. The only solution seems to be to
say that governmental employment in this context is employ¬
ment by either a ministerial department, a local authority
or a statutory corporation; and this is only partially
satisfactory.
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the occupation are such that the public interest requires
protection in their exercise. Many non-governmental
occupations will require greater restriction and regulation
than many governmental offices. And within the sphere of
governmental employment itself the degree of restriction
will vary in relation to the duties to "be performed.
The duties of the office or appointment are the
paramount consideration; "by this means alone can one assess
with any degree of accuracy the nature of the public interest
involved; and the factors to be considered in ascertaining
that public interest will vary in turn with the different
conditions of service to which the particular restriction
or regulation is being applied,
To accept this suggestion offers certain advantages:
it avoids the anachronistic difficulties which arise from
the theories about urown prerogative and sovereignty which
have bedevilled the law relating to Crown servants and
places the restrictions imposed on governmental employees
on an understandable and acceptable basis; distinctions
can be drawn between different groups of employees and
different conditions of service, thus avoiding the unjust
application of "blanket" restrictions irrespective of grade
^See The Queen v. Clarke [l95k] A.L.R. 312 for an example
of how important is the consideration of the duties per¬
formed by a governmental official in ascertaining the
presence or otherwise of public interest.
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or the duties performed. With regard to the "basic principles
governing tenure of office, salary and superannuation, for
example, uniformity of practice seems "both desirable and
possible. Any approach to problems of private conduct,
political activities and "security," however, seems less than
fair if it treats alike the industrial employee in thegovern-
rnent arms factory and the permanent head of a major department
of state.''
''This, however, appears to be the approach of the United States
courts. In the United Public Workers v. Mitchell case, the
Supreme Court held that the provisions of the Hatch Political
Activities Act were applicable to a metal roller in thePederal
Mint. For the point of view of the British courts see
Mulvenna v. The Admiralty 1926 S.C. 81+2 in which no
distinction was drawn between industrial and non-industrial
civil servants as regards the assignment of pay, and Commissioners
of Inland Revenue v. Hambrook [1956] 1 All E.R. 807, in which
GODDARD L.C.J, stated, at 810, 811 : "An established civil
servant, whatever his grade, is more properly described as an
officer in the civil employment of Her Majesty and I can see
no ground on which different rules of law in respect of his
employment can be applied according to the grade or position
he may occupy. They apply to the junior clerical officer as
they do to a Permanent Secretary ...". Contrast "The
personnel security programs would extend under this
recommendation to all positions v/hose occupants might endanger
national security and to no others. By thus narrowing the
scope of the programs to the areas where it is really needed,
we would both increase the efficiency of the programs and
remove an unnecessary burden on positive security and on
employees ... The access to information which would make a
position sensitive might be either authorized access or
opportunity for unauthorized access. So the position of a
secretary or a janitor who had opportunity for access to the
files of the Joint Chiefs of Staff would be classified as
sensitive ... sensitiveness would be by position and not by
agency." Federal Loyalty-Security Program, pp. 1^1-2. The
decision in Cole v. Young 315 U.S. 536 (1956) suggests that
in future distinctions will be made although the scope of the
decision is possibly rather limited. See R. Brown: Loyalty
and Security (1958) Yale University Press, p.2ij..
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No study of constitutional law would "be regarded as
complete if it omitted discussion of the political
conventions; international lawyers find it equally
impossible to ignore the realities of international
politics. Yet, British lawyers, with few exceptions,
have paid scant attention to the practice of public
i
administration in the field of governmental employment.
This approach seems lacking in realism.
An analysis of the position of the governmental
employee vis-£-vis his employer must take into account,
not only the strictly legal elements of that relationship,
as expressed in statutes and judicial decisions, but also
the practice and custom of the public service. To
ignore or underestimate the latter is to run the danger
of reaching conclusions at once unreal and misleading.
Any legal examination of the employment relationship
of the government servant must, therefore, include within
its scope the all-important systems of collective bargaining
''Significant exceptions are Sir Ivor Jennings and Professor
W.A.Robson. In contrast, American lawyers have shown no
reticence whatever about using public administration references
to supplement legal discussion of public employment. See,
for example, Ool.L.R. ,Vol.17, No.7pp.n6-i ff. Nor have
American courts. Gf. United Public Workers v. Mitchell 330
U.S. 75 at 97 and 121.
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and codes of internal conduct which govern, so comprehensively,
conditions of service. Failure to do this gives rise to two
serious consequences: the position of the public employee is
made to appear much worse than is really the case (and hence
much of the suggested legal reform may he unnecessary and
even undesirable ) and the effectiveness and importance of
the internal regulatory codes is gravely underestimated.
The problem here is, of course, a common one. Legal
discussion inevitably lays stress on the abnormal and legal
principles become of paramount importance when things go
wrong. The lawyer, therefore, is most concerned with the
provision of legal protection obtained in the ordinary
courts of law - because things do go wrong and, if the
protection of the law is lacking or defective, the results
2
can be unfortunate for the individual. This concern with
legal principles and judicial protection, however, must not
blind the legal observer to the fact that things may not be
so bad as they appear; and, furthermore, the absence of
legal provisions either in statues or case-law may be
evidence of a healthy state of affairs. The parallel in
1
See, infra Chap. IV
^Cf. the cases cited, supra at p. 3 n.i.
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1
industrial relations is obvious.
Further legal intervention^ may "be, therefore, to a
large extent unnecessary, since the need for greater
protection for the government servant can "be seriously
exaggerated. Another factor, moreover, which makes such
intervention even more unnecessary, is that the compre¬
hensive systems of internal rules and regulations governing
conditions of employment throughout the public service,
themselves form in a very real sense, legal patterns to
which the conduct of employees and employers must conform.
The problems posed by any attempt to define "law" are too
well-known to be repeated^but it is submitted that a body
of rules governing conduct, backed by accepted sanctions
and containing provisions for development, could, not
inappropriately, be termed "law," although the rules may
3
not be justiciable in an ordinary court.
A
'Cf. 0. Kahn-Freund in The System of Industrial Relations
in Great Britain Flanders & Olegg (eds. ) Blackwell (l'95U)>
p. U-3: "The first duty of a lawyer about to discuss the
legal framework of industrial relations is to warn his
readers not to overestimate its importance ... there exists
something like an inverse correlation between the practical
significance of legal sanctions and the degree to which
industrial relations have reached a state of maturity."
^Gf. H. KantofoWicz: The Definition of Law, C.U.P. (1958)
-*See, infra. Chap. IV especially p.ffH- for further discussion
of this point.
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In governmental employment neither employer nor
employee appears to pay much attention to such legal concepts
as "contractual right,""implied "term" and "enforceability;"
the emphasis is on negotiation and discussion as a means of
reaching a modus operandi which will maintain the effective¬
ness of the administration and at the same time meet the
<1
just demands of the employee.
The governmental employee is, by no means, as rightless
as his legal position (as defined "by statute and the common
law) would suggest. Nor is he lacking in protection for
his rights. The extent of those rights and more particularly
the adequacy of their protection, may give cause for concern
to the administrative lawyer "but he must, nevertheless, "be
wary of posing solutions to legal problems which in practice
may not exist. Formal, legal solutions - offering, for
example, statutory or contractual rights justiciable in the
ordinary courts - may satisfy a laudable desire to afford
maximum protection to the employee. As suggested, however,
they may be largely unnecessary, and, further, they may
introduce into the employment relationship too rigid a
structure with consequent disadvantages, some of which should
^Cf. The Constitution of the National Whitley Council. Clause 11:
"... The objects of the National Council shall be to secure the
greatest measure of co-operation between the State in its
capacity as employer, and the general body of Civil Servants in
matters affecting the Civil Service, with a view to increased
efficiency in the public service combined with the well-being
of those employed..."
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"become apparent later in this study.
*
The problems arising in the field of governmental
employment appear in every modern state. In what follows,
comparisons from Australian experience are used to illustrate
these problems and the ways in which they can be approached.
The choice of Australia for this purpose has certain advantages.
First, there is, as in Brtain, a legal background of
common law principles and a political system which combines a
parliamentary executive and ministerial responsibility. The
problems arising, therefore, can be appreciated readily by
lawyers in the two countries.
Second, the federal constitution of Australia raises
problems the solutions to which cut across many of the
accepted notions of the lawyer accustomed to a unitary form
•1
of government.
Third, the federal system of Australia has, for the
purposes of this study, two advantages over that of the
United States; it is smaller and younger and therefore lends
^See, for example, the discussion of the "transferred officers'
rights" cases in Chapter VIII, infra.
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itself more readily to fairly complete analysis. And in
Australia, unlike in the United States, the common law is
applied as a common source of juristic authority in the High
Court and in the courts of the States,"^ thus offering some
chance of a reasonably uniform approach.
Lastly, the problems of governmental employment in
both Britain and Australia, although alike in many respects,
have been approached in quite different ways especially with
regard to civil servants and the employees of local authorities.
Statutory regulation, for example, plays a much more important
role in Australia than is the case in the United Kingdom, a
fact which enables some important conclusions to be drawn
especially on the subject of granting legal rights in
government employment.
A
See Chief Justice Sir Owen Dixon, "The Common Law as an
Ultimate Constitutional Foundation," 31 A.L.J. (1957)
p. 21+0 ff. But contrast the views expressed by Professor
Zelman Cowen in 7 Res Judicata (Melbourne)(1955) pp.29,30.
PART ONE - THE UNITED KINGDOM
CHAPTER II - Basic conditions of service
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Of primary interest to the governmental employee
are the "basic elements in his employment conditions: tenure,
salary and superannuation, and from these have arisen legal
problems of no little importance. In recent years . these
problems have been solved to a great extent, but nevertheless
there remains a number of questions to which the public
lawyer may hope to provide some useful answers.
*
With regard to tenure of office the civil servant still
remains legally "a tenant at will" of the Grown, liable to
be dismissed "at pleasure" without the possibility of legal
redress.'' The local government employee has greater legal
protection against arbitrary dismissal; although basically
he is employed at the pleasure of his local authority, it is
statutorily provided that he may rely upon a formal contract
of service which can provide for a requisite period of
notice and stipulated grounds for dismissal,among other
^Terrell v. Secretary of State for the Colonies [1953]
2 Q.B.I+82 and the cases there cited. And see supra p.3» n.1.
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things.
At first glance it.might appear that the legal position
of the employee of the statutory corporation is most akin to
that of the private employee in that many of these "bodies are
engaged in activities of a commercial or industrial nature
and, indeed, have in many cases taken over these functions
2
from private enterprise. There are, however, in this
connection a number of factors to which some consideration
must be given.
The relationship between an employee and the statutory
corporation employing him will generally be one of servant
and master based on contractual rights and obligations.
There may be occasions, however, when that relationship is
not so straightforward and when it partakes more of status
than of contract. The contrast between Vine v. ilational
Dock Labour Board^ and Barber v. Manchester Regional Hospital
Boards-makes this clear.
''Local Government Act, 1933, s.121 (1). It should be observed
that this section does no more than make valid certain con¬
tractual provisions which by the decision in Brown v. Dagenham
U.D.G. [1929] 1 K.B. 737 were hitherto invalid. The section
does not affect the common law right of the local authority,
like any employer, to dismiss a servant summarily on any
grounds recognised by the common law as justifying summary
dismissal, even in the fac& of a contractual provision for
notice. See, J.H.Warren: The Local Government Service, Allen
& Unwin (1952) p. 111.
^Cf. Flanders & Clegg (eds. ) op. cit. p. Mo
3[ 1957] A.C. 1+88
^"[1958] 1 All E.R. 322
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In Tooth cases the nature of the relationship of the
plaintiff to his employer came under consideration hy the
court in ascertaining what would "be the appropriate remedy
for wrongful dismissal. The plaintiff in the Vine Case was
a dock worker employed "by the defendants under a scheme
embodied in the schedule to the Dock 'Workers (Regulation of
Employment) Order -19^-7 which was made under the Dock Workers
A
(Regulation of Employment) Act, 19^6. The ground on which
he averred wrongful dismissal was that the local dock labour
board had no power under the scheme to delegate their
disciplinary powers (including that of dismissal) to a
disciplinary committee. The House of Lords, upholding the
finding of the Court of Appeal (and also the judgement of
ORMEROD J. at first instance) then dealt with the plaintiff's
claim for a declaration that his dismissal was void. Such
a declaration had been granted by ORMEROD J. but refused by
the Court of Appeal (JENKINS L.J. dissenting).^
Holding that the plaintiff was entitled to his
declaration their Lordships were unanimously of the same
opinion as JENKINS L.J. in the Court of Appeal that the
relationship of the plaintiff to the employing Board was
different from that of the ordinary servant and master case.
^ sec.2
2[1956] 1 Q.B. 658
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The scheme gave him a status and the remedy (impossible in
the contract of service) was that his dismissal was declared
a nullity. He had never, legally, left the employment of
the Board.
In Barber's Case the plaintiff alleged wrongful dismissal
on the ground that the proper procedure for terminating his
appointment had not been followed. A part-time^consultant,
the plaintiff's employment was ended by the Board without his
being given the opportunity to appeal to the Minister of
Health, as provided by his conditions of service. BARRY J.
held that this right of appeal had been duly incorporated
into the terms ana conditions of the plaintiff's service with
the Board and that, therefore, the plaintiff had been wrong¬
fully dismissed.
The question of remedy arose and on the basis of the
Vine Case the plaintiff claimed a declaration that his appoint¬
ment had never been validly determined and was, in fact, a
nullity. The terms and conditions of service agreed between
the Minister of Health and the medical profession included
the provision for appeal to the Minister. Counsel for the
plaintiff argued that the proper procedure had never been
completed and therefore the termination was never effective.
1Cf. at 500; 506; 508.
2lt was held by BARRY J. that for the purposes of the con¬
ditions of service under consideration, no distinction could
be drawn between whole—time and part-time employees.
- 31 -
Nevertheless BARRY J. felt that the Vine Case was
distinguishable:
"There the plaintiff was working under a
code which had statutory powers . .. Here,
despite the strong statutory flavour
attaching to the plaintiff's contract ...
it was an ordinary contract between
master and servant and nothing more." 1
Presumably, had the learned judge found that the
element of statutory regulation was stronger than was the
case, he would have been willing to hold that the plaintiff's
relationship to the hospital board was one of status and the
remedy re-instatement as in Vine's Case. On this basis, the
extent to which statute or statutory regulation govern the
tenure of office of an employee of a public authority, will
determine whether or not his employment relationship is one
2
of status or contract.
Moreover, where the relationship between a public
corporation and an employee is clearly a contractual one of
at 331« As recently as April, 1939» this case featured in a
question in the House of Lords, a leader in "The Times" and
subsequent correspondence in the columns of that newspaper.
(See "The Times," 5 April, 1959). In demanding reinstatement,
the noble Lords, the leader-writer and most of the corres¬
pondents seemed to pay little attention to the long-established
common lav/ rule that a decree of specific performance will not
be granted in respect of contracts of service.
^Another aspect of the Vine Case which appeared to weigh heavily
with both the House of Lords and JENKINS L.J. in the Court of
Appeal was that the plaintiff by being dismissed was effectively
denied from performing his life's occupation at all. See, for
example [1956] 1 Q.B. at 676 and [1957] A.C. at 500; 507-9.
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master and servant, a possible complication may arise where
the corporation concerned is itself a servant or agent of
the Grown. This seems to make the employee, in turn, a
Grown servant and therefore subject to the rule of dismissal
at pleasure."^ In such circumstances De Peyser's Gase^ could
operate to oust the rule if it is based on prerbgative as has
been alleged^; as has been strongly urged^" however, the
prerogative does not appear to be the basis of the "at
pleasure" rule and the rule could therefore apply to employees
of Crown Corporations. Furthermore, it is possible that a
statutory provision authorising the appointment of such
servants as the Minister or Board "shall think fit" - common
in public corporation statutes - might involve dismissal at
pleasure because of the supposed rule against fettering a
discretionary power. -* Something more must be said of the
members of the boards of the corporations^, but meantime,
it is pertinent to consider whether or not any justification
can be advanced for the existence of the "at pleasure" rule.
1Cf. Griffith loc. cit. p. 193; G.H.Treitel: "Crown Proceedings"
[1957] Public Law pp. 329-335« Unless, presumably, the
enabling statute provided otherise.
^Attorney-General v. be Peyser's Bo.val Hotel [1920] A.C.508 .
3cf. GROVE J. in Grant v. Secretary of State for India (1877) 2
G.P.D. 2+2+5 at 1+53




The basis for the dismissal at pleasure rule has been
justified on the ground of public interest with reference
to both the Crown servant'' and the local government employee.2
But it is manifest that the rule was intended to protect the
public interest under conditions very different from those
prevailing in modern governmental service.
There may have been a period in the history of the
Civil Service when the right of the Crown to dismiss at
pleasure was indispensable to the efficient operation of the
3
service in the public interest but the legal rule is now
a needless anachronism and if proof were needed of how
inconsistent today with the public interest the rule is, it
is to be found in the practice of the service which lays so
much emphasis on security of tenure.^"
"^Cf. Dunn v. The Queen [1896] 1 Q.B. ii 6 e.g. and Richardson,
loc. cit. p. 2+29: "... it is generally in the public interest
that civil servants should be disrnissible at pleasure. "
2flioholson v. Whitstable U.D.C. (1925) 89 J.P. U80 at 508:
"The urban authority had not ... any power to enter into a
contract of employment ... under which they were deprived
of that power which in the public interest the statute
expressly conferred upon them of removing at pleasure."
Cf. also FRY J. in bonahoo v. Local Government Board (-1882)
2+6 L.T. (N.S.) 300 at 301.
3see Moses: The Civil Service of Great Britain, p. 27ff;
Logan, loc. cit. p. 255.
^-See infra, p. 50
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80 too with local government employment. Prior to
the Industrial Revolution it was still no part of the con¬
ception of local administration that there should he
permanent whole-time salaried staffs. The unit of local
government, parish manor "borough or county was an organ not
of government hut of obligation implying compulsory unpaid
service on the part of every "respectable male resident." ^
Side by side with this gratuitous service there existed some
offices like the clerk, of the peace, holding office for life
and being remunerated by fees.
But such a system of local administration was ill-adapted
to the rapidly changing conditions in eighteenth and nine¬
teenth century Britain and these ideas of office gradually
yielded, albeit slowly and incompletely, to the principle of
paid service by experts. The need for greater administrative
efficiency in the interests of the public was everywhere
p
apparent. The lack of control over the unpaid office
holder or the holder of the freehold office made it impossible
^Webbs: History of Local Government, Vol. IV p. 353;
Maitland Constitutional History of England, p. 43»
2Webbs, op. cit., Vol. IV, pp.453/4« In Wright v. Marquis
of Zetland [1908] i K.B. 63 counsel for the plaintiff alleged
that s. 22 of the Endowed Schools Act of i869 (which section
provided for the "dismissal at pleasure" of teachers) was
introduced to put an end to the serious objections which had
arisen hitherto because masters had held their appointments
for life. This allegation is borne out by the pre-amble to
the Act. Of. also the numerous Scottish cases like Brown, v.
Heritors of Kilberry, dealing with the control of school
masters as a public service.
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to execute satisfactorily the countless new duties "being
imposed upon local governing "bodies. So, with the passing
of the Poor Law Amendment Act of 183^4- and the Municipal
Corporations Act of 1835, "the foundation of the principle
of a salaried "bureaucracy holding office at pleasure was
well laid. ^
But if tenure at pleasure had "been introduced to
prevent the earlier abuses of office the gradual development
in the twentieth century of the concept of a career service
"bureaucracy has made the old rule completely out of keeping
with the times. In the twentieth century a permanent staff
of experts imbued with a sense of public service was required;
such a group could be built up only on a more certain
foundation than that which had hitherto existed. Tenure at
pleasure is, in these conditions, inimical to the public
interest. This is, in fact, recognised in practice by both
the civil service and local authorities. This gap between
law and practice will be discussed more fully in a later
chapter; suffice it to say, meantime, that even sympathetic
critics of the public service have asked whether security of
p
tenure, both central and local, has gone too far. Further-
^See Poor Law Amendment Act 183k s.IX; Municipal Corporations
Act 1835 s.LVIII.
^See W.Robson (Ed.): The British Civil Servant (1937) P»21;
H. Finer: The British Civil Service (1937) P*99; Laski's
introduction to J.P.W.Mallalieu: Passed to You Please (i 9^4-2):
H.R.G.Greaves: The Civil Service in the Changing State (19U7)
cpp. 1+6-66; G.D.H.Cole: Essays in Social Theory (1950) PP« 221+-21+3;
H. Finer: English Local Government, 2nd Ed. (i 9^4-5) p. 268.
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more, it is now commonplace to find public corporations
statutorily enjoined to pursue "good employer" policies
which is scarcely consistent with a dismissal at pleasure
1
rule.
Before leaving the subject of tenure, it is necessary
to say something of the tenure of office enjoyed "by members
of the boards of public corporations, As distinct from the
employees of these corporations, the appointment, tenure and
dismissal of the members of the boards concerned are expressly
dealt with in the enabling statutes. This suggests some
important distinction between board members and other staff,
the validity of which requires examination, in view of its
implications for a general theory of public employment.
It is sometimes suggested that this distinction exists
because public interest plays a more important part in the
case of the members of statutory boards than in the case of
p
employees of the boards. It is not difficult to envisage
circumstances in which a Minister might feel it advisable
^Gf. Flanders & Clegg, op^cit.p.239. A statutory body, unlike
an ordinary private employer, must act bona fide in terminating
a servant's employment (the onus of proof being on the party
alleging bad faith). See: Short v. Poole Corporation [i926]
Ch.66 at 90,91; Fennell v. Fast Ham Corporation [1926] Ch..6l|/1 ;
Price v. Rhondda U.D.C. [1923 J 2 Ch. 372 at 389; Barber v.
Manchester Regional Hospital Board [*1958] 1 A11.E.R.322 at 329,
330.
p
Cf. Mitchell, op.cit. p. 67: "It seems that a distinction
should be drawn here between the members and directing staffs
of the boards on the one hand and other employees on the other.
As to the former, public interest may well require a wide power
of dismissal, as to the latter, it could not. Indeed this
distinction seems to be recognised in the Acts in the
provisions regulating membership of the boards.
- 37 -
to remove a member of a corporation with whom he may have
to work in close collaboration in an atmosphere of mutual
confidence. Nor is it difficult to visualise occasions
h
arising when a particular member might have to go, whe^e',
for example, relations with his colleagues on the board
become strained.
Nevertheless, it is submitted that such circumstances
could be met by the ordinary law of master and servant.
Due notice given to terminate the appointment is all that
would be required. Where such notice would be inconvenient
to the Crown or the Minister, or where a fixed term has been
prematurely terminated, proper compensation could be made
without detriment to the public interest. Where the duties
of a particular board or board member required the existence
of special terms of office and tenure, these could be
provided in the appropriate contract - the instrument of
-1
appointment. This is recognised in present practice' and
2
has been applied even to servants of a Crown corporation.
Furthermore, the argument that the degree of ease of
dismissal can be related to the degree of public interest
involved, may be a plausible one but it is hardly supported
by the evidence of some of the more important statutes.
"ISee, Agriculture Act, 1 947, sec. 68 and Ninth Schedule, para. 5.
2Cf. Forestry Act 1945, sec.l.(l) by which the chairman and
commissioners are each appointed "by Her Majesty by warrant
under the sign manual" and "shall hold and vacate office in_
accordance with the terms under which he is appointed. This
provision would presumably prevent the operation of the normal
""at pleasure" rule.
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Broadly, the provisions governing tenure, laid down
in the enabling statutes, range from those which make the
office of the hoard member dependent solely on the pleasure
■\
of the Grown to those conferring a fixed term of years
2
statutorily guaranteed. Between these extremes lie
various types of statutory provision: providing for tenure
in accordance with the instrument of appointment, with a
power reserved to the Minister to dismiss "if he is satis-
3
fied" that certain circumstances exist ; giving the Minister
power to appoint but silent as to tenure^"; providing that ten¬
ure is to be governed by the instrument of appointment alone^;
in which it is laid down that the tenure shall be governed by
Ministerial regulations, subject to their being laid before
6
Parliament and, possibly, annulled; giving a fixed term of
''Cf. Television Act 1954» sec.1 (4); a copy of the notice of
dismissal is to be laid before Parliament.
^Gf. Bank of England Act 1946, Second Schedule.
3cf. Air Corporations Act 1949» sec.2. and First Schedule, para.
5; New Towns Act 1946, sec. 2(1) and Second Schedule, para. 5-
4cf. Agriculture Act 1947» sec.73 and Ninth Schedule, para.15.
This could, but does not necessarily, imply a power to dismiss
at pleasure, see, Smyth v. Latham (l833) 9 Bing.692.
^Cf. Agriculture Act 1947» sec. 68. and Ninth Schedule, para.5j
Atomic Energy Authority Act 1934» sec. 1 (2)(4).
6cf. Electricity Act, 1957» ss.2, 3» Electricity Act 1947,
sec. 3(7); Gas Act 1948 sec. 5(8); sec.73«
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years with a reservation to a Minister to dismiss in certain
«1
specified circumstances.
To find any rationale, at any rate, "based on public
interest, appears to "be impossible. Members of the Race¬
course Betting Control Board are liable to dismissal at
pleasure^ while the members of the Atomic Energy Authority
with functions of outstanding national importance have the
full benefit of their contracts as laid down in the terms
of their appointment. ^ The chairman and members of the
Independent Television Authority can be dismissed at any
time by the Postmaster-General, but their counterparts in
the Gas and Electricity Councils have the protection of
regulations which may be examined in Parliament.
Furthermore, the history of the Electricity Acts
suggests that wide powers of dismissal are no more necessary
in the case of members of the boards of public corporations
than in the case of other governmental employees. In 1 919
Electricity Commissioners were appointed by the Board of
Trade, two "on such terms as the Board of Trade might fix,"
other three "during His Majesty's pleasure."^" Seven years
1Cf. Agriculture Act 19U7, sec. 73, and Ninth Schedule, para. 11;.
2Racecourse Betting Act 1928, sec. 2(5).
^Atomic Energy Authority Act 1951+» sec.1(1;): "every member of
the Authority shall hold and vacate his office in accordance
with the terms of his appointment." They are also eligible
for re-appointment and may resign at any time on giving notice
to the Lord President of the Council.
Electricity (Supply) Act 1919» sec. 1(2).
-ido¬
later a Central Electricity Board was established, the
chairman and members of which were to hold office for a
fixed term of between five and ten years "as the Minister
may determine before appointment."
In 191+7 the Electricity Commission was dissolved, the
&
Central Electricity Board abolished and^new Central Elec-
2
tricity Authority was established, together with Area Boards.
Express provision was made for compensation to be paid to
members of the now defunct authorities - including those who
held office at pleasure.The same Act provided that
members of the new Authority and Area Boards would be
appointed by the Minister who would make regulations
governing inter alia appointment, tenure and vacation of
office.^" These provisions are maintained in the latest
statute creating a Central Electricity Generating Board,
appointing an Electricity Council and abolishing the Central
Electricity Authority.^
The history of this legislation seems to indicate
fairly clearly that the attitude towards tenure of office
in the public service has changed. The arbitrary powers
of dismissal contained in the earlier statute has given way
^Electricity (Supply) Act 1926, sec. 1(8).





to more acceptable form of Ministerial control - yet the
public purposes and interest involved are much the same as
they were.
Indeed, examination of the appointment, tenure and dis¬
missal of members of the boards of public corporations
strongly suggests nothing more than a combination of historical
accident and fortuitous circumstance in the drafting of the
relevant statutory provisions. Nor is this difficult to
understand.
The law surrounding the relationship of members of
public corporations to the Crown, to the appropriate Minister
or to the corporation itself is but little developed. That
they possess fiduciary duties, for example, is not difficult
to accept, but they are not analogous to the directors of
ordinary public companies. ^ It is possibly this lack of
relevant rules of common law or equity that has made it
necessary to make express provision for tenure of office
which is almost invariably included in statutes setting up
2
public corporations. The circumstances in which these
provisions are variously applied, however, cannot sustain
"^Members of the board of a public corporation, in a sense,
constitute the corporation; it is the shareholders and not
the directors who constitute an ordinary company. Gf. W.
Friedmann: Law and Social Change in Contemporary Britain,
Stevens (-1 951 ), pp. 203-4«
P
See, Twenty-first Report of the Joint Committee on Public
Accounts (Australian Aluminium Production Commission), Part
I, Government Printer, Canberra (i955) pp.86-7.
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an argument that wide powers of dismissal may he required
on grounds of public interest.
*
Although the right of the civil servant to his salary
is not yet completely beyond doubt, there have been recent
judicial pronouncements which suggest that a legal claim
to salary would no longer be denied by the courts.^ In
local government and in the case of employees of the public
corporations the matter is doubtless governed by the
p
ordinary la?/ of master and servant. But the civil servant's
salary is still subject to some legal disability. By
statute, he is forbidden to assign it-^j nor could it, until
recently, be attached.^"
"^See, supra, p.rv 2-
21he possibility of denial of a right to salary could,
presumably, exist in the case of the servants of those
statutory corporations which are servants or agents of
the Crown.
3crown Proceedings Act 19k7 sec. 27 (l)(a).
J+A recent statute, conferring additional powers on English
courts to enforce maintenance and other orders relating to
women and children, specifically applies the provisions
relating to the attachment of earnings to earnings paid by
the Crown. See, Maintenance Orders Act 1958 sec.
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This peculiarity of civil service salaries has "been
"based on considerations of public interest, "but as has
"been well demonstrated "by Dr. Logan, the circumstances
which gave rise to the limitations on assignment and
attachment have long since disappeared and can no longer
he adequately supported on grounds of public interest.''
It is certainly arguable that circumstances may arise in
which it might be desirable to prevent assignment of salary
in the interests of an employee's family, but whatever the
merits of this argument, there appears to be no good
reason why it should be applied to the civil servant as
such and not to other employees.
*
The governmental employee for long had a great
advantage over his counterpart in private enterprise in
that this employment invariably carries with it a beneficial
superannuation scheme of some kind. And if it is true
that in the last decade or so private enterprise has closed
this gap considerably, nevertheless governmental schemes
"'Logan, loc. cit. p. 258.
-Un¬
usually provide "better "benefits (at least at the lower
levels) and are "backed by government guarantee.
In the Civil Service, superannuation is governed by
the Superannuation Acts 183U-1950; in local government by
the Local Government (Superannuation) Acts of 1937 and 1939;
and in the public corporations and other quasi-governmental
bodies by the various statutes applicable to them.'' The
legal basis of these pensions, therefore, is a statutory one.
But the civil servant's superannuation scheme differs from
the others in one legally important respect - under the
Superannuation Acts 183U - 1950 the civil servant has no
legally enforceable right to his pension which is payable
2
entirely at the discretion of the Treasury.
This contrasts strongly with the superannuation
provisions for local government servants whose claims are
readily enforceable-^ and with the provisions applicable to
''see, for example, Fire Service Act 19U7 ss. 26-28;
Police Pensions Acts of 1921 and 191+8; Electricity
Act 191+7 sec. 5U; Probation Officers (Superannuation)
Act 191+7-
p
See supra p. 1+, n.5-
^Contrast s. 30 of the Superannuation Act 1831+ with s.8
of the Local Government (Superannuation) Act of 1937;
also s. 10 of the latter Act with s.8 of the Super¬
annuation Act 191+9 as to return of contributions.
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employees of other public services and clearly some
justification must "be found for this distinction.
On the 'basis of the "dismissal" cases, it is tempting
to suggest that the basis of the distinction is public
interest. That is, the degree of public interest which
has operated to deny rights of tenure to the civil servant
is equally great with regard to his superannuation
provisions; in the case of the local government employee,
on the other hand, the influence of the public interest is
p
much weaker and, therefore, legal rights have been given.
But this argument cannot be sustained and indeed can
be quickly refuted; the public interest in theemployee of
the Atomic Energy Authority is certainly no less than in
the case of the clerk in the Estate -Duty Office. Never¬
theless, the former has an enforceable legal claim to his
pension denied to the latter.
Nor does it by any means follow that the lack of legal
rights in the civil servant's pension scheme is a necessary
^See: Electricity (Pension Scheme) Regulations 1948 s.i. 1948
No.226; S.1. 1948 No.2172 and Firemen's Pension Scheme Order
1948, S.1. 1948 No.604 as amended by S.1. 1948 No.1094; Air¬
ways Corporations (General Staff Pensions) Regulations 1948,
S.1.. 1948 No. 2361 as amended by S.1. 1950 No. 2056, 3.1. 1951
No.527.
^Cf. Mitchell, op.cit♦, pp.67^68. It need hardly be mentioned
that Professor Mitchell was not, of course, approving of this
peculiar application of the idea of public interest.
^See: Atomic Energy Authority Act, 1954, First Schedule, para.
7(3).
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concomitant of its non-contributory nature, in which it
differs from other governmental superannuation schemes.
It is at least arguable that a legal right to pension should
"be given to the civil servant on the ground that the pension
is in fact deferred pay earned "by the civil servant during
his service and therefore as much a "contributory" pension
as any other.
This argument was raised by cousel for the respondent
in Considine v. iviclnerney^ but was rejected by the House of
2
Lords. It is true that in this case the attitude of the
Treasury was never brought but nor was the case for "deferred
pay" properly argued; to this extent, therefore, the case
is by no means conclusive. It appears unlikely, however,
that any evidence which could have been advanced in support
of the deferred pay argument would have found much favour
with their Lordships. Indeed, having regard to the terms
of the Superannuation Acts themselves one could not justify
on legal grounds any legally enforceable right to super-
^[l9l6] 2 A.C. 162. In this case the question was whether
or not a pension payed under the Superannuation Acts 1 83k-
1909 should be taken into account in assessing the amount
of weekly benefit payed under the Workmen's Compensation
Act 1906. If the superannuation allowance had been a pay¬
ment earned by the workment in respect of past services
(i.e. deferred pay) it would have been disregarded for the
purposes of Workmen's Compensation Act benefits; this was
the view taken by the Court of Appeal in Ireland ([l9l6]
2 I.E. 193) but rejected by the House of Lords.
2See especially at 1 71 , 172, 1 73 and 1 81.
- 1+7 -
A
annuation on the "basis of deferred pay.
It is difficult, therefore, to see how the civil
servant's superannuation allowance could, in any legal
sense, "be regarded as deferred pay. And, even in the
economic and practical sense, this argument has not found
unqualified support. The deferred pay argument was
debated "before the Priestley Commission and most strongly
urged "by the Union of Post Office Workers whose represen¬
tatives asserted that it should "be paid in the event of
retirement, at any time, from the servicer
The Treasury, on the other hand, maintained that a
civil servant agreed to serve subject to certain conditions,
one of which was that he would not leave the service before
the minimum retiring age. Fulfilment of these conditions
3
was a sine qua non of the grant of superannuation.
Moreover, the method of assessing the amount of the pension
payable at the end of the civil servant's service makes
almost impossible any strict calculation on the basis of
deferred pay. See Superannuation Act -1859, s. 2.
2Royal Commission on the Civil Service *1953-55, Minutes of
Evidence, 11th day, p.[+69, paras. 138-11+6.
■^ibid. Minutes of Evidence, 17th day, pp. 811-81I+. For an
interesting analogy in contract cf. Lord DENNING- in Kelly v.
Lombard Banking Ltd. [ 1958] 3 All E.R. 713 and 715: "It is
true that [the option to purchase] is subject to conditions...
Nevertheless [it] is an existing right as from the moment of
signing the contract and the payment of the money. So he
has got what he paid for. He has to fulfil the conditions
in order to exercise the option, but he has paid for an
oiotion which he has got."
- 1+8 -
The majority of the Commissioners considered that the
Treasury view was the correct one; the minority had "some
sympathy with the moral claim to some form of "benefit."
The matter is certainly not free from doubt.^ In any case,
however, the absence of a legal right to a civil service
pension does not depend upon its non-contributory nature.
Underlying the legal anomaly in the civil servant's
pension scheme is the desire to maintain as high a degree
of stability as possible in civil service employment. The
whole tenor of the service is that it is a life-time career
and resignations before retiral age should be exceptional
2
and not frequent.
From the inception of comprehensive pension schemes
within the civil service one of the main principles has been
to allow as great a discretion as possible to the Treasury
in the interests of complete and effective control over
employees.^ And this principle is still emphasised in the
"'See, for example,: Royal Commission on Superanaaation Acts
1 857» Parliamentary Papers 1857 (session 2) XXIV at p.225;
Richardson, loc.cit. p. 1+56 n.118; 15 Public Administration
Review (1955) p.11+9; Superannuation in the Civil Service,
International Institute of Administrative Science", (i955} p.9.
2Cf. Priestley Commission, Cmd, 9613> para. 98.
3see e.g. the debates on the Committee stages of the Super¬
annuation Acts of i 83I4- and 1$59 respectively: Hansard Debates,
3rd series Vol.23 (1831+) Cols.871+-5; Vol. 153 (l859) Cols.
355-6; 376. Cf. E. Cohen: The Growth of the British Civil
Service, Allen & Unwin (191+1) p.63.
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service today.
Under Section i+ of the Superannuation Act of "iSlkt For
example, in cases where a transfer to other public employ¬
ment is approved by the Treasury as being "in the widest
sense in the public interest"^ a contingent right to a Civil
Service pension (based on length of service at the date of
transfer) is granted to the transferred civil servant. If,
however, a civil servant proposes to transfer to private or
commercial employment, the "discretionary" nature of the
pension scheme becomes an important weapon in the hands of
the Crown.
"... a great many civil servants do acquire
various skills of various kinds at the
expense of their employer. Some of those
skills are not particularly valuable except
in the service of the State, but others are.
It does not seem to us to be wrong that the
Superannuation Scheme should be so designed
that the possessors of those skills, when
they have acquired them, cannot withdraw
^In the local government service, on the other hand, a com¬
prehensive superannuation scheme was achieved only after a
long struggle between the National Association of Local
Government Officers and the local authorities. Local
government employment was not then a "service" in the way
that it is today and therefore as a protection against the
vagaries of the various employing councils, the local
government superannuation scheme was of necessity a
legally enforceable one. See: Warren op. cit. , pp. 624.-65.
p
Royal Commission on Civil Service, 1953-55» Minutes of
Evidence, 17th day, p.79k) para.8. The wide range of
employment which has been approved includes: Universities
in the United Kingdom and the Commonwealth; N.A.T.O.;
U.N.Agencies; Singapore City Council; Royal Canadian
Navy.
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them except at a loss to themselves; and
if ... pension rights were to "be regarded
as ... something to which they had a right
in all circumstances - that would not in
fact he the position.
It seems, therefore, that it has "been the desire to
maintain the civil service as a career service in the
public interest, that has been largely responsible for
the denial of a statutory right to pension. Acceptance
of this, it is submitted, clearly demonstrates that the
case for thus singling out the Crown servant is not a
strong one - it is certainly not demanded by the nature
of the employer, nor, it might be added, by the nature of
the employment. Control and stability could still be
safeguarded by making superannuation a legal right from
2
retiring age or somewhat earlier. That it is regarded
^ibid, p. 811, Q.2574» Superannuation Act i83k> sec.20.
See also: "C'est qu'en effet, il n'appartient pas &
1'organisation d'un syst&me Equitable de retraite de
stimuler le recrutement des fonctionnaires. Son role,
tr£s different, n'en est pas moins indispensable & une
saine organisation administrative: il doit etre la
garantie la plus valable de la stability des personnels."
Guide pour 1' fe.tablissement d'un statut du personnel des
administrations civiles de l'Etat. (1951); compiled
under the direction of M. Roger Gregoire for the Inter¬
national Institute of Administrative Sciences.
2Cf., Superannuation Act, ^9k9 s. 3k which provides that
a civil servant between the age of fifty years and retiring
age (sixty years normally) whose employment is terminated
in the interests of efficiency or at his own request may be
granted the same retiring allowances as if he had retired
on medical grounds.
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as a right is obviously the view of the Treasury.-^
Public interest in governmental service today
demands security for the employee and continuity of
employment. This is now recognised as being as important
in local government and in the statutory corporations as
it is in the civil service. They are all service for
the public benefit: they are all "career services."^
There seems no sound r eason to give a legally enforceable
right in one branch of the public service and deny it in
another.
*
Thus, the concept of tenure "at pleasure," the
remaining legal disabilities associated with civil
service salaries and the denial to the civil servant of
^See Mitchell op. cit. p. 52, n.i. It is significant that
in the debates on the 1 83<U and 1859 Superannuation Acts
even where many of the arguments against the scheme could
have been countered by a reference to the fact that no
legal right to pension existed, this point was never
mentioned. See e.g. Hansard Debs. 3rd Ser. Vol. 153» Cols.
365; 380-1. This lends much weight to the view that s.30
of the 1834 Act was not thought of as a denial of right to
the civil servant but as a means of ensuring that ultimate
control would be with the Treasury.
^Indeed to say that they are all the one 'career service' is
nowadays much more accurate. See infra Chap.V
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a legally enforceable right to his pension are difficult
to justify on grounds of public interest. Furthermore,
they are scarcely in keeping with present day ideas of
"good employer" policies in which the government ought to
give a lead. Retention of such peculiarities serves only
to suggest some basic distinction between civil service
employment and other employment, both public and -private.
A distinction which it is hoped this survey will demon¬
strate to be untenable.
It is now proposed to examine some other conditions
of service which raise important and controversial questions
of no little difficulty to which attention must be drawn in
a legal study of this kind.
CHAPTER III - Civil liberties
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Public interest as determined "by the "duties" test
does not demand that the governmental employee should "be
treated differently from his counterpart in private enter¬
prise in respect of the conditions of service discussed in
the last chapter. The questions now to "be examined are
not so straightforward; they concern, not the usual
elements in the contract of employment, "but a wide range
of conduct, some of which, normally, would not "be within
the ordinary employer-employee relationship.
Should governmental employees have the freedom to
form employee associations and organisations? Ought the
governmental employee to "be forbidden to strike against
his employing authority?' Should restrictions "be imposed
upon the political liberties of the government servant to
^M. Ren& Manckiewicz suggests that the right to strike is
inseparable from the right to associate: "The Right to
Strike of French Civil Servants," A. J. I.L. , "Vol.i|, No.1,
Winter 1955, p.91. This is questionable; the formation
of associations gives coherence and expression to the
demands of different groups of employees thus making
negotiations between employer and employee easier and
more effective. The strike is but one aspect of employ¬
ment relations - and in governmental employment usually
the least important. This is borne out by the history of
civil service and local government unionism. Cf. M.
Waline: Traits El&m6ntaire de Droit Adrninistratif, 6th
ed. Sirey (1953) at p.370"i "[le] droit syndical ... est
essentiellement distinct du droit de gr6ve et peut se
concevoir sans lui."
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prevent his playing an active part in the affairs of a
political party? To what extent should governmental
employment c arry with it a prohibition on the holding of
political views considered to he contrary to those of the
system of government under which the rnployee lives?
These questions obviously raise problems entirely
different from those concerning tenure of office, salary
and superannuation. They raise important and often funda¬
mental political controversies. The protection of the
public interest becomes for that reason more vital; but
for the same reason the test of public interest encounters
more complex difficulties in its application.
One fact should be emphasised at once. These
questions of association, strike and political conduct
raise important political controversies not because they
concern governmental employment but because the questions
themselves are fraught with political implications. This
would be so even in respect of their application to private
employment.^ It is misleading to approach such questions
as though they could always be answered in fundamentally
different ways according to whether the employment relation¬
ship in question was a governmental or a private enterprise
^As, of course, was so in the nineteenth century with regard
to the right of workers to form organisations. See: e.g.
Webbs: Industrial Democracy, Vol. II (1897) passim.
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one. This important point will "be resumed later in this
chapter.
In the United Kingdom, civil service trade unionism
and collective "bargaining developed rapidly in the nine¬
teenth century. YYhile much of this development was the
concern of the government, the latter was reluctant to
regard its relationship to its employees as in any way
similar to that existing "between private employers and
employees. Conditions of service were regarded as
administrative matters to "be regulated solely at the dis¬
cretion of the government. Employees were discouraged from
association and any form of agitation"1 ; and to take part in
trade union activity, if not illegal, was punishable by
dismissal.
During the third quarter of the nineteenth and the
early years of the twentieth century, however, changes
took place which paved the way for rapid developments, and
^Although they were permitted to address "memorials" to
ministers, through departmental channels. See, Flanders
and CI egg op. cit. pp.235-6; Cohen op. cit. p. 11pO ff.
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"by the end of the First World War the service was provided
with a complete system of collective "bargaining similar in
i
many respects to that prevailing in private industry. How
the civil servant has the right to organise and indeed is
actively encouraged to join his particular staff association.
In the sphere of local government, too, ideas of
association and collective "bargaining were repugnant to
nineteenth century thought. Local authorities were left
to manage their staff relations in their own way and, as in
the civil service, employment conditions were thought of as
"best settled "by unilateral administrative action.^ It was
not until the twentieth century and particularly after 1918
that local government staff associations (especially NALGC)
"began to play an important role in negotiating adequate
conditions of service.^
^On the Whitley system see: L.D. White: Whitley Councils in
the British Civil Service (1932); E.N. Gladden: Civil
Service Staff Relationships (19U3); H.M. Treasury: Staff
.Relations in the Civil Service (1 955)•
2see the Fahian tract "by Professor W.A. Rohson: From
Patronage to Proficiency in the Public Service (1922).
3warren, op.cit. pp.68-69. The value of this local government
trade unionism was underlined in the Report of the Royal
Commission on Local Government, 1923-1929 Cmd 32.13 and in
the report of the Hadow Departmental Committee, Crnd
The task of local government trade unionism was of course
rendered much more difficult than in the case of the civil
service by the number and heterogeneity of the employing
councils with which associations had to negotiate.
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For many of the public corporations the problem of
whether or not to permit their employees to associate did
not arise; these corporations merely succeeded to the
system of trade unions and collective bargaining which had
existed in the private firms that the corporations super-
1
seded. The new public corporations established since
1945 are, by statute, obliged to enter into consultation
with the appropriate unions and establish collective
2
bargaining machinery.
The right of the governmental employee in the United
Kingdom to associate in a trade union or professional
organisation is thus well established. Moreover, this is
so even in the case of the Police and Fire Services which
are subject, in so many respects, to a semi-military type
3
of discipline.
^As, for example, in the case of the London Passenger
Transport Board. See London Passenger Transport Act 1933
s.67. The undertakings of the L.P.T.B. were transferred
to the London Transport Executive in 1947 by the Transport
Act 1947 s. 12 (1).
2Infra p. lo^
^See: Police Act 1919, s.1. and the First Schedule which
together provide for the establishing of a Police Federation,
"for the purpose of enabling the members of the police
forces ... to consider and bring to the notice of the police
authorities and the Secretary of State all the matters
affecting their welfare and efficiency Fire Services
Act, 1947, ss.l7(l)(2), 18(2) and Fire Services (Conditions
of Service) Regulations 1954? S.I. 1954S No.1158.
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The freedom to take strike action is, however, in a
different category. In this respect the governmental
employee is sometimes restricted in a way unknown in
private enterprise."^ In the civil service the convention
2
with regard to strike action has already been mentioned ;
in local government the attitude is the same - any attempts
by the staffs to coerce their employing councils are viewed
with disfavour and the penalty of dismissal is always
3
available.
This attitude to the strike is common in governmental
employment and countries as diverse in their political
1cf. "The right of workmen to strike is an essential
element in the principle of collective "bargaining" per
Lord WRIGHT in Crofter Harris Tweed Co. v. Veitch [ 19^-2]
A.G. U35 at 1+63. And see Conspiracy and Protection of
Property Act 1875 s. 17 which repealed older statues
restricting the freedom to strike.
2Supra p.7•
^See: Gibbon and Bell: History of the London County
Council 1889-1959. Ivlacmillan (l939l pp. 2197220.
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background as France, the United States , Canada-' and
Australia^- insist upon the right of governments to forbid
strike action to their employees.
Three reasons are usually advanced for this restriction
on governmental employees: that a strike of such employees
represents an infringement of the sovereign power of the
5
state and an attack on its authority ; that it may inter-
6
rupt essential public utility services; and - in the case,
for example, of police and fire services - such strikes
"^Cf. A. de Laubadire: Traits £l£mentaire de droit adminis-
tratif, Paris (1953) p. 655 et.seq.; J. Rivero: "Les
Graves d'aout 1953>" Droit Social 1953> p. 517.
p
See, for example, Taft-Harley Act 1947; Carlin-Wadlin Act
1947« The latter, New York, Act on which the Federal legis¬
lation was modelled is particularly severe in its penalties.
-^Cf. R. Mankiewicz: "Les Services Publics au Canada et le
Droit de Gr&ve," La Revue du Barreau de Quebec, Vo.17>
No.4 (i957) p. 186.
^■Gf. Commonwealth Public Service Act 1922-57S sec.66.
^See, for example, Parliamentary Debates, Vo.207 (1927) Cols
7lff. for opinions expressed by Members of Parliament on the
sympathies shewn by certain Civil Service Staff Associations
during the General Strike of 1926. The result of these
debates was the provisions in the Trade Disputes and Trade
Union Act 1927 barring civil servants from affiliation with
any organisation not exclusively composed of servants of the
Crown. These provisions were repealed by the Trade Disputes
and Trade Union Act of 1946.
^See: C.E., 20 October 1937» Dalloz 1938. III. 49; G'E. 18
April 19U7, Sirey 1948. III. 33; Cf. Sperb, op.cit. Ch.2;
Warren, ojc. cit. p. 133*
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might endanger public safety.
The argument that a strike of civil servants comes
nearer insurrection than a strike of, say, shop assistants,
is, on the face of it, an attractive one. The former as
employees of the state appear to he rebelling against
proper governmental authority; the latter are merely
bargaining with a private individual or organisation and
in no way upsetting the legal order.
But this confuses the governmental servant's obligations
to the state as a citizen, with those which he has as an
employee vis-d-vis his employer. The government - be it a
central authority vaguely designated the Grown, a local
authority or a public corporation - can insist on fulfilment
of obligations of the governmental employee as a subject in
the same way as it can demand such conduct of any citizen.
As an employer, however, the government cannot invoke -
without further grounds such as the interruption of essential
services or the jeopardising of public life and property -
''This is the reasoning behind such provisions as: Metro¬
politan Police Act, 1339 ss. 11+, 15; City of London
Police Act, 1839 ss. 15» 17; Town Police Clauses Act,
181+7 ss. 10, 16, which r elate to the neglect of and with¬
drawal from performance of duty by policement. Also Fire
Services (Discipline) Regulations 191+3 3.1. 191+8 No. 51+5
and Schedule. See: W.S.Carpenter, The Unfinished Busi-
ness of Civil Service Reform, Princeton University Press
(1952) ij.68.
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the concept of sovereignty in its employment relations.
In any case, the concept of sovereignty is, in this
connection, an unacceptable one. No single theory of
sovereignty is likely to meet general acceptance nor is it
possible to say with any degree of accuracy where sovereignty
2
lies in the modern democratic state. Moreover, even if
"sovereignty" in this context be considered no more than
"lawful authority," it is still a misconception to regard
a strike by the governmental employee as a violation of that
authority. The public employee who strikes is, as would be
any private employee, engaged in a conflict with his
employers. The conflict is evidence of a breakdown in
employment relations - it is, in no real sense, a refusal
to obey lawful authority; nor is it analogous, in any way,
to a breakdown of the authority of the state over its
^This distinction between a governmental body acting on the
one hand as an employer, and, on the other, as an instrument
of government, is illustrated by Mjfchell op. cit. p. 17:
"Thus, for example, in England the relationship of an Area
Gas Board to its employees should be regulated by the
ordinary principles of master and servant, whereas, in
fixing charges ... it is possible that the board should be
regarded as exercising a governmental function with the
freedom that that necessarily entails."
2For a discussion of the possible application of theories of
sovereignty to government contracts, see J.D.B. Mitchell:
"A general theory of public contracts," 63 Juridical ."Review
(-1951 ) p.60. And see infra Chap. IX pp.
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subjects.1
Furthermore, the rapid expansion of state activity
in the twentieth century makes the sovereignty argument an
impossible one to maintain. As has "been already said,
the limits of governmental employment are "becoming more
difficult to define and, in these circumstances, it is
impracticable to extend the notion of the state as a
p
"sovereign employer" any further.
A parallel is the position with regard to execution against
the state. The argument that to permit such execution
would be inconsistent with sovereignty is hardly a convincing
one. Even the more substantial objection that interference
with government property could hamper the performance of
public duties is subject to qualification, in that it should
not be impossible to allow execution against specified
property of an unimportant nature - a practice for which
there would be ample French precedents. Cf. H. Street:
Governmental Liability, G.U.P. (1953) pp.1 82/183»
^Indeed this is recognised in the autonomy in industrial
relations given to the public corporations. No attempt
has there been made to invoke the doctrine of sovereignty
as is apparent from the statement by the then Minister
of Labour during the rail strike of 1955: "All that I
have been saying about the role of Government in these
questions of industrial relations really applies as much
to nationalised industries as to private industries ...
I believe it would be dangerous to remove these questions
of industrial relations from settlement within the
nationalised industries. I am afraid that they might
then become only the subject of Government direction and
might well become party political issues, and that I
should deplore." Parliamentary Debates (1955) Vol.5^2
Cols 1519-1520.
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It is suggested, therefore, that no arguments for
forbidding governmental employees to strike can he
justified simply on the ground that the state is an
employer whose relationship with its servants is governed
by legal rules fundamentally different from those of the
ordinary law of master and servant. (,
Modern industrial communities are complex, highly
organised structures made up of social groups each of
which is dependent upon and may be importantly affected by
the actions of other groups. In such a society many
services are such that their interruption or breakdown can
cause inconvenience, distress and, in some cases, danger to
the general public. The maintenance of these essential
services is generally considered to be the responsibility
of the government and those involved in the provision of
such services may expect to be restricted or limited in
their employment relations, particularly with regard to the
right to strike.
Many of these vital services are run by governmental
instrumentalities: public utilities like electricity,
gas, water and transport; health and welfare services;
and the provision of pensions and allowances of various
kinds. In these cases there may be a case for imposing
a ban on any kind of action which would interfere with the
running of such services. There are, however, many other
- 6k -
services in the community, not performed "by governmental
employees, which are as essential and as vital as those
just mentioned, in which even a short interruption would
"be inimical to the public interest. A strike of milkmen,
doctors or refuse collectors, for example, could cause as
grave inconvenience and danger to the community as a strike
of local government clerks or executive officers in the
civil service.
The justification, therefore, for any prohibition,
legal or conventional, on strike action should be tested
not by reference to whether the employment concerned is
governmental but to whether the duties performed are vital
to the public interest. This is recognised by such
statutes as the Conspiracy and Protection of Property Act
of 1 875^ and the Electricity (Supply) Act of i9192 where
the motive for the application of criminal sanctions to
those responsible for interrupting public utilities is the
protection of vital public interests."^ The history of
labour relations in all modern countries provides abundant
evidence of governmental intervention in employment disputes
where the effect on the public welfare is likely to be
"^See: ss.4 and 5. These provisions were invoked against strike
leaders in the nationalised gas industry in 1950.
2Cf. sec. 31•
^Flanders, and Clegg, op. cit. pp.46-14.7.
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substantial and this is so whether or not the employees
1
concerned are governmental.
The fallacy of distinguishing in this respect the
governmental from the private employee is well illustrated
"by the cases where certain services are supplied "by "both
2
public and private enterprise. Would a strike in the
private enterprise section of the industry be any less
detrimental to the public interest than a strike of the
governmental employees-'? This is, of course, an important
reason why in the United Kingdom the employees of public
corporations must be free of statutory prohibitions on
strikes; the restrictions of normal civil service depart¬
ments could destroy the freedom in staff relations which
^Cf. Emergency Powers Act 1920 used during the coal strike of
1921 and the General Strike of 1926; C.E., 28 October 19U9,
Sirey 1950. III. 50, by means of which the French government
was able to prevent a strike of bakers; see also Wilson v.
Mew (1917) 2i+3 U.S. 332.
^As, for example, in the electricity industry before nation¬
alisation when the generating system or grid was operated by
the Central Electricity Board (a public corporation), the
distributing stations being owned, partly by local authorities
and partly by private companies. In South Australia at
present the electricity industry is run by a public
corporation while the gas industry is in the hands of a
private company.
^See Spero, op♦cit. p.6. for an amusing extract taken from the
1928 Presidential election campaign. Herbert Hoover was
opposing government liquor stores favoured by his opponent
Governor Alfred Smith and alleged that to make members of the
liquor trade into governmental employees "must limit them in
the liberty to bargain for their own wages, for no govern¬
mental employee can strike against his government and thus
against the whole people."
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is alleged to "be one of the administrative advantages of
the public corporation'1 - and would he impossible to justify
p
on the ground of public interest*
It is tempting to suggest that a solution to this
problem could be found by drawing a distinction between
directing and executive staffs and others-^; a right to
strike could be allowed to the latter but denied to the
former. But the grade or authority of the servant is not
necessarily a criterion of the effect on the public interest
of the withdrawal of his services. The only test which can
fairly be applied is the nature of the service provided and
this will often bear no relation to the rank or status of
the employee concerned. It may well be infinitely more
inconvenient to the public should the orderlies in a muni¬
cipal hospital come out on strike than if the entire admini¬
strative staff did so. The distinction, if one need be
drawn, is not between senior staff and others but between
"ISee: W.Friedmann (Ed.) The Public Corporation, Garswell
(195U) P* 1 2.
^This transfer of employees from private to public enterprise
raises particularly difficult problems in France. See: "Le
statut du personnel des entreprises nationalis£es compar6 au
statut des agents de la fonction publique," Revue de Droit
Public. Vol. LXXII, No.3» P.501.
^This is, of course, the solution used with regard to political
activities and "security"cases, see infra p. bq And cf.Mitchell
op. cit. pp.68 and 21+1 where he suggests a distinction between
directing staffs of public corporations and others. See also
Revue Adminstrative, (1950) p.371 et.seq.
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those who are performing immediately essential services and
those who are not.
Finally, can it "be argued that a prohibition on strike
action should he imposed on employees of organisations like
the police and fire services since interruption of these
services could well lead to danger for persons and property?
The case here is a much stronger one. The maintenance of
internal order and protection of property are traditional
governmental functions^ and the employees engaged in these
tasks must he subject to more stringent regulations to ensure
continuous performance of their duties.^ This is the reason
behind the even greater restrictions imposed on the members
of the armed forces. The duties performed by these govern¬
mental servants are important governmental functions, but
it is again emphasised that it is the nature of these duties
that is the paramount consideration and not the fact that
they are governmental.
A wholesale ban, legal or conventional, on strikes in
the government service is, in principle, unsound. It is
^See, for example: Great Western Railway Go. v. Bater [1922]
2 A.G. 1 at 3k'
^Though, of course, the fire-righting services were, in the
nineteenth century run by assurance companies as a private
protective measure.
3lt is possibly arguable that a strike of policemen^ or firemen
need not occasion any greater danger to public safety than a
strike of electricity workers on whom large hospitals may rely
for their supplies of power. On balance, however, the immediate
effect of the former would be much less desirable.
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"based on untenable reasoning and is unfair in that it implies
a distinction not only "between manual workers and directing,
executive and clerical staffs, "but "between "white-collar"
staffs in different arms of the government service. This
distinction is in neither case cased on a valid consideration
of public interest "but upon a mixture of historical accident
and anachronistic political thinking.
It must "be observed at once that the practical effect
of the "ban on strikes in the public service, presents no
real problem in the United Kingdom. With minor exceptions,
the strike threat has never assumed dangerous or even incon¬
venient proportions in the ranks of non-manual staffs.
Discussion of the topic has not, however, been superfluous.
Enough has been said to shew that the public attitude,
towards even the possibility of strikes in governmental employ¬
ment, has been one of intolerance. Closer examination of
the nature of the problem suggests that this attitude has been
coloured by much unreasonable thinking.
Because of the existence of well-organised systems of
rules and regulations, promulgated after proper consultation
and negotiation (of which systems, more shortly) strikes in
the public service have been virtually unknown. Such
strikes, no less than those in private employment, are to be
discouraged. They are a symptom of a breakdown in employer-
employee relations. If strikes in government employment
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ever became a possibility in any real sense, the solution
would lie not in an unjustifiable ban on striking but in
continuous vigilance to ensure that staff-official relations
were properly organised and managed.
The civil servant suffers certain disabilites with
regard to his political conduct. In the words of the
Masterman Report:
"The political neutrality of the Civil
Service is a fundamental feature of British
democratic government and is essential for
its efficient operation. It must be main¬
tained even at the cost of some loss of
political liberty by certain of those who
elect to enter the Service.
Thus, no civil servant (unless belonging to an
excepted group) may issue an address to electors or in
any other manner publicly announce himself as a candidate
or prospective candidate for election to Parliament unless
2
he has retired or resigned from the service. As has been
^Report of the Committee on the Political Activities of Civil
Servants, CmcC 7718 (1949) p. 30 para 1.
^Servants of the Crown (Parliamentary Candidature) Order, 1950,
Art.2. The excepted classes are industrial employees and
certain minor and manipulative grades. See Art.1 (2)(b)(c).
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1
already mentioned, apart from prohibiting adoption as a
Parliamentary candidate, such restrictions on conduct cover
a wide variety of political activity.
There are no legal prohibitions (but obvious practical
difficulties would arise) on employees of a local authority
being, at the same time, Members of Parliament, with the
anachronistic and anomalous exception relating to employees
2
of County Councils. As to participation in party politics,
while nothing has been laid down in legislation or in cases,
"the prevailing sentiment and practice" seems to be that
councils expect their salaried staffs - particularly senior
officials - to refrain from open participation in matters of
3
political controversy.
Nor in the public corporations are there statutory
restrictions on political activities, although possibly the
employees of those corporations that are servants of the
Crown would come within the prohibition imposed by the
Servants of the Crown (Parliamentary Candidature) Order.
^ Supra p.?,1
^Local Government Act, 1888, s. 83 (13) which provides that
paid officials in the permanent full-time employment of a
County Council are not eligible to serve^in Parliament.
jpc#A'iA» A«<• , icUco f£ (1)
-%ee, Warren jop. cit. pp. 120-1.
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The duties of an employee of a public corporation will
obviously have a "bearing on whether or not some form of
political restriction will "be imposed.
The political conduct of the government servant comes
under even closer scrutiny in what have come to "be called
"loyalty-security" cases. In the present state of world
politics the freedom of the individual servant can clash
with the interests of national security and in resolving
such conflicts it may often "be impossible to adhere to long
2
established constitutional traditions.
In this sphere of the political activities of the
employee, governmental employment seems truly sui generis:
the government by its very nature is inextricably bound up
with the activities which it is sought to limit.
As in the case of the employee of the East Kilbride New Town
Corporationwho was dismissed because her political activities
would have been incompatible with her duties which involved
docm-Ato-door interviews for a social survey. See Parliamentary
Debate's ^(i 956) cirri Cols.^~ftn South Australia, employees of the
Municipal Tramways Trust (a State Corporation) are prohibited
from being candidates in local government elections because
of the close relationship between the Trust and local
authorities. A recent British example is that of a B.B.C.
talks' producer removed from his positionAintimating his
intention to be a candidate at a general election. See The
Times, 9 February, 1959.
^"The Conference recognise that some of the measures to which
the State is driven to take to protect its security are, in
some r espect alien to our traditional practices. Thus in
order not to imperil sources of information, decisions have
sometimes to be taken without revealing full details of the
supporting evidence. " Statement of the Conference of Privy
Councillors on Security, Cmd. 971 5 P-4* fitHu. ^
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Restrictions on political liberty are required "by the need
to maintain the confidence of the public and politicians
in the advice tendered by government servants or by the
even greater need to safeguard the security of the state
by protecting vital information. Here, above all, it seems
that it is to the nature of the employer, and not the duties
of the employee that one must look to find justification for
restrictions imposed. Duty and employer seem inseparable;
and in this field, particularly, one appears clearly to be a
function of the other.
A little reflection, nevertheless, shews that this is
at least open to question. Indeed, if it were true, no
distinction could be drawn between different duties and
different classes of employee where all come under the same
employer. An employer may have certain functions (and the
employees therefore have particular duties) which require an
unusual degree of regulation - statutory or otherv/ise; with
regard to other functions and employees, however, no such
control may be necessary. Shipping companies and the sea¬
men they employ are - because of the duties involved -
subject to the stringent regulations of Merchant Shipping
legislation. The other staffs of the same companies, on
the otherhand, are no different from ordinary commercial
employees - yet the employer is the same.
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Many duties are not a function of the employer who
performs them, nor inseparable from that employer, in any
real sense; many tasks could "be carried out by either
public or private enterprise or both."' Clearly those
tasks are only a function of the employer or inseparable
from him in the sense that at a given time they are in
fact being performed by the given employer. The nature of
that employer - in particular, whether governmental or not -
seems irrelevant. It is the nature of the tasks performed
which are of vital importance.
Thus, in respect of the public employees concerned, the
government, because of its functions, may be compelled to
impose very stringent standards on the political conduct of
these employees. It is clear, however, from the practice
of the public service that the test applied is related to
the duties to be performed by the employee. This is recog¬
nised, for example, by the civil service practice of
distinguishing between staffs, obviously totally unconnected
2
with policy and those who are, or might be.
Furthermore, it is not only in governmental employment
that political conduct may have to be restricted. Security
''See, supra p.G5 h.2-
^And, for example, by the distinction which appears to be
drawn in the B.B.C. between "restricted" and "unrestricted"
staff, those in the latter group being employees who do not
come into contact with the public in broadcasts or otherwise.
See The Times. 9 February 1959.
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restrictions, for instance, may have to "be applied to a
wide range of private employees.
Many of the activities in which a present day
government engages make it highly dependent upon the
operations of private contractors - mail delivery, manu¬
facture of scientific instruments and industrial research,
"1
for example. This at once poses the difficult question
of how far a security system should cast its net - the
occupations are legion in which some real danger to the
safety of the realm could arise "because of the activities
of "subversive persons" (a term impossible to define with
any degree of accuracy). It may be that in the United
2
States the system has been carried to extremes or that in
the United Kingdom it is not comprehensive enough. This
^Cf, Official Secrets Act, 1920 s.5. which compels the
registration and police supervision of persons "carrying
on the business of receiving postal packets."
2"... there are Federal personnel security programs which
cover nearly six million civilian employees of government
and industry ... They apply to the more than two million
Federal civilian employees, to over three million
employees of private industry, and to Americans employed
by international organisations." Federal Loyalty-Security
Program, p.ix. These figures do not include some three and
a half million State and local government employees, a large
proportion of whom come under some kind of "loyalty" check.
Cf. the Lang case in which an assistant solicitor in
Imperial Chemical Industries Ltd. was compelled to leave
his employment because of the nature of certain contracts
undertaken by the Company. See infra p.
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problem lies outside the scope of this study hut the test
here suggested of public interest measured in terms of the
servant's duties serves to emphasise the paramount
importance of the tasks undertaken by the employee. Prom
the information available this, indeed, seems to be the
practice followed and "blanket" restrictions are not
applied.
*
In the development of the conditions of service
dealt with in the last chapter, statute law and judicial
decisions have played a role, which, if not large, was
not entirely unimportant. The conditions of employment
just discussed, however, have developed virtually free
2
from legislative or judicial interference. These con¬
ditions, therefore, have been left almost entirely to
the laws of the service to which reference was briefly
made in a previous chapter.^ it is in this connection
1 See: Conference of Privy Councillors on Security, Cmd.971 5
passim.
^Except for examples like those already mentioned, e.g. the
Official Secrets Acts 1911 and 1920; Conspiracy and pro¬
tection of Property Act 1875; Servants of the Crown (Parlia¬
mentary Candidature) Order 1950.
3Ch.I, p.23
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that the need for the protectionof statute ana the ordinary
courts might "be thought to arise most acutely.
True, from statements made in Parliament about the case
of Mr. Lang, it seems that the procedure at present adopted
with regard to security cases leaves much to he desired
1
from the point of view of protection for the individual.
The order of events according to a recent critic is "first,
judgement without hearing, then hearing, then reconsideration
of judgement. This might indicate that the internal legal
patterns form an insufficient safeguard and., that perhaps the
further protection of legislation and ordinary courts is
required.
It is not difficult to see, however, that it is not
the absence of "lawyer's law" that is responsible for the
problems of protection that arise regarding the political
activities of government employees. In the United States
the rights of public employees have regularly come before
the courts. Both judicial decisions and government legis¬
lation have demonstrated that certain functions of govern¬
ment necessitate restrictions on the liberty of those
responsible for executing these functions, whether directly
as public employees or indirectly as employees of govern¬
ment contractors.^ The highly developed systems of
^Parliamentary Debates^(j956) Vol. 55k Cols.lbb-~1~1°
2[1956] Public Law p. 195.
3See, supra pp.
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employment relations in the public service are no less
effective in this sphere as elsewhere. The effectiveness
of this system, in the civil service for example, has not
escaped comment and a proper understanding of its true
significance is essential in any analysis of public employ¬
ment. It is to this internal legal system we now turn.
A
Cf. Flanders and Clegg, op. cit. pp.237-8: "... the Whitley
system compares favourably with arrangements concerning
wages and conditions in some other countries. In the U.S.A.
the doctrine of the sovereign legislation employer is
accepted by many states and still largely determines the
behaviour of Congress in these matters. Such a doctrine
makes lobbying the only effective weapon of civil servants.
British civil servants have lobbied successfully in the
past, but since they have obtained an effective system of
collective bargaining they have made little use of this
slow and uncertain method."
CHAPTER IV - Law, reality and collective agreements.
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Law and reality are often in conflict. In the sphere
of industrial law, for example, "the law still reflects a
state of affairs which has long ceased to "be the norm of
practical life"' and continues to emphasise the "contract
of employment" "between the individual employer and employee.
Ho notice is taken of the "collective agreement," which, in
fact, is the mainspring of British industrial relations.
The constitutional lawyer is, however, more than
usually familiar with what Lord President COOPER called,
p"the conflict "between academic logic and political reality,"
and this conflict is nowhere more striking than in present-
day governmental employment.
From the relevant judicial decisions it seems that
the civil servant is a homunculus without rights and subject
■1
Flanders & CIegg,op.ext., p.50. See, with regard to commercial
law, 29 Columbia L.R. p.121; Dicey: Law and Opinion, p.368,
n.1. and DEVLIN J. "Commercial Law and Practice," Ik M.L.R.
(1951) p.21+9. Indeed, the lav/ of equity may be said to have
originated in the gap between common law and reality. See,
Ashburner: Principles of Equity, 2nd ed. p.21.
SjVicCormick v. Lord Advocate, 1953 S.C. 396 at 1+12. The obvious
parallel is the famous apophthegm of Lord Sankey L.C.discussing
the possibility of the repeal of the Statute of Westminster:
"...Indeed, the Imperial Parliament could, as a matter of ab¬
stract law, repeal or disregard Section k of the Statute. But
that is theory and has no relation to realities." British Coal
Corporation v. The King [1935] A.C. 500 at 520.
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to disabilities affecting tenure, salary, superannuation
and the like, to a degree unknown in private employment.
But "that is theory and has no relation to realities."
Tenure of office in the civil service is more secure
than in most private employment and this security is
implicit in the salary structure, promotion system and
-I
superannuation rules to which the civil servant is subject.
Similarly, the right to salary, although still resting on
doubtful legal foundations, is left in no doubt whatever by
o
the practice of the service. So, too, superannuation, if
not a legal right, is never denied in practice, where the
conditions of its award have been fulfilled.
Indeed, a study of the employment relationship of the
British civil servant serves to emphasise the inadequacy of
^Cf. Report of Royal Commission on the Civil Service, 1929-
31 (T oral in) Cmd.3909 para. 305; Report of Priestley Commission
Cmd.9bi3 paras. 98 and 701; [1958] Public Law p.32 et.seq.
^The Treasury pledged, in 1925? that the government would
give effect to awards of the Civil Service Arbitration Court
a guarantee which continues in respect of the Civil Service
Arbitration Tribunal which replaced the Court in 1938. The
pledge was made "subject to the over-riding authority of
Parliament," a qualification stated to be^necessary "to
preserve the constitutional supremacy of Parliament and the
possibility of a government defeat there"»but it was agreed
"that the government will not itself propose to Parliament,
the rejection of an award once made." Treasury Circular
1 iq. March, 1925«
■^See, supra p. 5*|
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any analysis of that relationship "based solely on the legal
position as found in statutes and judicial decisions. The
rights, obligations and sanctions imposed "by the internal
patterns of administrative regulation are of greater
practical importance.
By Treasury regulations the civil servant is subject
A
to detailed control of his conduct, private as well as public.
Failure to obey these rules may result in severe disciplinary
action varying from a reprimand to summary dismissal; on
the other hand, they provide him with a readily ascertainable
code of conduct containing guarantees of reasonable treatment.
The courts, on a number of occasions, have expressed
opinions on the legal effect of these rules insofar as they
could be considered to confer rights enforceable in ordinary
2
courts of law. In Shenton v. Smith the Privy Council had
to consider the argument that certain Colonial office
regulations formed part of a contract between the respondent
and the Crown:
"As for the regulations ... they are merely
directions given by the Crown to the Govern¬
ments of the Crown Colonies for general
guidance... they do not constitute a con- ~
tract between the Crown and its servants."^
^Order in Council, 3 August 1956, by Article 6 gives the
Treasury power "to make regulations, or give instructions, for
controlling the conduct of Her Majesty's Home Civil Service,
and providing for the classification, remuneration and other
conditions of service of all persons employed therein, whether
permanent or temporary. "
2[i 895 ] A. C. 229
3bord HOBHOUSE at 235.
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Too much weight cannot "be given to this statement as
the point was not necessary for the decision which was
based on the ground that servants of the Grown hold office
"during pleasure;" it seems clear, however, that even had
this not been so, their Lodships would not have considered
the regulations as anything but "directions for general
1
guidance" and in no sense, of a contractual nature.
P
The later case of Rodwe11 v. Thomas is of greater
importance. It deals with modern conditions, and in
particular with the terms of National Y;/hitley Council
collective agreements. TUCKER J. dealing with the merits
of the argument that the recommendations of a Whitley
Council joint committee, incorporated in a Treasury circular,
were part of the contract, stated:
"It is well-known that it has been found, con¬
venient to settle questions relating to con¬
ditions of employment through the medium of a
representative body such as the joint committee,
but I am at a loss to understand how every
matter which is disposed of by give and take in
that way can be said to be incorporated into a
civil servant's contract of employment..."3
"^And see Venkata Rao v. Secretary of State for India [ 193/]
A.C.21+8 at 256-7.
2[19M|j K.B. 596,
^Contrast this with Littlejohn v. h-0.C. [1933] 1 K.B. 78 and
v« Industrial Disputes Tribunal ex parte Portland U.D.C.
Il953] 3 All E.R. 18. See infra pp.!©o"Ioi
- 82 -
With respect, the fact that certain conditions of
service were "disposed of "by give and take" in the joint
committee was not the real point at issue which was
whether the subsequent incorporation of these committee
recommendations into an official Treasury circular made
4
them recognised conditions of employment.
The courts therefore are clearly of the opinion
(although the outton Case suggests that such an opinion
may be erroneous) that Treasury regulations, of such com¬
prehensive importance in practive, have no contractual
force. This, in turn, has led to a certain amount of
distortion in discussion of the legal position of the civil
servant and, it is submitted, an undue emphasis on the need
for the protection of the ordinary courts.
With regard to tenure of office, for example, it has
1 Contrast Sutton v. Attorney-G-enerai (1923) 39 T.L.R. 23k.
where the terms of Post Office circulars were held by the
House of Lords to constitute "a contract between the Post¬
master-General and the individual person who ... accepts
the terms of the general offer..." It may be argued that
Sutton's Case concerned merely an immediate inducement to
take a certain step (i.e. to volunteer for the Army in the
knowledge that one would.not suffer financially) and that
these circulars were fundamentally different from an offer
of terms for a life-long career as in the case of normal
Treasury regulations. The writer submits that this
distinction does not affect the question of how far regu¬
lations (be they long-term or short-term) can be legally
enforced which was the point at issue in Sutton. See:
[i 958] Public Law, p.32 at l)3ff.
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"been alleged that:
"The Crovm practice [of dismissal at pleasure]
is contrary to public policy "because it tends
to deceive employees about their rights and it
deprives them of that sense of security
essential for the best performance of their
duties." ^
It must be observed, however, that the term "Crown
practice" is obviously a misnomer in view of what has been
said above, and., furthermore, every new entrant to the civil
service is told:
"Every civil servant, established as well as
temporary, holds his or her appointment at the
pleasure of the Crown, which means that the
Crown may dismiss him or her at any moment,
without notice and without compensation. That
is the legal piosition; but naturally the
Crown does not act in that way without having
an extremely good cause for doing so, and it
is only if you should be guilty of really
serious misconduct that you need by afraid of
summary dismissal, "
This would appear to be a reasonable explanation of the
true position and can scarcely be described as tending to
deceive employees about their rights. It is not, of course,
suggested that legal critics of the present form of
regulating civil service conditions are unaware that the
^Street, loc. cit. p.115; cf. also, Beinart, loo, cit.
pp.i.i-2-3; Richardson, loc. cit. pp. 1+29-U30.
2Handboo!c for the new Civil Servant, H.M. Treasury, 7th
ed. (1953) pp.26-7.
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practice of the service mitigates the strictly legal
position. It is submitted, however, that such critics
have been unduly concerned with judicial protection against
the risk that Treasury control may cease to be governed by
present standards. But the need for judicial protection
is true, in any important sense, only so far as the system
of staff-official negotiations and collective agreements
leaves the employee in a disadvantageous bargaining position.
The earliest means by which a civil servant could make
representations to the Treasury about his salary and general
conditions of employment was by individual memorial to the
head of his department which was then transmitted to the
Treasury. The practice then grew up of submitting
collective memorials about particular grievances.
The creation of clerical grades common to a number of
different departments stimulated combination and an
association of clerks was formed in the l880's which
negotiated with the Treasury from a position of some strength.
In the late nineteenth century staff associations were
making an appearance with'some regularity, particularly in
the Post Office and in the Admiralty; by j891 there were
no less than nineteen of these associations. Finally, in
1906 the then Postmaster-General announced that he was
^ See: Gohen, op. cit. pp.11+0—1.
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prepared to recognise any properly constituted association
and to receive representations through a suitable
representative. Somewhat similar steps were taken by other
departments and there seems no doubt that by 19*1 k the right
of civil servants to negotiate through their associations
was recognised throughout the service.
Conditions of employment today, therefore, are the
subject of intensive discussions between representatives
of the "staff" and "official" sides of the service. This
may be either through the medium of the Whitley system
(where the interests of more than one class or homogeneous
group of classes of civil servants are involved) or between
a particular department and an association recognised as
representing a class of civil servants within that department.
Thus the civil servant has a great advantage over the
ordinary industrial or commercial employee. Legally and in
strict constitutional theory the civil servant's employer is
the "Crown;" as a matter of political reality the Crown in
this respect is the appropriate Treasury and departmental
establishment officers. These officers are, of course, no
other than senior civil servants working under the same
conditions of service as all the other civil servants and
having wide experience of service problems. The "staff"
side officials are part of the general administrative
arrangements of the service.
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Conditions of employment are settled, therefore, not
by "bargaining with an employer whose interests and sympathies
may "be diametrically opposed to those of the employee, "but
"by negotiations with other civil servants working in close
•1
co-operation in departmental administration.
It is unrealistic, therefore, to discuss the Crown-
servant relationship as though there was, on the one hand,
an omnipotent legal entity called the Crown, armed with an
unassailable battery of prerogatives and discretionary
powers and, on the other hand, an inadequately protected
individual servant liable to have his rights abused in an
arbitrary manner without hope of legal redress. The
factual condition of the civil servant and the legal position
as expressed in judicial opinion are completely at variance
and too much emphasis appears to have been given to the
latter.
If the administrative lawyer has any doubts about the
true position of the civil servant in relation to the Crown
^This does not mean that disagreements do not arise. There are
often sharp differences of opinion between the staff and
official sides, especially on salary matters; but, as a
general rule, the residue of cases where agreement cannot be
amicably reached and in which resort must be had to arbitration
is small. There is one reform, however, which is overdue. The
Civil Service Arbitration Tribunal suffers severe limitations
on its jurisdiction. It can consider grades only below a
certain salary figure and certain conditions of service are not
arbitrable (see p. 16 supra). These limits are defined by the
Treasury under the existing system. It is suggested that the
the Tribunal itself should decide whether or not a claim falls
within its competence. Cf. J.Callaghan Whitleyism Fabian
Research Series No.i59 (1953) P*36.
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they must he dispelled to a large extent "by the recent
demonstration of the attitudes of the staff and official
sides of the service when the subject of making minor
adjustments in superannuation benefits without legislation
was being canvassed before the Priestley Commission.
The representatives of the civil service staff
associations pointed out that the powers of the Treasury
with regard to superannuation were considerably more
circumscribed - because of the statutory framework - than
their powers in respect of pay, hours and leave. The
staff association suggested that the Treasury should be
given wider powers over superannuation, powers more in
line with those wielded over the other conditions of
service. In other words, the staff association were
asking that the Treasury be given greater powers of discretion.1
With the reasons given by the staff association for
their request we are not here concerned; nor need we con¬
cern ourselves with the fact that the Treasury declined the
offer of greater discretionary powers on the grounds that
"the Government would be well advised to consider very
carefully how far it should go in asking Parliament to
confer powers to make minor adjustments in the particular
"'Royal Commission on the Civil Service, 1953-55, Minutes
of Evidence, jOth day, p.1+25; 17th day, p. 805.
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matters to which that new legislation relates." ^
What seems clear, at any rate, is that the civil
servant considers that the treatment he will receive from
the Treasury is unlikely to require additional legal safe¬
guards. If there is any immediate need for further
protection and guarantees to he given to the civil servant
he appears to he unaware of them.
It has "been suggested that to talk of the law and
practice of the civil service in the same way as the lex et
consuetudo of Parliament is to he "more executive-minded
Q
than the executive." If "by this is meant that the civil
servant should he placed in an intolerable legal position
should civil service "law" alone he his only protection,
it is difficult to agree with such an assertion.
True, civil service rules and regulations are "binding
in honour" only. That is, the "rights" and "duties" which
they are intended to yield are not rights and duties in the
strictly legal sense of being enforceable in the ordinary
courts of law. Any sanction which attaches to a breach
of the regulations will he an administrative one imposed
within the framework of intra-service discipline.
^ibid. Treasury evidence, 17 th day, Q.2685» So much for
the theory that civil servants continually seek additional
powers involving delegated legislation.'
^See, Beinart, loc. cit. p.l+3*
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It is unrealistic, however, to regard the rules of
the civil service as other than a proper system of law,
no less effective within the service than that made "by
Parliament in statutes or the common law of the law courts.''
Professor Robson has clearly stated the significance of
the law of the civil service:
"The fact that there is very little legislation
or case law dealing with the civil service does
not necessarily mean that there is no law and
practice of the civil service. There is such a
thing as customary administrative law; and I
contend that there is a considerable "body of
customary administrative law and practice
regulating the civil service. By this I mean
a pattern of conduct regulating the relations
"between the Grown and its servants, involving
obligations which are clearly formulated and
regularly followed "by all concerned. Such a
pattern of conduct can give rise to rights and
duties which are effectively recognised and
observed by the administrative authorities
''There is also the 'negative' aspect of these rules to be
considered. They are binding only on the civil servant
and not directly on anyone outside the service. But
'negatively' everyone is under a legal duty not to inter¬
fere with the rights and obligations they confer. Cf.
Allen: Law in the Making. 5th ed. p.519: "All valid
autonomic legislation, however restricted its positive
scope, may be said to have this negative and by no means
unimportant meaning for the whole body of citizens; and
it therefore cannot be regarded as something altogether
distinct and apart from the general rule of law."
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concerned even though they are not
enforceable in the courts of law.
Assuming that a civil service "collective agreement"
has been made and is thereafter incorporated in the manual
of regulations called Estacode, what are its effects?
It creates certain obligations between the parties to it;
but, further, it establishes a code of conduct for the
civil service generally. In other words, there is a
distinction to be drawn between the "contractual" effects
of the agreement and the "normative" or "legislative"
effects.2
It is this latter, "legislative," aspect of the
collective agreement which is of the greater practical
importance. The rules and regulations formulated by Orders
in Council, Treasury Minutes and the various other types
'British Government since 1918« Lord Campion (ed.) p.97«
Professor Sobson also quotes, at p.98, Ernst Freund's state¬
ment that "voluntary and long continued administrative practice
has many of the characteristics of law and, under favourable
conditions, inherent guaranties of fairness may approach those
which are generally associated with the courts of justice."
Cf. E.C.8. Wade's Appendix to Dicey's Law of the Constitution,
p.530: "... there are rules contained in Orders in Council and
Treasury warrants and minutes which provide the effective law
of the Civil Service." And see also Jennings, Law and the
Constitution, 3rd ed. at p.179: "... there is a'law and
practice of the civil service* as there is a law and practice
of Parliament."
^Cf. Flanders and Clegg, op.cit.pp.55-61. As is pointed out by
Professor Kahn-Freund, this distinction is well-known to German
and French legal literature, although its significance appears
to have been underestimated here.
- 91 -
of civil service enactments already mentioned together
constitute a law of the civil service which is obeyed "by
"both employer and employee. This code of norms governs
the employment of the civil servant and confers rights
and obligations on both the servant and the employer."1
*
While it is still far from true to talk of a local
government civil service, in the sense of a homogeneous body
with nationally uniform conditions of employment, there has
been, in the twentieth century - and especially since the
end of World War II - a growing uniformity in conditions of
service of local employees generally. Many large
authorities operate a highly developed system of "establish¬
ments" which takes much the same form as that of the central
civil service; most of the smaller authorities adhere
fairly closely to standard terms of employment. This is
evidenced by the growring number of officers who transfer
from one local authority to another, which would be unlikely
^Cf. DENNING L.J. in Bonsor v. Musicians' Union [1954] Ch.^79>
where at ij.85-6 he indicated that in respect of the rules of
trade associations it is often unrealistic to talk of contract
as the rules are "more in the nature of a legislative code."
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unless conditions of employment (particularly with regard
to salary and superannuation) were fairly uniform over a
wide area.
This uniformity, to a large extent, is the result of
intervention "by the national government "by means of
statutes of general application imposing similar duties
and obligations on all local authorities."^ But the main
impetus towards a common local government service has, in
fact, "been extra-legal although the courts of law have
materially assisted.
In law, the relationship between the local authority
and the employee is governed by an ordinary contract of
employment in which - but for the statutory exceptions
mentioned below - the parties are free to determine the
terms and conditions of employmemt within very wide limits.
Before the first World War this was true in practice also.
Local authorities made their own contracts with their
employees and, except in the case of manual workers who
were members of large trade unions capable of direct
bargaining with the authority, the terms and conditions of
service were rarely standard, even in the same local
authority's service.
^ Cf. Local Government Act, 1 933; Local Government Superannuaticx
Act, 1937; Local Government Staffs (War Service) Act 1939.
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Possi~bIy the first World War demonstrated the value of
fuller co-operation between master and servant; at any rate,
"between the years 1916-1918 there grew up the system of
Whitleyism as a government sponsored scheme of employer-
employee negotiation. Coupled with this was the develop¬
ment of bodies representative on the one hand of the local
authorities and on the other of their employees. The
County Councils Association, the Association of Municipal
Corporations and the District Council Associations are
examples of the former; N.A.L.G..G., the Local Government
Clerics Association and the National Union of Public Employees
of the latter.
But during the inter-war period the growth of organised
negotiation and collective bargaining was slow, and
individual local authorities continued to maintain their
independence. Many of them refused to join their
associations or take part in the Whitley machinery and they
did not, therefore, c onsider themselves bound to accept the
decisions arrived at by the negotiating bodies. Trade
unions, anxious to get for their members the best possible
terms, played one local authority off against another "even
where a rate of wages had been negotiated by a Provincial
Joint Council.Por local authority staffs the individually
1M.Mcintosh: "The Negotiation of Wages and Conditions for Local
Authority Employees in England and Wales" (1955) Vol. XXXIII
Public Administration p.150. And, ibid: "The political affil-
iation of the elected members of a council might play its part
in deciding what terms the trade union could obtain.
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determined contract was, therefore, still the prevailing-
arrangement.
The need for joint co-operation was vindicated "by
World War II and as in the case of private enterprise,
the system of collective bargaining "between local
authorities and their employees' organisations received
new impetus.1 And in the strengthening of this system
of joint negotiation the law was destined to play a not
unimportant part.
2
I" -Field v. Borough of foplar, McCARDIE J. raised
"the unusual and perhaps important" matter of the effect
on the plaintiff's employment rights of his membership of
N.A.L.G.O. The defendant council had contended that the
plaintiff was "bound by the acts and views of the National
Association of Local Government Officers" and the learned
judge thought it necessary, therefore, to say something of
that organisation. After briefly describing the aims and
objectives of the association he came to the conclusion
that neither the association nor any branch thereof had
any authority "to alter the plaintiff's status, or to
See: The Elements of Local Government Establishment Work,
-Royal Institute of Public Administration (1951 ) p. 53 This
impetus was probably due, in large measure, to the Conditions
of Employment and National Arbitration Order 1940 (S.R. & 0.
1940, No. 1305) which was framed to strengthen the voluntary
joint negotiating machinery which had been developing during
the previous decade.
2[1929] 1 K.B. 760.
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ignore or override his statutory rights and privileges;
or to reduce his salary without his consent, and in
defiance of statutory provisions as to his employment
and remuneration."
In the circumstances of the particular case this was
a reasonable approach to the relationship between the
employee and his trade union.1 The consequences of thus
limiting the power of the union to negotiate on behalf of
the local government servant might nevertheless have had
unfortunate repercussions. An employee's welfare was
often dependent upon the implementing of terms of employ¬
ment arrived at, not by individual arrangement, but by
joint negotiating between the errgploying council and the
staff association. Fortunately later judicial decisions
have demonstrated a different attitude to the system of
collective bargaining in local government employment.
The National Arbitration Tribunal had been established
in i9^0 (by S.R. & 0. 19^-0, No. 1305)^ and to this Court
the Minister of Labour was empowered to refer any
1 Contrast, however, Lord WRIGHT in the Bolton case mentioned
below, "It would be strangely out of date to hold that a
trade union cannot act on behalf of its members in a trade
dispute..." (at 189») And see GQDDAED L.J. (as he then was)
in Evans v. National Union of Printing, Bookbinding and Paper
Workasl 19381 U All E.R. 51 at 56-. Also Flanders and Clegg,
op. cit. pp. 529-63.
^See p.58 n.1. In i951 this Order was revoked and replaced by
the Industrial Disputes Order, B.I. 1951? no. 1376, the tribunal
becoming the Industrial Disputes Tribunal. This latter oody
has now been abolished. See post p.^
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industrial dispute reported to him, the decisions of the
tribunal "being "binding upon "both employers and employees.
In NALGO v. Bolton Corporation, the plaintiff union
sought to use this tribunal to enforce its claims using
as a test case the non-application by the defendants of
the provisions of the Local Government Staffs (War Service)
Act 1939.
By s.l(l)(2) of that Act a local authority "shall have
the power" to male payments to employees (or their
dependents) who have ceased to serve the local authority in
order to undertake war service. The defendant corporation
decided not to exercise this power and the trade union
sought to have this refusal dealt with by the National
Arbitration Tribunals as a "trade dispute." The House of
9
Lords (reversing the judgment of the Court of Appeal)'' held
that a dispute as to the conditions of service of officers
of a local authority was a "trade dispute" so as to bring
it within the jurisdiction of the National Arbitration
Tribunal. This decision opened the way to extensive and -
from the point of view of the employee - outstandingly
successful use of the arbitration machinery. Recommen¬
dations of the Whitley Councils could henceforth be made
1 [ 1 91+3] A.C. 166.
2r. v. National Arbitration Tribunal. Ex parte Bolton
Corporation [19^-1-1 ] 2 K.B. i|05.
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the subject of a "trade dispute" and could "be brought
"before the Tribunal. The. consequence of this was that
local authorities who refused to adopt the recommendations
were gradually compelled to fall into line with the majority
1
who accepted them.
That this was a likely result of the decision seems to
have been in the mind of Lord ATKIN when at i 80 discussing
the terms of s.1. of the Local Government Staffs (War
Service) Act of 1939, he said:
"Icannot think that the legislature did not
foresee that, once the power was given, claims
would be madefor assurances that it would be
exercised, and that the claims would be made
and settled by the usual processes of
collective bargaining with which sensible
masters and workmen are now familiar."
•1
It is important to notice that in the matter of wages a
local authority would not necessarily be acting illegally
if it paid more than the rates negotiated through the
medium of the appropriate Joint Council. The Roberts v.
Hopwood ([1925] A. C. 578) decision has been shown to be
capable of bearing this interpretation - see In re Walker
[i914.Z4.] 1 K.B. 632 mentioned below. But even if the local
authority were properly exercising its discretion in paying
additional amounts over and above the national scales and
their action could not be legally impugned by the District
Auditor, the latter could conceivably refuse to certify
the excess expenditure for grant purposes. The Report of
the Establishment Committee of Birmingham City Council for
1954 reveals that the Corporation of Birmingham is having
to meet entirely out of the rates certain wage increase
payments which have been disallowed for grant purposes
because "they are in excess of national standard rates of
pay." See Mcintosh, loc. cit. p.ipOip. This obviously
operates to maintain the uniform rates laid down by the
Whitley councils and thus further standardise local
authority conditions of service.
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To appreciate the full impact of this decision on
the movement towards a common, uniform local government
service attention must he drawn to the formulation by
the National Joint Council for Local Authorities
Administrative, Professional, Technical and Clerical
Services (National Joint Jouncil) of a scheme of con¬
ditions of service designed to cover all local govern¬
ment employees in these four main classes. This scheme-
known generally as the Local Government Charter - was
passed by the National Joint Council in 19^-6. It
granted most of what the staff associations had been
bargaining for over a long jjeriod: national scales of
salaries, entry and promotion according to qualification
and acomprehensive scheme of conditions generally.
Acceptance of this Charter by the National Joint
Council did not mean, however, automatic adoption of its
terms by aLl local authorities; many of these were out¬
side the Whitley structure and many of those whowere
within it, resented strongly the abrogation of their
authority which acceptance of the Charter involved. The
Bolton decision, by giving local government employees
access to the National Arbitration Tribunal (later, the
Industrial Disputes Tribunal"^) made for widespread
^Local government employees have apparently the same right
of access to this body as to its predecessor - see EC. v
Industrial Disputes Tribunal ex parte Portland U.D.C^.
"[1955] 3 All E.R. 18.
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application of the terms of the Charter and for greater
uniformity in the main conditions of local government
A
employment throughout the country.
The case of In re Walker2 concerned the right of a
local authority to pay increased salaries to their
employees "by way of adding children's allowances where
appropriate. In upholding the claim of the local
authority to do so the court werecompelled to consider
"prevailing practices and conditions" in local government
employment.^
The judgment of du PARQ L.J. at 651 illustrates a
strikingly realistic approach:
"The practice of collective "bargaining "between
associations of employers and workers has
greatly developed in the present century. It
is nowadays often impossible to regard the
employment of each individual worker as the
result of a separate "bargain struck "between
master and servant. It is commonly
^The importance of this tribunal to local government
employees was evident from the strong objections raised by
NALG-0 to the decision to abolish the Industrial Disputes
Order of 1951 and thus end the system of compulsory
arbitration and the Industrial Disputes Tribunal (see ^S".
'79£). Indeed, so strong was the local government
"lobby" in Parliament that a promise was extracted from the
Minister of Labour that the "issues" part of the Order of
1951 will be retained in some form - this will still, there¬
fore, make it p>ossible to compel an employer to observe the
terms and conditions recognised in his industry. See: Public
Service, Vol.32, No.11, p.3k1 et seq.
2^9kk] 1 K.B. 6J+J+.
3This was necessary if the Hasse of Lords Decision in Roberts
v. Hopwood ([1925] A.0.578) was to be overcome - See SCOTT
L.J. at 6l|-8.
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convenient and satisfactory to settle wages
"by means of negotiations and discussion "be¬
tween the representatives of employer and
employed. In the case of local authorities
it appears that it is customary to establish
joint committees for this very purpose. The
evidence shows that the salaries now in
question were paid as a result of the recommen¬
dation of such a joint committee who thought
it expedient to pay what are called
"children's allowances" to the salaries of
married men with children. In so doing the
Birmingham Corporation, far from setting them¬
selves up as model employers, are following
the example of many of the joint stock "banks
and insurance companies. If a local authority
were to "be debarred from following a course
which has commended itself to such profit-
making employers, it is possible that they
might be seriously hampered in their efforts
to obtain the best services available and that
the efficiency of local government would
suffer accordingly."
The same realism was apparent in the decision in
-1
Littlejohn v. London County Council , a case concerning the
application of "sick pay" regulations. The plaintiff was
employed as a senior poor law officer by the Stepney
Guardians until -1st April 1930 on which date, under the
Local Government Act of 1929, he was transferred to the
employment of the London County Council. The defendant
council offered the plaintiff on his transfer a new contract,
at a higher rate of pay and containing the proviso that
employment with the council was subject to the council's
standing orders and other rules and regulations. A
1 [1938] 1 K.B. 78.
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summary of these orders was attached to the contract and
under the heading "Sick Pay" appeared a clause stating that
an employee unahle to work on account of illness would he
paid "Full pay for a reasonable period at the discretion of
the appropriate sub-committee of the Public Assistance
Committee."
By the Public Assistance Order 1930 the removal of a
senior poor law officer was subject to the control of the
Minister of Health; and article 162 (2) of that Order
provided:
"The Council shall not, without the consent of
the Minister, reduce the remuneration of a
senior poor law officer."
It was admitted that the approval of the Minister had
not been sought for the sick pay provisions of the council's
standing orders and regulations.
The plaintiff was prevented by illness from performing
his duties between December, 1933» and September, 1934» (when
he retired on superannuation) and the council paid him full
pay for eight months during this period and for the last two
months of the period he was paid on half-pay. He sought to
claim that (a) the standing orders and regulations were
invalid in his case as they had not been brought to the
notice of the Minister and (b) the reduction in his pay for
the last two months of his service were contrary to the
provisions of article 162(2) of the Public Assistance Order
of 1930.
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Delivering the judgment of the Court of Appeal,
SCOTT L.J. did not think it necessary to comment on the
first half of the plaintiff's allegations. On the point
that the Minister's approval was necessary in order to pay
the plaintiff at half his usual rate of pay, the learned
judge commented:
"Getting sick pay rights he got a new advantage
which was part of his remuneration ... We do
not think that the application of the Sick Pay
Rules on the lines of the present case ... is
a reduction of his remuneration ... within the
meaning of article 162. In our opinion the
appellant was not only treated with kindness
"but in strict accordance with his contract." ^
It may "be that the payment of half-pay, during a period
of sickness, is not strictly "reduction" in the normal
salary payable to the plaintiff, since whether sick pay is a
2
right or not is by no means certain , but it is suggested
that the Court of Appeal was, to some extent, induced to
take the view it did because to have done otherwise would
have been manifestly contrary to the policy behind the
council's sick pay regulations. In this particular case
the relevant trade unions had in previous years pressed the
ibid, at 96. It is interesting to notice that in this case
the party to a contract sought, when it became disadvantageous,
to avoid it by pleading a statd&cpy prohibition. Cf. Brown v.
Dafeenham U.D.C. [1929] 1 K.B. 737 where the same attempt was
made by the employing council. On this practice see the
strong remark^ of KAY J. in Robarts v. London Corporation
(1882} 1+6 L.T. 623 at 623 and 630. Also GODDARD L.C.J, in
A.R.Wright and Cons Ltd. v. Romford Borough Council [1956]
3 W.L.R. 896.
^See infra. p.IOtf n. |
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council for sick pay terras; at first these were granted
to the extent that full pay would "be paid for six months
and then nothing further. The unions continued to agitate
for "better terms and the council made regulations providing
for half-pay to he paid after the payment of full pay for a
1
reasonable period. The whole background to the sick pay
regulations was, therefore, to be viewed in terras of
advantage to the employee; as SCOTT L.J. put it: "To be
employed on the terms of whole salary or dismissal is in
the case of prolonged illness most disadvantageous to the
servant."
This recognition by the courts of the role played by
joint negotiation in the field of local government employ¬
ment was also apparent in v. Industrial Disputes Tribunal
p
ex parte Portland Urban District Council. Here the Court
of Appeal was asked to quash an order of prohibition granted
by the Divisonal Court and prohibiting the Industrial
Disputes Tribunal from dealing with a matter referred to it
by the Minister of Labour and National Service on the appli¬
cation of N.A.L.G.O.
The facts were that an employee of the council was
employed under a scheme of conditions of service to which
the Union took exception. As a result of adjudication by
''see at 8i+.
2[i955] 3 All E.R. 1 8.
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the Industrial Disputes Tribunal the council were instructed
to employ the servant concerned under a different scheme
of conditions, more advantageous to the employee. The
local authority, as they were compelled to do, duly
implemented the award hut immediately got out of it by
the simple expedient of terminating the servant's contract,
re-advertising the appointment and subsequently re-appointing
the same employee, specifically under the scheme of con¬
ditions originally objected to by the union. The union
thereupon referred the matter to the Minister and asked
that the Industrial Disputes Tribunal should adjudicate
this new issue. The local authority took objection to this
reference to the Tribunal and accordingly sought an order of
prohibition which was granted by the Divisional Court. On
appeal the order was refused.
The judgment of DENNING L.J. is revealing in that it
clearly indicates that in the light of modern collective
bargaining systems, there may well be circumstances in
which the contract with the individual employee is less
important that the repercussions such a contract might have
on employment relations generally.
^This point also arose in Whitley Council discussions about
the advisability of giving to civil servants, contractual
enforceable rights. See infra p. 24?
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"The first point is whether there was any
controversy ... I think there clearly was.
The action taken "by the local authority
was so provocative that no one could suppose
that the trade union would acquiesce in it
or remain silent under it. Mr. Garter
[the employee] himself may have "been con¬
tent, so that there was no issue "between
Mr. Carter and the local authority; "but
there was clearly an issue "between the.
trade union and the local authority." ^
BIRKETT L..J. referred to the case as "really a "battle
between a local authority ... and a trade union" and dis¬
cussing (at 2k) the fact that not only the Industrial
Disputes Tribunal, but previously, the Whitley Council had
decided in favour of the union, he strongly disapproved of
the local authority's action:
"lam bound to say that it does not seem to
me to be consonant with the standards local
authorities ought to set as employers to
try to defeat the decision of the tribunal
by this rather transparent device."
It is true that all the court had to do in the Portland
case was to say whether or not there existed an "issue"
which would come within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal,
but the above statements illustrate the court's willingness
to look further than the individual master and servant con¬
tract where necessary, in order to give effect to the
system of joint negotiation.
1 at 21.
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Apart, therefore, from any particular terms in the
contract applicable to a given appointment, and any rele¬
vant statutory provisions, there can "be three other kinds
of conditions of service to which the local government
employee may be subject and to which - if they have been
brought to the notice of the employee - the courts will
give effect as terms of the contract. These are: conditions
settle by the National Joint Council, those decided by a
Provincial Joint Council and the rules, orders and regu¬
lations of a particular local authority.
It seems that individual notification of these con¬
ditions is not necessary (except, perhaps, in cases where
they are of special importance, e.g. a proposal to reduce
salary would presumably require the consent of the
individual employee) and a general notice of the conditions




In Compton v. West Ham Borough Council it was held
that regulations made by a local authority (providing that
employees absent on account of illness should be paid for
three months on full pay and thereafter on half-pay for
another three months) would not be implied as terms of his
"^See Parmer v. London County Council [19I|-3] 2 All E.R. 32;
and also: Local Authorities Letters of Appointment E.I.P.A.
(1951 ) pp.1 5/1 b.
2 [1939 ] 1 Ch. 771.
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contract "because they had not "been communicated to the
employee. The sick pay regulations had "been agreed hy
the council in 1913 and at the instance of an employees'
trade union had "been altered to the advantage of council
employees in 1922. The plaintiff's employment dated from
October, J\93k> In finding that these regulations could
not "be implied as a tern of the plaintiff's contract,
GROSSMAN J. said:
"I find that the plaintiff when he was appointed
in 193h did not know of the sick pay regulations
which had "been adopted "by the defendant council
... and there is no sufficient ground for
implying as a term of the plaintiff's contract
of employment the provisions as to sick pay which
the defendant council had adopted. ""1
This is in contrast with the decision in nittlejohn v.
L. G, G mentioned above and it is submitted appears to be
contrary to the normal practice in industrial relations;
there can be no management in enterprise, public or private,
without some code of discipline and by entering into a
contract of employment the employee submits to the existing
code of discipline, even though he may not have seen a copy
3
of the rules. It is not only more realistic, but more in
the public interest, that where rules and regulations are
made by a local authority - particularly after some measure
at 776
2[1938] 1 K.B. 78, see supra p. (©t)
^Kahn-i'reund, op. cit. p.U9.
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of .joint negotiation has taken place - they should "be
regarded as terms of the employment contracts made "between
1
that authority and its servant. It is in this way that
greater standardisation of conditions of employment is
achieved; and without this standardisation it is fruitless
even to attempt to make worthwhile improvements in the local
government service.
The local government servant works under a contract of
service; "but to a greater or less degree according to the
duties he xoerforms, his contract is hedged around hy a mass
of statutory provisions, and "by conditions of service laid
down "by negotiating "bodies. From a heterogeneous collection
of contracts local government employment has progressed to a
highly developed system of standard form contracts, in which,
however, the "bargaining power of "both parties is substantial.
*
^Fortunately the Compton case, on other grounds, will
prohahly not "be followed. It was assumed "by the learned
judge that on the authority of Marrison v. Bell [1939]
2 K.B. 187, an employee was entitled to full pay during
sickness unless otherwise provided ley an express or
implied term. But now see 0' Grady v. Saper [l9'l0] 2 K.B.
1+69, where it is denied that Marrison v. Bell can "be
interpreted in that way.
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In the statutes of the public corporations we
frequently encounter the rare exceptions to trie general
rule that British industrial relations do not rest upon
legal foundations. Many of these corporations, parti¬
cularly tnose which administer the nationalised industries,
have "been statutorily obliged to enter into consultation
with appropriate employee organisations in order to
■\
establish collective bargaining and negotiating machinery.
Most corporations have a Staff or Labour Department
and the negotiating machinery in some cases is highly
2
developed and complex. Staff conditions of service
follow the usual pattern and legal enforceability plays
an almost insignificant role in their application.^ Even
in semi-military services like the police and the fire
service machinery exists for joint negotiation with respect
^Coal Industry Nationalisation Act 1946 S.i+6; Transport
Act 1947 s.95; Electricity Act 1957 s.12; Gas Act 1948
s.57; Overseas Resources Development Act 1948 s.8; Air
Corporations Act 1949 s.20. For similar examples of pre-
1945 corporations see: Port of London Act 1908 s.l(7);
London Passenger Transport Act 1933, Part VI.
2See: CIegg & Chester: Wage.Policy and the Health Service.
Blackwells (1957) especially chapters 2 and 5; Clegg:^
Labour Relations in London Transport, Blackwells (1950)
Ch.II.
^There are minor exceptions in respect of "fair wages"
clauses - see, e.g. Civil Aviation Act 1949 s.15 and 11
M.L.R. (1948) p.269 and p. 429.
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1
to conditions of service.
As in the case of the servants of local authorities the
employees of public corporations work under contracts of
p
service^ which are standardised within each corporation "by
3
regulations establishing uniform conditions of service.
See supra p. ^>1 n.3 ; Fire Services Act 1 9i+7 s.l7(l)(2)
Conditions of service are considered, in so far as they affect
chief officers, "by the National Joint Council for Chief
Officers of Local Authorities' Fire Brigades, the counterpart
body for other firemen (not being auxiliaries) being the
National Joint Council for Local Authorities' Fire Brigades.
The Police Council was established in 1953? the constitution
of which provided for arbitration at the request of either side.
^Again the point arises whether this would be so where the
corporation was a Crown Servant. This seems however in practice
to be unimportant. Cf. NcClelland v. Northern Ireland Health
Board [ 1957] 2 All E.N. 129 at 131* The Irish judge of first
instance dismissed the plaintiff's action for wrongful dis¬
missal on the ground that she was a civil servant holding
office during the pleasure of the Crown. But this view was
not argued nor was it at any time supported by the Board.
It is submitted that this was not because of the difficulty
of establishing that the Board was a Crown servant but because
of the desire to avoid any suggestion that appointment should
be terminable at pleasure. See the remarks of GCDDARD L.C.J,
at 132+ to the effect that the Board's employment policy was
influenced by civil service security of tenure.
^These regulations may be statutory in form (as under the
National Health Services Act, 19^6, s.66) or merely internal
departmental instructions (as in the case of the London
Transport Executive); see Clegg _op. cit. Ch. VI.
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Dock labourers provide an interesting exception to this
contractual relationship. They are employed in the reserve
pool of the National Doci-c Labour Board and are not subject
to a contract of service; they have a status conferred upon
them by the regulations made under the Dock Worker (Regulation
of .Employment; Act 19Ub and like, therefore, the police and
fire services, they work under a code of discipline involving
4
a wide range of punishments ana possessing a system of appeals.
Even, however, in those cases where the employee is
subject to a comprehensive disciplinary code of this kind, the
effectiveness of the code is based almost entirely on admini¬
strative sanctions ana the law courts rarely have occasion to
2
interfere.
Employer-employee relations in the public corporations
illustrate the same divergence between law and practice that
was apparent in the case of the civil service and local
3
government and which permeates the whole of British industrial
^See: Barnard v. National Dock Labour Board [ 1953] 2 Q.B. 18;
Vine v. National Dock Labour Board Ii9371 2 W.L.R. 106. In
the latter case, see especially Lord KILMUIR, L.C., at i12
and Juord KEITH of AVONHQLM at 119.
2Cf. Ex parte Fry [195U-] 2 All E.R. 118 at 121 .
3cf: "In theory, the decisions of the conciliation machinery,
being incorporated in each man's contract, are enforceable in
the courts, but the extent to which this is so and the manner
in which it could be done have never been fully tested in the
courts. In practice, disputes are almost invariably settled
by reference to the conciliation machinery itself..." Friedmann
(ed. ) Public Corporations, Carsweil, (195U) P»W+9«
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relations. Cases which have any "bearing on the relationship,
rights and duties of the governmental employees are few;
statutes, where they are not completely silent, leave con¬
ditions of service to "be regulated "by machinery and
procedures essentially non-legal in nature.
*5»
Certain differences do exist "between the forms of
collective "bargaining used in the different "branches of the
governmental service - the awards of the Civil Service
Arbitration Tribunal are not legally enforceable, as were
the awards of the Industrial Disputes Tribunal to which the
employees of the local authorities and the public utilities
had access; the Whitley machinery within the civil service
is organised differently from that in local government
reflecting the greater diversity of employers in the latter
service; some employees, as has gust been mentioned, are
subject to a semi-military code of discipline rather more
far-reaching than the usual employment regulations. As
will be suggested in the next chapter, these differences are
of little legal or practical significance and indeed the
collective bargaining machinery throughout the public service
contributes in no small way to the uniformity of conditions
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therein existing. One important, and regrettable,
limitation on the effectiveness of the system of collective
"bargaining within governmental employment deserves mention -
the ministerial veto over agreements reached in the course
of Whitley Council deliberations.
A particularly flagrant example of this occurred when,
in 1957* the Minister of Health vetoed an agreement for a
% increase for the administrative and clerical grades of
the National Health Service made by the appropriate Whitley
Council. The veto operated extremely unfairly since it did
not constitute a dispute between the respective employer and
employee organisations ana could not, therefore, be taken to
the Industrial Disputes Tribunal. The claim was, hov/ever,
subsequently taken to the Industrial Court which awarded much
higher increases than those which had already been turned
down by the Minister.
The government in situations of this kind are attempting
to fulfil three functions - employer, guardian of the
national economic interest and arbitrator; these roles are
incompatible, but the solution is clear. The government
cannot cease to be an employer, nor can it avoid the
^See, The Times. 16 August 195S, p.3; on the same page it
was reported that the Home Secretary and the Secretary of
State for Scotland had asked the National Joint Council
for Chief Officers of Local Authorities' Fire Brigades to
reconsider certain recommended pay rises on grounds of
"the present financial and economic situation."
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responsibility for the national economic interest. It
can, however, transfer the functions of conciliation and
arbitration to an independent tribunal and accept the
findings of such a tribunal - or, if it is going to be
compelled to vary them because of the overriding nature
of the demands of public interest, then such variations
must be applied to all employees and not to governmental
servants alone.
It is not surprising, that the government
tabes a vital interest in the wage negotiations of public
employees, but it is well to bear in mind that direct
governmental influence of such negotiations is apt to be
governed as much by the attitude of a particular Minister
or by the Cabinet mood of the moment or by fear of criticism
from colleagues as by any acceptable general principle.
The result may often be that the consequences of a decision
fall arbitrarily on one group thus creating ill-will and
distorting recognised patterns of employment conditions.
This is not to argue that the minister can, or should,
abandon legal responsibility. It seems quite consistent
with constitutional theory that vis-^-vis public servants,
as employees, the minister should agree to be bound by the
decisions of an arbitration body; ministerial intervention
in such cases is no more appropriate than it is in respect
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of private employees. The fact that it may "be admini¬
stratively and politically easier is obviously significant,
p
"but hardly an argument.
The operation of collective bargaining in public
employment relies to a great extent not on law but on
voluntary agreements on which pledges that they will be
respected have been given. The confidence of the staffs
of government bodies of all kinds in reasonable negotiation
can only be undermined if the government does not respect
the system.
"^It might also be observed that many ministerial decisions are
by no means final in that they are subject to review by a
court of law; and in some cases a minister's decision can be
exercised only with the approval of other persons. Cf.
Tribunals v. Inquiries Act 195S s.5« See p. ffc n.( supra for
the practice of the Treasury in respect of awards of the Givil
Service Arbitration Tribunal which maintains constitutional




CHAPTER V - The unified "bureaucracy
_ 1 i 6 ~
All governmental service is for the public benefit
and the public interest in the effectiveness of that service
is a characteristic common to all governmental employment.
As has been apparent in previous chapters this element of
public interest is responsible for the presence of certain
common features in the conditions of service of the govern¬
mental servant, whether employed by a ministerial department,
a local authority or a public corporation. Governmental
service is becoming, to an ever-increasing extent, a national
service in which uniformity and transferability are prominent
features.
There are, of course, limitations on this. A number
of differences exist that distinguish, in many respects,
employment conditions in the different arms of government.
In local government, unlike in the civil service, there
are still many officials who need not give their whole time
to the local authority. In many urban and rural districts,
for example, the clerk is a partner in a local firm of
solicitors; the medical officer, a private practitioner
relying for the greater part of his income on his practice
and the treasurer is often a local banker. Such part-time
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service may raise administrative problems'^ "but it has been
of little legal significance, except in connection with
reckonability of service in assessing superannuation
2
allowances or compensation for loss of office.
There are, too, many differences in the composition
of the staffs of the different branches of government
service. The proportion of manual to non-manual workers
is much higher in local government and in many public
corporations (especially the nationalised industries) than
it is in the civil service; the administrative class of
the latter has no real counterpart in either of the other
two services where for the highest executives the emphasis
is on professional qualifications. Again these differences
raise no problems for the lawyer. It might be argued that
the distinction between manual and non-manual workers is a
real one in the sense that more exacting standards of public
interest operate with regard to the latter^ but, as has
been suggested, this dichotomy pays too little attention to
''See: Maud & Finer: Local Government in England and Wales
Hutchison's H.U.L. 2nd Ed. (1953)> pp.138/9-
-R. v. Local Government Board (■] 8>7k) k3 L.J.Q.B. I+9
Carpenter v. Bristol Gorpox'-ation [1907] 2 K.B. 6-17« There
are numerous examples of part-time employment on the boards
of various public corporations.
^Cf. Mitchell on. cit. p.68.
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the importance of the duties to "be performed."1 The manual
worker may "be, incertain circumstances, no less a subject
of public interest than a senior executive or member of the
2
"board of a public corporation. The minor local authority
is less a matter of public interest than the Treasury, not
"because it contains a higher proportion of manual workers
'but "because the duties of the latter obviously affect the
welfare of the nation in a much wider manner.
Of greater significance is the heterogeneity of
employers which is a major feature of local government.
The local government "Charter" referred to above has been
^See p. 6-7 and n.1 supra. In the Bater case there mentioned
Lord WRENBURY said at 3k: "A man's employment does not
become any more 'public' because it is sedentary or clerical
and not physical or manual. As between an engine driver and
a fourth-class clerk, the former certainly owes more duties
to the public, whose lives he, in fact, has in his hands,
than does the clerk who sits in an office and casts up
accounts or conducts correspondence o/^checks returns." On
the fact that manual workers usually have a wage and not a
salary, see the remarks of Lord SUMNER at 28: "It is, how¬
ever, a purely arbitrary distinction and so indefinite as to
be really accidental. For economic purposes it is convenient
to treat wage-earners as a class, and for political purposes
the receipt of a salary is often supposed to involve a
different point of view from that which attaches to the
earning of wages, but the first term really refers more to
the nature and conditions of the manual work done than to the
remuneration paid for it and the second denotes social
aspirations rather than any revenue category."
2The fact that the latter may often have more detailed terms
of appointment is not necessarily a criterion of superior
public interest.' See supra p. Jfe-ty-t
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drafted in purposely wide language^ "because of the difficulty
of making comprehensive conditions of employment for a
service so heterogeneous as local government. The detailed
and precise regulations providing for the uniform conditions
of employment of civil servants, police and firemen, for
example, are in contrast to the scheme of the local govern¬
ment Charter "because much of the field which the latter
attempts to cover is impossible to standardise. The
differences in size, area and functions of the different
local authorities demand differences in organisation and
staffing. Here again, however, this diversity, since it
relates mainly to salary scales, rates and classification
of appointments is of little legal significance.
*
These organisation and administrative differences are,
however, more than offset "by a number of factors which
directly and indirectly are drawing together the different
branches of government with consequent uniformity in
conditions of service and transferability of staffsj - the
"^See: Warren, op. cit. Ch.IV.
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powers of surveillance and inspection exercised "by the
central government over a wide range of local authority
activities; the growth of the new towns established "by
public corporations; the wholesale transfer of local
government staffs under the social services and public
utilities legislation of the post-World War II period;
the imposition of statutory duties on certain local
government officers and ministerial control over the
conditions of service of others; the facilities for
transfer afforded by the superannuation statutes; and,
of major importance, the influence of collective
bargaining and Whitley machinery assisted by powerful
trade unions like N.A.L.G.0.
The increased central influence over local authorities
1 2
by means of powers of review, advisory services and
direct control-' has greatly increased since 1938. This
i+ 5
power over local authorities may be deprecated or praised
"ICf. Education Act 19IU+ s.l6.
^E.g. information circulars and memoranda issued by the Home
Office to Children's Committees under the Children Act, 19^-8.
3Cf. Fire Services Act, 19^-7» s.21. Pwe
^+See W.A. Kobson: The Development of Local Government 3rd
Ed. (195U) Allen & Unwin p.38 et.seq.
5cf. J.S.Harris: British Government Inspection (1955)
Praeger, N.Y., pp.7-11.
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"but it has had the important effect of imposing on local
authorities a high degree of standardisation with regard
to some of their more important functions. This is most
obvious in the police and fire services'^ but under such
statutes as the National Assistance Act, 19U8> and the
National Health Services Act of -19^6, the central govern¬
ment department has by legislative and administrative
direction defined national uniform standards to which
2
local authorities must conform. The immediate legal
effect on the employee of this form of local government
supervision is nou significant, but the practical effects
cannot be ignored by the lawyer. This central government
intervention develops:
"A service professionalism divorced from the
old conception of a local government service,
and finding its stronger links with the
central government department, and through it,
with colleagues in other areas all over the
country, rather than with councils and
committees and colleagues,in other [local
government] departments.
iThe major .terms jOf the fireman's contract with the local
authority a^sTiaid down by the Home Office. See: P.Pain: Manual
of Fire Service haw, Thames Bank Publishers (1951) p. 59* ha*
Vv(l Wx/irOb A«X-
2see: Local Government and Central Control, A West Midland
Group Study, Rutledge & Kegan Paul (1956) p.23k et. seq.
3Except that it is interesting to observe that with regard to
officials like policemen and firemen "the major terms of the
contract are laid down by a stranger to the contract." See:
Pain pp. cit. p. 59 and infra p.Ub
^Local Government and Central Control, p.2bh and see n.1 on
that page.
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In other words the local government employees con¬
cerned with those services in which central government
control plays an important part."become professionally
integrated, with the civil servants who are responsible
for that control. The distinction between local and
central government becomes blurred and the feeling of
"service" is not local but national.
Under the New Towns Act of 191+6 and subsequent
A
legislation the central government may, under
Commissioners appointed by the appropriate minister,
establish and develop "new towns. " These may be either
completely new towns or former villages re-planned and
2
extended to admit new industries and population.
These corporations are, in fact, a kind of hybrid
administrative unit, combining the statutory form and
organisation of a public corporation under ministerial
control^ with many of the functions of a local authority.^
^New Towns Acts of 1952 and 1953»
^See G.D.H. Cole: Local and regional Government, Cassell
(191+7) P'7k ff. The various port authorities such as the
Mersey Board and the Port of London Authority are also akin
to local governing bodies in many respects. See, H.R.G.
Greaves: The Civil Service in the Changing State. Harrap
(191+7) P. 109 et. seq.
^New Tovras Act, 191+6 s.19. And see franklin v. Minister of
Town and Country Planning [ 191+8] A.C. 87.
1+ibid. s. 2(1+); this general section is however severely cur¬
tailed by s.21 and the effect of this is to make the primary
purpose of these corporations estate development and manage¬
ment.
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It is apparent that in the fulfilment of their duties
they will require to work in close liaison with the local
i
authority in whose area the new town is established.
The affinity of these corporations with local government
p
is further strengthened "by the fact that statute provides
that they are to "be "undertakers" for the purpose of the
3
application of local government superannuation "benefits.
Whether a local governing "body or a public corporation is
chosen to administer a particular area is thus largely a
matter of administrative convenience; it does not require
any legal differences in the employment relationship of the
employees concerned. The purposes of the instrumentalities
are broadly the same, the public interest in their duties is
identical. The fact that one is legally more a part of
1 "The New Towns are not to become at the outset separate
administrative units, either under their Commissioners or
under new Local Authorities of their own. The existing
Local Authorities of the areas in which they are to be
built are to assume, in the first instance, the respon¬
sibility of providing sanitary, educational and other
public services; and the Commissioners are to act rather
as Estate Development Companies for their entire areas ...
than governing authorities." Cole, op.cit. p.7A«
2jMew Towns Act 131+6 s.18.
3juocal Government Superannuation Act i 937 s.fj. provides for
the participation in the benefits of superannuation funds
maintained under that Act^of employees of undertakers
exercising powers under any Act or statutory order.
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"central" government than the other should "be, for the
purposes of conditions of employment, irrelevant.
The transfer of services from local authorities to
central government "bodies is not new and important instances
A
occurred early in this century. But it was after the
Second World War that this trend "became of major significance
and the public utility and social welfare legislation since
191+6 has "been responsible for a large scale transfer of
local government tasks and employees to central government
2
agencies.
A tradition for long existed that servants of local
authorities were, in some important sense, professionally
distinct from those of the civil service; educational
qualifications on entry and the emphasis in local govern¬
ment on executive and professional duties in the higher
ranks served to establish a difference in status.
This difference has been rapidly disappearing, how¬
ever, mainly because of post-war interchange between the
staffs in all branches of government and it is reflected
^See: Local Government and Central Control, pp.2i+-25.
2And, under the National Insurance Act of 19^8» many-
employees of private enterprise assurance companies
were so transferred.
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in the development of such trade unions as N.A.L.G-.O.^
This trend underlines the need to abandon anomalous
distinctions between governmental employees based solely
on the particular arm of government in which they are
2
serving.
In some cases local government officers have duties
imposed upon them directly by statute. For these pur¬
poses the officers are in fact acting as agents of the
Crown, although the employing local authority may still
Of the total membership of N.A.L.G.O. in 1950 (209,000),
about -150,000 members were employed in local government.
See Warren, op.cit. pp.133-13k* The official journal of
N.A.L.G.0., Public Service, is now published in three
different sections - local government, gas and electricity,
and the health services. The striking feature of this
journal is the continual emphasis on the unity of govern¬
mental service in every sphere. Cf. Public Service, January
1958: "Is there any reason why civil service and
nationalised industry employees should continue to be
regarded and treated as different types of public
servants'? ... all public servants could be recognised as
such be they employed in the civil service, local govern¬
ment or the nationalised industries and services."
p
In the national Health Service, for example, the medical
officers of the Ministry of Health will work in terms of
equality with their professional brethren in the local
authorities. The employer in each case is different but
the duties are much the same; this is manifested in the
transfers of local authority medical officers to administra¬
tive posts within the Ministry of Health. Technical
officials in the Fire Service Department of the Home
Office were recruited largely from the local authority
fire services. See Local Government anu Central Control;,
p. 21-3.
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retain some employer's rights.'1 In other cases the
appointment, dismissal and, occasionally, salary of local
government officials are subject to some degree of con—
2
trol by the central government.
This has certain important effects with regard to
the liability of the local authority for the actions of
these officers vis-&-vis the general public and the law
x
on this matter is more than obscure.
Consideration of this aspect of the effects of
central government control over local authority employees
lies outside the scope of this study. Not so the effect
such control has on the eirployer-employee relationship
from the point of view of the parties to it.
^Cf. Fuel & Lighting Order, 1939? art.l6(-|): "Each local
authority shall ... appoint ... an officer to be called 'the
local fuel overseer' who shall hold office, subject to any
directions of the divisional coal officer, at the pleasure
of the local authority." Also Representation of the People
Act, 1949, s.6, providing for the appointment of the clerks
to local authorities as "registration officers."
2Some of the officers to whom this is applicable are: Medical
Officers, Sanitary Inspectors, Surveyors, Chief Education
Officers and Clerks of County Councils. See, Robson, op.cit.
pp. 315-318.
•^See, generally, Gleeson E, Robinson: Public Authorities and
Legal Liability (1925) Chap.III. Partial control by the
central department may destroy the master-servant relation¬
ship between the local authority and the officer so that the
former would not be liable under the doctrine of respondeat
superior. See, for example, Stanbury v. Exeter Corporation
Tl905j 2 K.B. 838. Similarly, the dual "control" of central
and local authorities over the police has made the law
regarding responsibility for police activities far from
clear. Cf. Fisher v. Oldham Corp0rati0n [1930] 2 K.B.
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This matter has "been raised in two cases.''' the
decisions in which seem to conflict. In Field v. Borough
2
of Poplar the defendants reduced the salary of the plain¬
tiff, a senior sanitary inspector in their employment.
They had not dismissed him, nor had he resigned, nor at any
time did he consent to the reduction. The council failed
to obtain the unconditional consent of the Minister of
Health and it was held "by McCARDIE J. that the council had
no power to make the reduction in salary.
The statutory provisions governing the plaintiff's
, appointment were complex-"* hut broadly, the effect of the
legislation was that (a) a senior sanitary inspector should
be removable by the local authority only with the consent
of the Minister of Health, (b) he could not be appointed
for a limited period only and (c) the local authority must
pay to every sanitary inspector such salary as may from
time to time be approved by the Minister of Health.
^ In Littlejohn v. L.C. f 19381 1 K.B. 73 and Ooarpton v. West
Ham Borough Council I -19591 1 Ch. 771 the question of
Ministerial control was raised but in neither case was the
point taken. See supra pp.100 and 106.
2[1929] 1 K.B. 750.
^Metropolis Management Act 1855 s.62; Public Health (London)
Act 1891 ss.1<3>7, 108; London Government Act 1&99 ss. 1, 2;
Public Health (Officers) Act 1921 s.7; Sanitary Officers
Order 1926, Clauses 13, 17'. See the remarks of McCARDIE J.
at p.756 on "possible insanity."
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McCARDIE J. prefaced his remarks on the question of
the right to reduce salary with a comparison of the instant
1
case with that of Brown v. Dagenhara Ur"ban District Council
which the learned judge had decided a month or so previously.
.. it seems clear that the plaintiff occupied
a position which differed in striking fashion
from that held "by, for example, the clerk to the
urban district council in the recent action of
Brown v. Dagenham U.D.G. ... There the clerk was
liable to immediate dismissal at any time at the
pleasure of the council. His salary was quite
free from any question of approval by the Mini¬
ster of Health.
Having regard, therefore, to the statutory provisions
governing the plaintiff's position as senior sanitary
inspector, "I hold that these defendants could not cut down
the plaintiff's salary without his consent []my italics]
given by himself or some authorized person." It is not
absolutely clear whether the words in italics are meant to
refer to the Minister of Health or to the plaintiff but it
is difficult to see how they could refer to the latter.
Whether this is so or not, the Field case, is not easy to
reconcile with the decision in Moss v. Chesham Urban
3
District Council.
The plaintiff in that case was a surveyor and engineer
employed by the defendant council between the years 1927
1[1929] 1 K.B. 737.
2at 759-
3(l9l+5) 61 T.L.R. 290.
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and 19U1 • In September, 1927, by an agreement in writing
it was agreed that the plaintiff should serve the council
for four years from that date, subject to the right of
either party to determine the engagement at any time on
giving one. month's notice in writing. In 1 931 the agree¬
ment was to terminate automatically unless the parties
should have previously agreed for the continuance thereof;
at the expiry of the agreement in 1931 the plaintiff
continued in the service of the council, on the same terms,
except that his salary was from time to time increased.
By the Ministry of Transport Act 1919, Section 17(2):
"... the Minister may, by agreement with the
local authority, defray half the salary and
establishment charges of the engineer or
surveyor to a local authority responsible
for the maintenance of [certain classified]
roads, subject to the condition that the
appointment, retention, and dismissal of
such engineer or surveyor, and the amount
of such establishment charges, shall be
subject to the approval of the Minister."
The defendant council was in receipt of a grant from
the Ministry of Transport. The plaintiff was suspended in
December, 19'-|-1, and it was contended on his behalf that the
council had no power to suspend or dismiss him without the
consent of the Minister. It was admitted by the council
that such consent had not been obtained.
In the view of LYIISKEY J. the effect of the statute
on the contractual relationship between the plaintiff and
the defendant council was clear. The section just quoted
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did no more than empower the Minister of Transport to
enter into agreements with local authorities to defray
half the cost of certain charges which would otherwise
have to he "borne entirely "by the local authority. The
section conferred no right on the local authority or on
the plaintiff; nor did it provide for any payment "by the
Minister to the plaintiff. The local authority, as a
result of an agreement made "between the authority and the
Minister, acquired certain rights against the latter.
But unless the plaintiff had "been a party to that agree¬
ment he could not, in the view of the learned judge,
acquire any rights against either the employing authority
or the Minister of Transport.
The local authority, having made such an agreement
as was contemplated "by the section, and having dismissed
the plaintiff, was liable to the Minister for breach of
the agreement but that did not in any sense invalidate the
dismissal so far as the plaintiff was concerned under the
terms of his contract with the council.
"I am of the opinion, therefore, that the
right of the defendant council to suspend
or dismiss the plaintiff was in no way
affected by the provision of s.1?(2) or by
the agreement made by the council with the
Minister under the powers conferred on the
Minister by the subsection."'1
1at 291.
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Counsel for the plaintiff cited the case of Field v.
Borough of Poplar hut LYNSKEY J. considered that the latter
decision turned on the construction of Acts of Parliament
different in terms from that which he had to construe and
it gave therefore little guidance on the question which he
had to consider. With respect, it is suggested that the
cases have more in common than at first appears.
In each case the office was a compulsory one which
the local authority was "bound "by statute to create and to
fill. In theFjeld case, the Public Health (London) Act
of 189i provided, "by section 107(1), that:
"Every sanitary authority shall appoint an
adequate number of fit and proper persons
as sanitary inspectors. "
And in the Moss case, the relevant section of the
Local Government Act of 1933 stated:
"Every district council shall appoint fit
persons to be ... sanitary inspector or
inspectors ... Provided that a rural
district council need not appoint a
surveyor..."1
There is a difference in that in the Field case the
statutory conditions pertaining to the office automatically
2
applied by virtue of the regulations made under the Act;
in the Moss case, on the other hand, the statutory
1s. 107(1 )
2Public Health (Officers) Act 1921 s.7(l); Sanitary Officers
(Tenure of Office) Order 1926, S.R. & 0. 192b, No. 552.
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provisions embodied in the Ministry of Transport Act of
1919 s. 17(2) did not take effect until an agreement had
"been made between the local authority and the appropriate
Minister. It might be contended, therefore, that the
sanitary inspector had _ab initio a statutory right to have
certain of his conditions of service controlled by the
central government, while the surveyor could claim no
rights under the relevant statute since all that was given
there was a power to the Minister to make agreements with
the local authority - agreements to which the surveyor
would not be a party.
It is submitted, however, that this argument cannot
be sustained. Under the Ministry of Transport Act 1919
the power is given to the Minister to make an agreement with
the local authority. But once that agreement is made, the
statutory provision comes into operation and modifies the
contract of employment between the surveyor and the local
authority. The former may have been no party to the
agreement, but the effect of that agreement, once made,
was to alter the office of surveyor from one held solely
at the pleasure of the council (or on such terms as agreed)
to one subject to a degree of control by the Minister.
Up to the time the agreement was made, the surveyor had
no greater statutory protection than any other local
authority employee; after the agreement, however, the
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surveyor's position was dependent not upon contractual
terms alone, "but upon the terms compulsorily imposed by
the statute and which terms could not he altered by any
contractual agreement to the contrary. The measure of
Ministerial control which follows the making of an agree¬
ment between the local authority and the Minister flows,
it is submitted, not from the agreement but from the
terms of the statute which postulates such control as a
necessary result of the agreement. The contractual
agreement between the Minister and the local authority,
may be said to create the conditions in which the statutory
provision will take effect, but the consequences flow
thereafter from the statute and not from the agreement.
Thus the employee had a right and interest to challenge
•1
any interference with his new statutory position.
It mattered little, therefore, whether or not the
plaintiff in Moss v. Chesham had been a party to the agree¬
ment; he held an office the incidents of which became
modified by a statutory xorcvision protecting him from
arbitrary dismissal on the part of the council. It seems
illogical to deny him this protection and accord it to the
sanitary inspector, simply because the statutory provisions
1Cf. Vine v. National bock Labour Board [1956] 3 All E.R.
939 at 9U6, 9i+8.
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in the case of the former require a predicative contract.
it is suggested; therefore, that the decision in the latter
case should not he followed.1
One more point should he made about these "statutory"
officers. It seems that the practice of the central
government and the local authorities mitigates to a large
extent the harsh effects which might otherwise arise from
the ivioss case. Where a local government appointment is
subject to a degree of Ministerial control (over dismissal,
for example) it appears to he the practice for the central
department, or departments, concerned to hold a public
enquiry into the circumstances in which the particular
2
council action took place.
This joint control therefore has further reduced the
long-accepted differences between local and central govern¬
ment employees. The same employee may he answerable, for
11t is interesting to speculate whether had this been a
Scottish case the plaintiff would have acquired a jus
quaesiturn tertio since the agreement between the local
authority and the Minister could be viewed as'a con¬
tract whose object was to advance the interests of the
plaintiff in his official capacity.
2Of. The enquiry in October, 1957, into the dismissal of
the borough surveyor/sanitary inspector of the Borough
of Tenby; it seems that the central authority will
interfere, however, only in circumstances which suggest
manifest injustice to the employee. The judgment of the
council is left as free as possible. See Public Service
Vol. 30, Nos. 9, 10, 11.
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some purposesj to a central government department and
for others, to his employing authority; his conditions
of employment may combine features of "both the civil
service and the local government service.''
Furthermore, this growing unity of governmental
service has been recognised and assisted by the facilities
provided for the retention of superannuation benefits
where a governmental employee transfers from one branch of
the service to another - and even to outside employment
where this is approved by the Treasury.
The legislation covering these "transfer" arrangements
2
is extensive and complex but they provide for the
preservation of superannuation rights in the event of
transfers to and from different branches of governmental
service. Rules have been made under this legislation in
relation to employees transferring between the civil
"^Registrars appointed under the Births and Deaths Registration
Act 1836 s.7« and the Marriage Act -1836 s-17- have their con¬
ditions of service determined by the councils employing them.
This is subject, however, to the approval of the Registrar-
General who is also empowered to remove a registrar for
serious default in the performance of his duties (Local
Government Act, 1929, ss. 22, 2k (l)(9))« Deputy registrars
must be appointed by a registrar or superintendent registrar
and these deputies hold office at the pleasure of the
appointing officer subject to removal by the Registrar-General
for serious default. (Marriange and Registration Act, 1856
s.16; Births and Deaths Registration Act, 187k S.21+). Yet all
of these officers have their superannuation dealt with under
local government superannuation schemes and have a legally
enforceable right thereto.
23ee, Halsburv's Laws, Simonds Edition, Vol. 7, PP• kk3~kk5•
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service and (a) local government service (b) teaching
(c) certain public corporations (d) fire service; and similar
provisions safeguard the pension rights of former private
employees who hecame civil servants as a result of legis¬
lation or administrative reorganisation. This clearly
recognises the affinity of the different branches of govern¬
mental employment and has materially assisted the inter-
-1
change of governmental employees.
But the legislation goes further and provides that a
civil servant may retain his existing pension rights on
transfer to "approved employment." This is defined2 as
employment (not being employment in a public office, service
in which qualifiQ>a4i«»s for the grant of superannuation
allowance) which is recognised by the head of the approioriate
department and by the Treasury "as being employment in
reference to which it is expedient the section should apply."
This wide discretion has been liberally interpreted^
and the practice of the Treasury demonstrates how the
criterion of public interest cannot "be measured solely with
reference to whether employment is governmental or not but
must take into consideration the nature of the duties involved.
"•And makes even more anomalous the civil servant's lack of a
legally enforceable right to his pension. It has been suggested
that these rules "seem to endow pension rights with some of the
qualities of the Cheshire cat since they are enforceable or not
according to which service the officer belongs for the time
being." Mitchell op.cit. p.52.
2Superannuation Act s.i+(2); Superannuation Act 1935 s.8(U).
3see supra p.U9-
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Finally, the unity of governmental service has "been
importantly influenced "by the development of collective
"bargaining, Whitley machinery and the rise of large-scale
unions like N.A.L.Cr.O. By negotiation, conciliation and
arbitration governmental employees in the different services
have gained conditions of employment which are ia.aif.orm to a
high degree. The educational qualifications of local
government officers have "been greatly improved as a result
of trade union exhortation which saw the advantages of this
in the civil service; the local government Charter drew
A
heavily upon civil service practice and the unions maintain
2
liaison upon important conditions of service. The effect
of this has "been to make governmental employees more and more-
conscious of their membership of a unified public service in
which uniformity of conditions and transferability are major
characteristics.
*
The administrative advantages of recognising this unity
1 The "code of conduct," for example, in Fart IV of the Charter
is, in fact, an abstract of the leading passages in the Report
of the Civil Service Board of Enquiry which followed on the
Ironmonger case. See Warren, op» cit. p.9d
2-fn December 1957 the staff side of the Civil Service Whitley
Council invited N.A.L.G.O. to Le represented at a meeting to
discuss increases in pensions. PuMlc Service, January 1958P.10
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in governmental employment have "been fully discussed
elsewhere."1 What is of importance in this study is that
such recognition demonstrates that many differences in the
treatment of government employees are anomalies based on
p
false conceptions of public interest.
It may be objected that the doctrine of ministerial
responsibility places the civil service on a different
footing from local government or the public corporation.
This is difficult to sustain. In local government although
no doctrine of ministerial responsibility exists, local
councillors in practice do regard the actions of depart¬
ments of whose controlling committees they are members,
as politically important. They recognise that they have
a duty to interfere in departmental administration for
"policy"reasons. In public corporations the minister's
responsibility will vary with the degree of direction or
control given him by the enabling statute and in some cases
this degree of control will be considerable. The fact that
a minister is responsible for the actions of his subordinate
civil servants may demand high standards of impartiality and
integrity in the civil service. Nevertheless the main
1 See Greaves op.cit. pp.79-80
2It is impossible to see how by any test of public interest the
right of the civil servant to salary is legally doubtful while
the policeman (in whom public interest can be no less strong)
is given his salary as a right. See Police Act 1919 s.12 and
metropolitan Police Receiver v. Croydon Corporation and Another
Li 957J 1 All B.E. 78 atl 81.
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reason these qualities are important in the civil service
is the protection of the public. And this will operate
just as importantly in other governmental employment.'
In the same way the absence of legal enforceability
in civil service employment and its presence in local
government employment and in many other governmental
agencies is not due to amy fundamental difference in the
character of the employment. The reason is partly
historical and in part because of the way in which public
interest was apprehended in the eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries. Legal enforceability of his conditions of
service was not permitted the civil servant because of the
legal mysticism associated with the Grown. But over a
long period these conditions became firmly established and -
with the development of collective bargaining and trade
unionism - strongly protected. The need for legal sanctions,
at first denied, became obsolete because of social and
political changes. In local government the situation was
different. The heterogeneity of employers, varying greatly
in financial ability and social ideas, made it imperative
1 See: Local Government Act 1933, ss. 102(U); 106(5), which
prevents the clerk of a local authority frornbeing at the
same time the Treasurer, and also Hawkings v. Newman (1839)
U M. & W. 6-13; "Ethical Standards in Government," Report
of a sub-coromittee of the United States Senate Committee
on Labour' "and Public Welfare, 82nd Cong. 1st Sess. Xl95l);
"Practical considerations in the formulation of a code of
ethics for Government Employees," (1952) 52 Col♦ L..R. p.1.
- i i+O -
xor employee associations to seek legislation which would
make their conditions ox1 employment at once uniform and safe. ^
It is not, therefore, "because the degree of public
interest in the civil service is greater than in local
government that employees of the former are, legally, more
"rightless" than those of the latter. This is clearly
demonstrated by the fact that in important instrumentalities
like the police and fire services and in public corporations
the basic conditions of service are enforceable in the law
courts.
It has been suggested in this and previous chapters
that the basic test against which conditions of employment
in governmental service (as in any employment) must be
measured is that of "public interest" ascertainable only
by reference to the duties to be performed; in turn this
involves the denial that governmental service, as such, is
sui generis, the latter view having been responsible for
parallel is noticeable in the different auditing and
accounting procedures. That of the District Auditor is
highly legalised; in the civil service i-t is largely a
matter of intra-service regulation. The reasons for the
difference are the same.
- 1bi -
placing anachronistic restrictions on governmental
employees even when the public interest did not require
a
them» It has been further suggested that the instru¬
mentalities of government form a unity and that uniformity
of conditions and inter-changeability of staffs is both
possible and desirable. And finally it is submitted that
since in the United Kingdom the law has played a relatively
unimportant role in establishing and developing conditions
of service it is unnecessary and, perhaps, undesirable to
demand legally enforceable rights where none exist.
The importance of these conclusions for public employ¬
ment generally will be better appreciated after a study of
some of the problems of governmental employment in Australia
to which attention must no?/ be directed.
1It was this attitude towards Crown employment which led to
the restrictions on military forces being extended to civil
employees. See, Logan, loc. cit.
PART TWO - AUSTRALIA
CHAPTER VI The government as employer
- A k2-
To the English lawyer, the most striking character¬
istics of governmental employment in Australia are: the
importance of statute law in conditions of service; the
emphasis placed on the rights of the employee and the lack
of restrictions on political activity.
In order to understand the important part played by
these factors, it is necessary to examine briefly the early
history ofAustralian public service legislation. In the
colonies, until the coming of responsible government, the
Governor appointed all governmental officials, subject to
the ratification of the British Colonial Office and, as in
the mother country, political patronage played a major role
in selection."' After responsible government had been
1
Objections by the colonists were based not on the
inefficiency of the system of patronage but on the fact
that the patronage lay with the British Colonial
Secretary. In 1850 the N.S.W. Legislative Council passed
a resolution "that the reserving to the Secretary of
State for the Colonies of the gift of appointment to
public offices .. is inexpedient and that, from the
advanced state of Society in the Colony, this patronage
should be absolutely vested in the local Executive."
See: R.S. Parker, Public Service Recruitment in
Australia, M.U.P. (l9k2) pp. 19-20.
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n 1
granted this control over governmental employment passed
to the Governors of the colonies, which meant, in effect,
to the responsible Ministers, and patronage continued to
dominate appointment to public offices, although now in
different hands.
The first colony to take steps to reform the defects
of the system was Victoria; in 1856, the year after the
proclamation of the colony's constitution, the government
of the day appointed a Board of Enquiry under Professor
W.E.Hearn to report upon the administration and efficiency
of the colony's civil service.
p
In the report of this body the influence of the
Northcote-Trevelyan recommendations and of the Macaulay
3
reforms in India are at once apparent. The report stressed
the complete lack of regulations and rules; the absence of
superanimation and leave provisions; the need for "a
Central Board of Control;" the necessity to appoint
''Tasmania and South Australia in 1 854 and 1856 by local Acts
authorised by the Australian Colonies Act 1850 (13 and 14
Vict, c.59); New South Wales and Victoria in 1855 by two
Imperial statutes (l8 and 19 Vict, c.54, 55); Queensland
in 1 855 by Order in Council made under 13 and 14 Vict. c.
59 and 5 and 6 Vict, c.76; Western Australia in 1889 by a
local Act which was validated by a retrospective Imperial
statute of 1890 (53 and 54 Vict. c. 26).
^Victoria Parliamentary Papers, Session 1 856-57, Vo|,4^No. 23.
■^ibid. pp. 4-11; 18-19
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non-political heads of departments1; the evil effects of
nepotism and political patronage2; and, above all, "the
most striking and the most objectionable feature in the
Civil Service of this Colony is the uncertainty -of its
tenure.
Because of governmental changes and rather unsettled
political conditions nothing further was done about the
L
Hearn report after it was tabled in the Legislature. '
In 1859? however, a Royal Commission (of which Hearn was
a member) was appointed to investigate the civil service
and the defects of the existing system were once more
1See at p.15: "Under the recent alterations in the Govern¬
ment of this Colony those officers who were formerly working
Heads of Departments have become Parliamentary Ministers ...
It will be impossible to prevent confusion and public incon¬
venience if the orderly working of the Civil Service is
interrupted by frequent Ministerial changes. We, therefore,
sunmit ... the propriety of following the English precedent
of appointing non-political and permanent officers to carry
into execution the policy which the Ministry of the day may
originate."
2rJ?he bad English example "deplored by all" was cited as a
warning: ibid. p.i+.
■^ibid. p.16. This statement is followed by a plea to make
the civil service "as secure as that of England."
^Bills were introduced from time to time in the following
few years but land law occupied by far the greatest part
of legislative time and members manifested little interest
in civil service legislation.
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censured in the Report of the Commissioners.^
"The radical defect of the present con¬
dition of the Civil Service is the total
absence of any general rules. There is
no rule as to appointments; no rule as
to promotion; no rule as to dismissals;
no rule as to leave of absence; no rule
as to superannuation ... from the absence
of any formal regulation the service has
practically become fragmentary ... We
think therefore, that the first step to
remove anomalies and to restore the
service to its natural and lawful unity
is the establishment of a proper system
of classification."
The commissioners stressed the need for proper super¬
annuation and leave provisions and they recommended inter
alia the establishment of a Court of Inquiry whenever any
punishment, including dismissal, was imposed upon an
employee. The emphasis was strong on the need to protect
the rights of civil servants and the inference that this
3would best be achieved by statute is unmistakable.
1Victoria Parliamentary Papers, Session 1859-80, VoL3» Wo. 19.
2ibid, p. 10, para.9«
3cf. at p.13 where, discussing the fact that salaries might
have to be reduced on a systematic classification of the
service, the report stated: "Many officers have incurred
obligations on the expectation that no serious diminution
on their incomes would be made; and the reduction which
would be a trifling gain to the public would be to them a
serious loss. The Imperial Government and Legislature
have on all occasions fully recognised "the propriety of
not interfering with the existing rights and reasonable
expectations of public servants." [This is a quotation
from the British Royal Commission on Superannuation of 1857].
In Canada^, also, an Act recently passed for the regulation
of the Civil Service in that Colony contains a clause
expressly saving existing salaries. The same rule has been
observed at the Cape of Good Hope; and we perceive that
the British Government have recently recommended its
adoption in reference to the Civil Service of India.
- 12+6 -
In the Parliamentary session 1861-62 a hill was
introduced to give effect to the recommendations of the
Royal Commission and Act No. 16O of 1862 became the first
Australian legislation relating to the conditions of service
of public employees. The Act proposed in its preambles:
"to classify the Public Service according to
the duties performed by the officers, to
regulate salaries accordingly, to establish
a just and uniform system of appointment,
promotion and dismissal, to grant to such
officers furlough for recreation and to
provide retiring allowances in certain cases."
It is interesting to observe that the Minister who
introduced the bill justified it on the grounds that it
would provide an element of security in civil service
conditions; it was following the good examples set in many
European countries; it would provide decent employment
opportunities for the youth of the Colony. But above all,
"It would ... not be so much a gain to the civil servants
A
as it would to the House in shortening the sessions. "
This last reason was of great practical importance as so
''See: Victorian Hansard, Session 1861-62, Vol. VIII, pp.881-
888. Also of interest are the grounds given by the Minister
for refusing to include policemen in the superannuation
provisions of the Act. They were "on a different footing
from the other servants of the Government;" they had their
own form of pension fund; they formed "a semi-military body
doing duty peculiar to itself;" and, lastly, because "the
time was not far distant when they would be placed under
local control in the different districts." In fact this
last never happened and throughout Australia the police have
remained under the State governments. See, infra, Chap. VII
pp.
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much of the legislature's time, under the system of
patronage, was taken up with the grievances and petitions
of individual civil servants.
Unfortunately this Act was not effective in achieving
what it had "been intended to do. A section which had "been
included to allow for the appointment of persons outside
the service who were possessed of special qualification was
used in fact as an instrument of political patronage; as a
result, while the "properly" appointed civil servants
decreased hy twenty-five per cent during the years 1862-1882,
•1
the "supernumary" service increased hy sixty-five per cent.
This struggle against political nepotism is a feature of the
civil service legislation of all the States and it was not
until late in the nineteenth century and, in some cases,
even in the twentieth century, that an effective system of
2
appointment hy examination existed throughout Australia.
*
^See: Report of Royal Commission on the Public Service of
Victoria, 1917? PP.6-11.
2Victoria achieved this in 1883 (the influence of the American
Pendleton Act of the same year is unmistakable); New South
Wales in 1895; South Australia was partially successful in
1871+; Queensland, Western Australia and Tasmania in 1899,
1900 and 1901 respectively.
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On the "basis of Victorian experience - which the
other States followed to a large extent - it is possible
to put forward some tentative reasons for the features of
Australian governmental employment mentioned at the
"beginning of this chapter.
The significant place of statute lav/ may well he
ascribed to the need to make the conditions of service not
only cognoscible, but reasonably permanent. And to a
newly established responsible legislature the obvious way
of achieving this was by an Act of Parliament. The need
for certainty in civil service conditions of employment had
been emphasised by the Victorian investigating commissions
and the continual pressure on parliamentarians for ad hoc
decisions in individual cases was a direct result of this
instability of conditions.
The pernicious influence of political patronage,
subjected to severe criticism by the Northcote-Trevelyan
report and local colonial reformers, could be combatted only
by arming those in control of the public service with
Parliamentary authority which could not be readily circum¬
vented by individual politicians or by the government in
power.
Further, it seems likely that the colonies, having
newly emerged from a period of "preogative" rule and
subservience to the statutes of the Imperial Parliament,
- 1U9 -
felt that the "best way to make a fresh start was to control
their civil services hy local Acts and limit (as far as
possible) the prerogative powers of the Crown.1 This is
borne out by the practice of other colonies like Canada and
2
the Cape of Good Hope.
In the same way, the emphasis on the rights of the
employee is probably a natural concomitant of the liberal
political and social atmosphere of the new colonies but two
other possible reasons suggest themselves. First, the
complete absence of any civil service rules whatever meant,
in effect, that the employee was rightless - no leave, no
superannuation, a salary liable to wide fluctuations and
promotion prospects entirely at the mercy of political
patronage. The contrast with the home Civil Service and
that of India had been observed-^ and the natural reaction
to this was a demand for rights for the employee not only
in his interest but in the interest of the efficiency of
the service.
Second, the recent superannuation legislation in the
United Kingdom played an important part in the deliberations
1 Cf. the New South Wales Civil Service Act of -l 88i+ which was
the subject of the decision in Gould v. Stuart [-1896] A.C.5'75.
2See supra p. ^14.5 ru'3* For an obvious parallel, see Wheare;
Modern Constitutions, H.U.L. (1951) P«9«
3supra p. -H1.5 n.3«
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of the 1859 Victorian Royal Commission"^ and the commissioners
were clearly impressed "by the need to respect existing rights.
This respect for "rights" was to have important effects on
the history of Australian public service legislation
2
generally and was to give rise to considerable litigation
3
on the formation of the Commonwealth.
The third feature of Australian public service employ¬
ment - the freedom from political restrictions - is, for the
lawyer, of less importance than the others just mentioned.
The wide political liberty accorded to governmental employees
is not a matter of.law except in the negative sense that few
statutory restrictions exist other than with regard to
correspondence in the press, commenting publicly upon
departmental administration and, of course, membership of a
legislature.
None of the statutes..relating to governmental employ¬
ment nor regulations made thereunder in either the State
or the Commonwealth sphere refers directly to political
^Cf. pp. 18-19 of the Report.
2Royal Commissions to investigate the working of the various
civil services were held in Victoria (1917), New South Wales
(1917-18), The Commonwealth (1917-20) and Queensland (1919)-
The rights of civil servants feature prominently ,in the
reports of these bodies. See, F.A.Bland: Government in
Australia, N.S.W.Government Printer, 2nd Ed. (1914.U) s p.xxvi.
3Infra, Oh. VIII, pp.
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activities. The Federal Constitution"1 "by s.iUl-(iv) dis¬
qualifies any person holding office under the Crown from
"becoming a candidate for election to Parliament. In the
case of members of the Commonwealth Public Service the
Public Service Act 1922-57 gives (s.^7A) a right to re¬
instatement in the event of failure to be elected. In the
States statutory restrictions generally exist on the
publication in the press of material affecting the public
p
service and on public comment upon the administration of
3
the department in which the servant is employed. The
right to reinstatement on failure to succeed at a Parlia¬
mentary election is assured in all States^ and in certain
cases the servant need not resign to contest an election
but is entitled to claim leave of absence without pay during
3
his campaign. Such restrictions as do exist have given
rise to no litigation and it is important particularly in
'"'The Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act 1900 came into
force on 1st January 1901. It is divided into nine clauses;
the first eight are the Covering Clauses and the last is the
Constitution proper.
^Cf. South Australian Public Service Act 1936-56 s.58.
3cf. New South Wales Public Service Act 1938-56 Regulation 17«
^Cf. South Australian Public Service Act 1936-56 s.70.
^See, e.g. Tasmanian Constitution (State Employees) Act ■\9khr'
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this sphere of employment relations to realise that the
presence of a statutory restriction on. for example,,
making public comments on departmental administration is
no criterion of its enforcement or effectiveness - law and
reality here,as elsewhere, are often widely divergent.
For example, a member of the Commonwealth Public Service
"shall not publicly comment upon any administrative action
or upon the administration of any Department." In
practice, this prohibition is rarely enforced; and, in the
Federal capital, Canberra, where Federal public servants
constitute by far the largest part of the total working
2
population the regulation is virtually ignored.
This liberality stems, in part, from the intimate
association of politics and administration in the early days
of the colonies^, in part from the general democratic
liberal tradition of Australian social and political life
and, in the twentieth century, partly from the strength of
"'Commonwealth Public Service Act 1922-57, Regulation.' 3U(b).
^Canberra is administered by two government departments - the
Department of Works and the Department of the Interior -
assisted by an Advisory Council. This Council contains both
elected and government-nominated members and some of the
former are official candidates of the two main national
political parties - the Liberal and Labor parties. Campaigns
for election to the Council are conducted on party lines and
the present Chairman (elected) is a Labor party candidate and
a public servant. The Council frequently criticise depart¬
mental policy and administration.
3see supra p. 1 kk n.1.
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the Labor Party whose doctrines found favour with a high
proportion of governmental employees.'''
*
The effect of these attributes of governmental employ¬
ment in Australia has "been to give the government as
employer few special rights and to subject governmental
service and private employment to much the same
considerations as far as the rights of the employee are
2
concerned. This is manifested, at the present time, in
the minute regulation of all conditions of service in which
guarantees to the employee play a major part; the complex
system of appeals throughout governmental service; the
importance of compulsory arbitration in government employment
and the insistence on the preservation of "existing rights"
and the provision, where necessary, of compensation for loss
of office. Something must now be said of these character¬
istics before discussing what their effects have been on
1 I?or an interesting discussion of the history of the
political rights of Commonwealth public servants see V.
Subramaniam: "Political Rights of Commonwealth Public
Servants," Public Adminiaj^_ajJ-Qiu Sydney, March, 1958, p. 22.
2
But see infra Ch. VII for exceptions.
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the governmental employee's legal position.
In the United Kingdom statute plays some part in the
regulation of conditions of service in governmental employ¬
ment.^ Governmental service in Australia on the other
hand presents a striking contrast in that this form of legal
control is much more extensive and detailed. Almost every
aspect of the employer-employee relationship is minutely
regulated by statutes and regulations made thereunder and
most of these legal rorovisions have from time to time given
rise to litigation.
While there are variations in the public service legis¬
lation of the different states and of the Commonwealth, it
is clear that, in the main, they follow the same pattern.
This is true also of local government legislation and also
of the statutes governing the wide variety of quasi-govern-
p
mental "bodies that exists in Australia. Typical of the
general pattern is the. Commonwealth Public Service Act
3
i922-57 which, together with a number of other statues ,
''For example, in local government, the police and fire
services, statutory corporations and (with regard to
superannuation) the civil service.
2Cf. e.g. ss. 158-163 of the Victorian Local Government
Act, 191+6, and ss. 88-95 of the hew South Wales Local
Government Act, 1919-19^-3«
^Superannuation Act 1922-50; Commonwealth Employees'
Compensation Act 1930-50; Commonwealth Employees' Furlough
Act 1 9Ii3-i4.il-; Officers' Rights Declaration Act 1 928—i+O;
Audit Act 1901-50; Public Service Arbitration Act 1920-50;
Crimes Act 191U-50.
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governs the conditions of service of Federal public servants."''
This statute provides for the composition and admini¬
stration ("by a Public Service Board) of the service^ and
deals in great detail with, inter alia; the creation and
abolition of offices, salaries, promotions and transfers,
offences, leave of absence, transfers of employees "between
the Commonwealth service and State public services, as well
as certain statutory authorities, temporary employment and
returned soldiers.
The servants'right to salary is left in no doubt.
Apart from the heads of departments and a few other senior
officers, all public servants under the Act, "shall be paid
salaries at such rates,or in accordance with such scales of
rates, as are prescribed. "-3 The former officers "shall be
paid such salaries as the Parliament provides."^"
By s.8 the Act is stated not to apply to: any Justice of
the High Court of Australia; the High Commissioner; the
Auditor-General; the Public Service Arbitrator; the
Commonwealth Railways Commission or any employee under the
Commonwealth Railways Act 1917; any person employed in
an honorary capacity; any officer the right to appoint
whom is not vested in the Governor-General or the Board;
any person remunerated by fees, allowances or commissions
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The emphasis on the rights of the employee is manifest
in the promotion provisions of the statute which go so far
as to lay down the criteria "by which promotions shall "be
made.'' Terms like "relative efficiency" and "equality of
efficiency" are vague and imprecise and the amendments to
which these sections of the Act have "been subject are in
themselves strong testimony of the influence of the employee
organisations and of the importance placed on the servants'
"rights."2
So, too, in the sections of the statute dealing with
offences, guarantees of just treatment and respect for the
x
employees rights are manifest. The offences which are
punishable are fully set out and the method of charging and
punishing the offender are precisely described. And the
necessity for strict adherence to the procedure laid down
k
in the Act was proved early in the history of the service.
But it is in the comprehensive provisions governing
appeals of various kinds that the protection of the rights
of governmental servants is most apparent. Any promotions
1s. 50 (3) (3A) (k) (HA).
^See the Report of the Commonwealth Public Service Board,
1950, pp.20-22, for a discussion of the conflict between
"seniority" and "efficiency."
3s. 55 (3).
^■Williamson v. The Commonwealth (j907) 5 C.L.R. i 7U-
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made within the service are provisional only and are without
increase in salary pending confirmation; and such confirmation
cannot he given until a right of appeal has heen given to
those employees who are so entitled. The wide field that
this covers may he judged from the terms of the Act which
gives a right of appeal to "any officer who considers that
he is more entitled to promotion ... on the ground of
(a) superior efficiency or (h) equal efficiency and
seniority.
To hear these appeals there have heen established
Promotions Appeal Committees which in certain cases determine
2
the appeal and in others make a recommendation to the Board.
A Promotion Appeals Committee must contain a member nominated
by the staff association covering the class of office
cone erned.
The system of Disciplinary Appeal Boards provides even
more striking evidence of the desire to protect the public
servant from arbitrary punishment or dismissal. for the
offences specified in the Act the departmental head may
impose punishments including a fine, a reduction in salary,
demotion or a recommendation to the Public Service Board
1s. 50 (6).
20n the system of promotion appeals, see, L. Blair: "Employer-
Employee Relations in the Federal Public Service," Public
Administration Vol. XXXV,Spring 1957, p. 53 at pp.59-6i.
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that he may he dismissed. Against such punishment a
servant has the right of appeal to a Disciplinary Appeal
Boardj the chairman of which must he a magistrate and which
must include a representative of the Division of the service
to which the appellant belongs. The Appeal Board has power
to determine the appeal in any way it sees fit except that
it cannot dismiss an appellant, hut may recommend dismissal
A
to the Public Service Board.
It may he observed that although no such provisions
exist in the statute at present under consideration, certain
Acts governing governmental employment provide for appeals
p
by employees against salary classification and even against
transfer from one area to another.^ These provisions give
the employee powerful legal rights against the government
and, as with the appeals under the Commonwealth Public
I
Service Act mentioned above, the machinery is frequently used.
^s.55(h)(5); see Blair, loc. cit. pp.6i-62. Legal represen¬
tation is permitted before the Appeal Board.
^See: South Australian Local Government Act 1938-57 which
provides for a Classifications Appeals Board.
^Cf. H.S.W. Police Regulation (Appeals) Act 1923 (as amended
by subsequent statutes) s.6 (1).
h-Tbe extent to which promotion appeals are used is apparent
from the annual reports of the Commonwealth Public Service
Board and the State public service controlling authorities.
In a recent report of the former, statistics shewed that for
the year ended 30th June 1956. there were I0,h55 provisional
promotions and 12,709 appellants. Of the promotions appealed
against 17.1# were successful.
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The government is further limited as an employer "by
the extensive compulsory arbitration system. By means of
this machinery conditions of employment in the civil
services, local government and the public corporations are
decided by judicial tribunals whose decisions are binding on
both employer and employee. The effect of this complex
system on the legal position of the governmental employee
will be discussed in a later chapter. It suffices to say,
meantime, that the decisions of the various Wages Boards,
Arbitrators and the Conciliation and Arbitration Commission
provide abundant illustration of the reluctance to concede
to the state any special right, as an employer and of the
refusal to treat governmental employment as essentially
different from employment in private enterprise. Indeed,
the existence of arbitration machinery is frequently referred
to in the early reports of governmental controlling bodies
like Public Service Boards in terms which clearly indicate
the limitations imposed by arbitration on the freedom of
-I
the Boards to determine basic conditions of service.
Finally, the government's freedom as an employer has
been statutorily limited by the many provisions in both
"'See: Bland, op. cit. Ch. XII and L. Blair: "Arbitration in the
Federal Public Service of Australia," Public Administration
Vol. XXXIV, Spring 1956, p.61 at p.6ii.
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Commonwealth and State legislation foi~ the preservation
of rights where, for example, a governmental employee has
heen compulsorily transferred between the State and Common¬
wealth administrations. And the Constitution itself has
provided specifically for the rights of State civil
servants who were transferred to the Commonwealth govern¬
ment on federation? As will "be explained "below, the
desire to preserve the rights of the employee featured
strongly in the enactment of these provisions and the High
Court's interpretation of them has reflected this view.2
It is against this "background that the legal position
of theAustralian governmental employee must 'be viewed.
The "basic problems of governmental employment are similar
^s.8U: "When any department of the public service of a State
becomes transferred to the Commonwealth all officers of the
department shall become subject to the control of the
Executive Government of the Commonwealth.
Any such officer who is not retained in the service of the
Commonwealth shall, unless he is appointed to some other office
of equal emolument in the public service of the State, be
entitled to receive from the State any pension, gratuity or
other compensation, payable under the law of the State on the
abolition of his office.
Any such officer who is retained in the service of the




to tnose encountered in the United Kingdom, hut historical,
legal and constitutional differences have resulted in the
application of different legal solutions. In Australia
the main features in governmental employment of interest
to the comparative lawyer have centred on the right of
the Grown to dismiss at pleasure and how far it has "been
abrogated by statutory provision; the extent and effect
of the detailed system of statutory rights; and the
existence and implications of what might "be termed a
complex "body of administrative lav/ in the form of the
compulsory arbitration machinery.
It is with the way in which the problems arising
from these factors have been tachled and the lessons of
the solutions whichhave been attempted that the remainder
of this part of the study are concerned.
CHAPTER VII The implied term
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In Australia, as in the United Kingdom, the courts
have consistently held that contracts "between the Crown
and its servant contain an implied term that the servant
*1shall Toe disrnissible at pleasure. This doctrine has
"been of minor significance in the United Kingdom where the
long-established tradition of security of tenure has
always "been maintained. But in the early Australian
p
colonies local political conditions demanded some
abrogation of the Crown's right.
The effectiveness of an implied statutory restriction
3
on the implied term was first tested in Gould v. Stuart ,
a case which merits detailed discussion insofar as it
illustrates the main criteria by which an alleged abrogation
of the right to dismiss at pleasure could be tested.
The Supreme Court of N.S.W. concluded that the N.S.W.
Civil Service Act of i 88k was "a code of laws ... to
declare the manner in which the Crown shall act with
reference to all appointments, dismissals and other matters
Cf. Carey v. Commonwealth (1921) 3Q C.L.R. i 32; Commonwealth
v. Quince (19UU) C8 C.L.R. 227»
2supra p. iij.2 ejt« seq.
■3[i 896] A.C. 575; (d 893) 16 1J.S.W. L.R. 132.
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affecting the Civil Service" and based this conclusion on
four main features of the legislation.
First, the preamble to the Act which referred to the
expediency of classifying the service and stated that "a
system of appointments promotions and retiring allowances
should he established and that other provisions for the
regulation of the service should he made."
Second, Part II of the Act which "dealt exhaustively"
with the appointment and promotion of civil servants. The
court were of the opinion that this part of the statute was
clearly intended to restrict the power of the Crown to
appoint persons to the civil service "at its will and
pleasure" and to exclude the possihility that candidates
for the service might he appointed or promoted hy the
operation of political Influence to the detriment of the
1
public interest.
Third, Part II of the Act which related to dismissals
and penalties for offences. The Privy Council placed more
importance on these sections of the statute than the
Supreme Court hut the letter pointed out that in this part
of the Act there was provision not only for a systematic
^ (-1895) 16 H.S.W. L.K. -132 at i36. On the same page
WINDEYER J. went on: "Plainly, then, this part of
the Act limits the powers of the Crown and regulates
the nature of the contract which the Crown makes with
its servants, by prescribing the conditions under
which that contract is to be made."
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dismissal procedure but also for the mandatory dismissal
of a civil servant if found guilty of certain offences.
Summing up the effect of these sections, WIEDEYES J.
commented at 137:
"No person can, therefore, be summarily
dismissed except in the cases specified,
and in those cases he not only may but
must be dismissed, and this appears to
me to restrict the rights of the Crown
in two ways - first by talcing away the
power of summary dismissal at pleasure
and secondly, by taking away, in certain
cases, the right of the Grown to retain
in its service an officer who has mis¬
conducted himself."
Fourth, the Act's provisions for the creation of a
Civil Service Superannuation Fund to which every officer
had to contribute.
In assessing the effect of all these factors the
court concluded that the burden of a contributory
superannuation fund had to be compensated for by suitable
dismissal provisions which would be used only in specified
cases and after an opportunity had been given to the civil
servant to make explanations; that it was desirable in the
public interest to staff the civil service with persons of
ability and integrity and such peox^le could not be attracted
without security of tenure, and that the whole intention of
A
the statute was to provide guarantees from arbitrary dismissal
"'see especially at 13 /—8.
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In affirming thedecision the Judicial Committee of
the Privy Council supjjorted the grounds on which the
Supreme Court reached its conclusions, "but laid greater
stress on the provisions of Part II of the Act which were
''the most material in the present case. The relevant
provisions were sections 32-37 and the importance of their
implications warrants treatment in some detail.
Section 32 provided for the suspension of any officer
who in the opinion of the Minister or of any officer
authorised "by him had committed an action which appeared to
justify suspension. If the suspension was not made "by the
Minister a report had to he prepared for him and he might
confirm or annul the suspension.
By section 33 if the Minister ordered or confirmed a
suspension, he had to report this to the Governor who, after
calling on the officer to make an explanation, could remove
the suspension or punish the servant with penalties up to
and including dismissal. The Governor before deciding
could appoint a hoard of inquiry to investigate the circum¬
stances.
In sections 31+ and 37 certain penalties were provided
for negligence or dishonourable conduct and section 35 made
i [^ 896] A.C. 575 at 578. Referring to the superannuation
provisions SIR RICHARD COUCH mentioned that the servant was
not entitled to a superannuation allowance "until he has
served fifteen years."
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provision for summary dismissal in the event of the
commission of a felony or infamous behaviour.
"These provisions," said SIR RICHARD COUCH, (at 578),
delivering the opinion of the Judicial Committee, "are
manifestly intended for the protection and "benefit of the
officer [and] are inconsistent with importing into the
contract of service the term that the Crown may put an end
to it at its pleasure. In that case they would be super¬
fluous, useless and delusive."
The decision in Gould v. Stuart may, therefore, be
summed up thus. Because of the existence of certain statu¬
tory provisions the rights of the Crown as employer had been
abrogated as to (a) how the contract of service was made
(b) dismissal at will (c) the retention of unsuitable
servants. The provisions which enabled these conclusions
to be drawn were: the existence of a power to dismiss
(after justifiable suspension) which could be exercised
A
only by the Governor ; a concurrent duty on the Crown to
dismiss in certain circumstances; a system of examination
for appointment to the service and of promotion within it;
and a contributory superannuation scheme.
The reaction to the Gould v. Stuart was immediate and
was expressed in the N.S.W. Public Service Act of 1895-
"'it should be observed that the Minister was under no
obligation to hold any Rind of enquiry before ordering
or confirming a suspension; nor was the Governor oblige
to hold an enquiry before deciding whether or not the
servant should be dismissed.
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This statute was passed on the recommendations of a Soyal
Commission which had reported that the 1882+ Act had 'been
of little effect in abolishing political patronage and
inefficiency.'' The government of the day took the oppor¬
tunity of including in this new legislation a section
which provided that nothing in the 1881+ Act or the present
one "shall "be construed or held to abrogate and restrict
the right of the Crown as it existed "before the . . . Act to
dispense with the services of any person employed in the
p
public service."
This saving clause has since featured in the public
3 2+
service legislation of both Tasmania and South Australia
and in these cases the effect of the express retention of
^See Bland, op.cit. pp.xiii-xiv.
p
New South Wales Public Service Act s.58; this provision is
still retained in s.o5 of the Public Service Act 1902-1952]-.
During the debates on the 1895 bill the clause was justified
on the grounds that it was necessary "in the public interest. "
One member objected to the clause on the grounds that it
nullified the effect of the other parts of the Bill "designed
to put aside from ministerial interference the administration
of the public service of the colony." The same member
promised to raise the question in committee but no further
mention of the clause appears at any stage of the debates.
See New South Wales Parliamentary Debates (1895) Vols. 80,
81 , pp.1578, 2551 and 2554*
■^Public Service Act 1938-55 s.77.
^Public Service Act 1936-55 s.65.
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the Crown right to dismiss at pleasure is clear. Not¬
withstanding that the remainder of the Act in question
may contain limitations on the Crown's right of appoint-
ment, promotion or suspension the servant holds office at
■]
the will of the Crown.
But in the other States and in the Commonwealth the
relevant statutes contain no reference to the retention
of the Crown's right and the courts, since Could v. Stuart,
have held that the Crown's right is in these cases abrogated
and that dismissal can take place only after the statutory
p
procedure has been followed.
In these cases, therefore, the implied term has been
negatived by the existence of statutory provisions, the
implications of which are clearly inconsistent with dis¬
missal at pleasure. But that the statutory implications
need to be unequivocally expressed is apparent in a number
of cases in which the High Court has refused to hold that
the implied term has been negatived by the provisions of
statutes pertaining to the state policeforces.
1See Young v. Adams [i 898] A.C.1+69; Hughes v. The Crown (1903)
6 W.A.L.fi. 21 .
^Williamson v. The Commonwealth (1907) 5 C.L.R. 171+ at 119;
Le"~Leu v. The Commonwealth (1 921 ) 29 C.L.R. 305 at 311* Bat
see infra p.I°[^ for the suggestion that this is open o
considerable qualification.
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On the "basis of the decision in Gould v. Stuart it
seems reasonable to assume that the implied term will "be
negatived by the existence of statutory provisions governing
Inter alia examination and appointment; specific offences
and penalties; promotions and disciplinary appeals; and a
system of superannuation. But it is clear from the decisions
of the High Court in three important cases'1 that, although
they are subject to a comprehensive code regulating conditions
of service and notwithstanding the absence of a specific
statutory reservation of the Crown's right to dismiss at
pleasure, policemen hold office at the pleasure of the Crown.
2
In Ryder v. Foley the decision turned on the effect of
s.6 of the Police Act of -1863, a Queensland statute. By
this section the Commissioner of Police "shall appoint fit
ana proper persons to fill such vacancies as may hereafter
occur among the sergeants and constables of the police force,
and upon sufficient proof of misconduct or unfitness to be
submitted for the approval of the Government shall have
power to dismiss any sergeants and constables ..." In
reversing the decision of the Supreme Court of Queensland
(of which decision something more will be said below), the
High Court held that this section did not abrogate in any
1 Ryder v. Foley (1906) 1+ C.L.R. 1+22; Fletcher v. Hott (1938)
60 C._L.R. 55; Ka.ye v. Attorney-General for Tasmania (1956)
91+ C.L.R. 193.
2(1906) 1+ C.L.R. 1+22.
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way the Crown's right to dismiss at pleasure and that the
word "Government" meant the Executive acting through a
responsible Minister of the Crown, and not the Governor-
4
in-Council.
GRIFFITH C.J. rejected the argument that s.6 could
"be interpreted as conferring on a constable accused of an
offence an opportunity of being heard before he could be
deprived of his office. He referred to the Constitution
Act of 1867 which provides that all appointments in the
governmental service have to be made either directly by or
2
by a duly constituted agent of, the Governor-in-Council.
Hedid not regard s.6 as dealing with the tenure of office
of constables but as a section passed with reference to the
constitutional provision referred to. That is, s.6 vested:
4
A striking instance of judicial recognition of political
reality in the shape of ministerial responsibility. See
at 1+32, I4I+6 and 2+I4.8.
. i Ip: "The appointment of all public offices under the
Government of the Colony hereafter to become vacant or to
be created whether such offices be salaried or not shall
be vested in the Governor-in-Council with the exception
of the appointment of the officers liable to retire from
office on political grounds which appointments shall be
vested in the Governor alone. Provided always that this
enactment shall not extend to minor appointments which
by Act of the legislative or by order of the Governor-in-
Council may be vested in heads of departments or other
officers or persons within the Colony." Similar sections
appear in theConstitutions of all the other States.
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"This power of appointment, with the
correlative right of dismissal, in the
Commissioner of Police, subject to the
qualification that he shall not exercise
the power of dismissal, which is only
given to him in the case of misconduct or
unfitness, without consultation nor
without the approval of the Executive
head of his department ...
The section, therefore, in the view of the learned
Chief Justice, had "nothing to do with the tenure of
office of the constable as 'between himself and the Crown,"
and His Honor went on to discuss the tenure of the office
of a constable. On the basis of the decisions in Dunn v.
2 3 U
The Queen, De Dohsfe v. The Queen and Shenton v. Smith ,
he concluded, at 1+35-6, that "it is an implied term in the
engagement of every person in the Public Service, that he
holds office during pleasure, unless the contrary appears
by Statute."
BARTOW J. enunciated the basic proposition that all
military servants of the Crown hold office at pleasure and
that no contract could derogate from that right unless
5
authorised by statute. As to whether the Police Act of
1at 1+31+.
2[j89o] 1 Q.B. 1l6.
3(1897) 66 L.J. Q.B. 1+22 (n).
^[1895] A.C. 229.
%e cited for this Grant v. Secretary of State for India (1877)
2 C.P.D. 1+1+5. Further, at 1+1+3?kbk> His Honor cited with
approval Shenton v. Smith and Dunn v. The 'Queen as extending
the proposition to civil servants.
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1863 constituted such authorisation he regarded three
sections of the Act as vital.
The first of these sets out the form of oath which
*1has to "be taken "by all members of the police force ; the
next deals with the nature of the agreement between the Grown
p
and the member of the force ; the last lays down the con¬
ditions under which resignation from the force may be effected.
These sections the learned judge thought were completely
clear and had the effect of binding the constable by a
"unilateral contract" which could be determined only "by
cancellation ... by the Commissioner, acting for the Crown,
or by the Commissioner being willing to accexot his
4
s.11. Under this section every member undertakes to
serve "eithout favor or affection malice or ill-will ...
until I am legally discharged."
^s.12: "Every person taking and subscribing such oath shall
be deemed to have thereby entered into a written agreement
with and shall be thereby bound to serve Her Majesty ...
until legally discharged. Provided that no such agreement
shall be set aside, cancelled or annulled for want of
reciprocity. Provided also that such agreement may be
cancelled at any time by the lawful discharge dismissal
or other removal from office ... or by the resignation
of any such person accepted by the Commissioner of Police..."
^s.l5: "Ho constable ... shall be at liberty to resign ...
unless expressly authorised in writing ... by the
Commissioner of Police or the officer under whom he may
be placed or unless he shall give to such officer three
months' notice of his intention so to resign..."
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i . *1
resignation." Turning to s. 6 His Honor stated that it
could "be reconciled with ss.11, 12 and 15 only "by holding
that it did not affect the ordinary term of a contract with
the Grown that the latter can dismiss at pleasure. There
was nothing in the section to show that the authority given
to the Commissioner was more than an addition to the power
remaining with the Crown. It was a direction to the
Commissioner "to submit to the Government his reasons for
his actions in the shape of the proof he has found sufficient,
so that Government may approve or otherwise of what he has
done." (i+h-5). It was all part, however, of an administrative
plan and conferred no right to a hearing or any form of
judicial proceeding. Further, to give such an interpretation
to s.6 would have the effect of making the officers of the
police aismissible at pleasure -while serjeants and constables
were entitled to a hearing "before dismissal. This position
^At kkO. In this connection^liis Honor quoted BARRY J.
in Power v. The Queen (-1873) h A.J.R. 1 Uk and lk5 as
saying of sections of a Victorian statute identical
with those in the instant case that they created a
unilateral contract which ""binds him to serve ...
["but he] is not allowed to exercise the privilege of
withdrawing from the force ... without cause assigned
or "because at some critical emergency some distasteful
duty may "be allotted ..." With respect, this appears
to ignore the fact that "by s.15 of the Queensland
statute the policeman can resign "by giving three months
notice without any need to assign a cause and whether




His Honor refused to accept (2+2+6):
"This Act intended the whole of the members
of the police force to he placed on the
same footing in this respect, that for
ohvious reasons of policy applicable to
such a force, they are all from the highest
to the lowest liable to dismissal at
pleasure in that public interest for the
protection of which the Crown's Ministers
are responsible."
O'CONNOR J. reiterated that ss.11, 12 and 15 stipulated a
unilateral contract and referring to the oath's being
similar to that undertaken by the military forces added at
b50: "One can well understand that, the police force being
in itself a quasi military organisation, the form of con¬
tract should be the same in both cases." His Honor was
similarly of the opinion that s.6 was necessary because of
the x^rovision in the Constitution Act which made it necessary
to delegate the authority to make minor appointments. The
section was intended to give the Commissioner the power of
appointment and of dismissal for misconduct or unfitness
"with the additional obligation of keeping a record of the
reasons for the Commissioner's action." The learned judge
refused to interpret the phrase "upon sufficient proof" as
bringing the case within the rule of Gould v. Stuart and
thought it "merely incidental." To hold otherwise would
distinguish between officers of police and other members of
the force and the section was nothing more than part of the
administrative plan regulating the organisation. It is
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submitted with respect that the importance placed on ss.11,
12 and 1 5 was over-emphasised. The oath is of little
significancej since apart from the phrase "until I am
legally discharged"(which as has been pointed out above
can be by resignation on three months' notice) it is the
same as that used throughout Australian public services
(see Commonwealth Public Service Act 1922-57. Fourth Schedule)
in many of which organisations the Crown right has been
abrogated. 3.12 mentions "legally discharged" and "lawful
discharge" and only the phrase "no such agreement shall be
set aside ... for want of reciprocity" affords any ground
for postulating aunilateral contract involving an implied
term of dismissal at pleasure. But the meaning of this
phrase is by no means clear"' and it seems a slight
foundation on which to build a doctrine with such important
consequences. And s.15 does not appear to be of great
significance in view of the provision for resignation.
The stress laid on the Crown right to dismiss at
pleasure and its unhesitating extension to all public
servants; civil as well as military, are a result of the
importance placed by the High Court on the decision in Dunn
v. The Queen.2 Yet, as has been pointed out elsewhere^ the
*1 Though see remarks of EVATT J. in Fletcher v. Hott discussed
below.
2 [1 896 ] 1 Q.B. 116.
^Mitchell op. cit. p.38*
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judgment of the House of Lords in Dunn treated as "binding
statements of law, oiJinions which were no more than o"biter
1
iLisJiS De Dohse v. The Queen. The Court furthermore
seems expressly to exclude prerogative and "base its judgment
2
on the "basis of an implied term ; such a term can "be
negatived "by the existence of implications suggesting an
intention to do so and there are certain factors on which
it can at least he argued that such an abrogation was intended.
In S.12 of the statute in question reference is made to
"lawful" discharge or dismissal. It is arguable that this
presupposes the possibility of an unlawful dismissal which
could not be the case if the intention was that the office
should be held at pleasure. In this connection it should
be observed that a dismissal by the Commissioner alone would
not be "unlawful" but would be a nullity in view of the
terms of s.6 , it is suggested, therefore, that s.12 assumes
that dismissal will follow only after a particular procedure
has been undergone.
Further, the Police Act of 1863 had repealed an early
statute of -l 852 by which a constable could be convicted by
two justices for "neglect or violation of duty." This was
a judicial proceeding and dismissal could then be ordered
1(1897) 66 L.J. Q.B. U22 n.
2<3ee BARTOW J. at 1+26. On the basis of the decision inAtt.Gen.
v. De Ke.vseb'» Roval Hotel [-1920] AC 508, the prerogative would
presumably be abrogated by the provisions oi ohe statune.
And see at 1+36.
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"by Petty Sessions. But an appeal was given under the Act
to the Governor who could confirm the dismissal or order a
further enquiry. As CHUBB J. commented in his judgment in
the Queensland Supreme Court"1:
"in taking away from him the right to "be
judicially tried, Parliament intended to
give the constable the protection of the
Governor in Council, and the more so
"because, if the contention of the Crown
is correct, a constable can be condemned
and dismissed unheard without having
either the charge stated to him or being
given an opportunity of answering it, with
the loss of his superannuation contributions
and his superannuation rights ..."
The learned judge was here urging that the word
"Government" meant the Governor in Council ana not a Minister
of the Crown, but the underlying emphasis on a right to some
2
form of judicial process before dismissal is clear. Thus
there is some ground for arguing that the 1863 Act did not
intend to remove the protection hitherto given to policemen;
prior to the statute of 1863 the police forces we're under
local control and the members were not servants of the Crown
and the view of the Supreme Court seems mpre in accordance
^
sub, nom. Foley v. Pyder [1906] St.K. Qd. 225 at 231.
2Unlike the High Court, His Honor took the view that the
words "sufficient proof" implied evidence of facts both
by accuser and accused which "to a reasonable and right
minded person ... would suggest hearing what the party
accused has to say."
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• 1with the historical development of the force.
The implied term was in the judgments of BARTON and
O'CONNOR J.J. , a power which existed concurrently with the
power given to the Commissioner under s.6 'but since the
Crown can act only through the medium of its officers , it
is arguable that the power given to the Commissioner was
not intended to he a concurrent power hut a power delegated
to him and exercisable by him subject to the approval of
the executive government acting through a responsible
minister.
As such Crown servant cases as Dunn, De Dohsdb and
Shenton played such an important part in the decision in
-1
This argument from the history of Queensland police legis¬
lation was rejected by O'CONNOR J. in the High Court (at U5U-)
when he stated that the 1863 Act "swept away all local super¬
vision and placed the whole of the police force under one
central control in the hands of the Government ... and it is
that Act, and that Act only, in whichwe are to find the
rights, if there are any rights." But, with respect, it
can be argued (as the State Supreme Court did) that the
history of the legislation is evidence that public interest
does not necessarily demand dismissal at pleasure of police¬
men, as such. Their public importance and their duties were
the same before and after they became Crown servants.
2See, for example, at ii39 where BARTON J. says: "It [the
constable's service] may be terminated at any moment by the
other party - that is the Crown, by its officers."
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JiZSLSE Foley, the judgments in the High Court emphasised
the importance of "public interest,and assume that the
public interest in the activities of the police force
required an implied term of dismissal at pleasure. It is
not necessary here to discuss further the validity or other-
p
wise of this assumption in view of what has been said above,
but another important consideration is relevant in deciding
wherein lies the best interests of the xoublic - the need to
preserve the salaried governmental service from the inter¬
ference of politicians whose motives, however reasonable
they may be in the individual cases with which they are con¬
cerned, may not necessarily be in the best public interest.
The effects of continuous political interference on
governmental employment have been referred to in the last
chapter and the history of police legislation is similar to
that of other governmental services insofar as it shews an
intention to limit, by the operation of statute, the extent
to which governmental employees would be subject to arbitrary
and unfair treatment. The decision of the Queensland
Supreme Court in the instant case is preferable in this
respect to that of the High Court and the unfortunate (for
the public interest) consequences of R.yder v. Foley are
fully reflected in the next police case to which we must
^ See especially, BARTON J. at U39, bb3-kk^; O'CONNOR J. at 1+50.
2Suora pp. 33 " If5-
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turn our attention,, namely F1 etcher v. Nott. ^
The appellant in this case had "been a -police constable
in New South Wales. As a result of a Royal Commission into
the operation of State gaming and "betting legislation; the
Chief Secretary (the Minister responsible for the police
force) directed the Commissioner of Police that a number of
policemen , including the appellant; be dismissed. The
Minister also recommended to the Governor in Council that
these members of the force be dismissed. Accordingly;
notice of dismissal was given to the appellant by the
Commissioner and confirmed by the Governor in Council.
2
The Supreme Court of New South Wales dismissed a
claim by the plaintiff for damages for wrongful dismissal
and in affirming this decision the High Court held that
neither the rules providing for the general government and
discipline of the police force made under s.12 of the Police
Regulation Act 1899 - 1935 nor the Police Regulation (Appeals)
Act 1923 controlled or restricted the power of the Grown to
dismiss at will.
The main grounds for the decision are contained in the
judgments of LATHAM. C.J. and EVATT J. The Chief Justice
began with the basic proposition of the implied term in all
1(1938) 60 C.L.R. 55.
2Pletcher v. Nott (1937) 37 S.R. (New South Wales) 1+30.
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contracts of employment with the Crown and reiterated the
statement to this effect in Ryder v. goley. The relevant
provisions of the New South Wales Police Regulation Act
1899—1935 were indistinguishable from those of the Queens¬
land statute considered in the Ryder case and. therefore,
in His Honor's view, could afford no grounds for assuming
any limitation of the right to dismiss at pleasure."^ By
S.12 of the New South Wales Act the Governor was empowered
to make "rules for the general government and discipline of
the members of the police force" and the appellant maintained
that these rules constituted an implication that the usual
implied term did not apply.
The learned judge pointed out that many of the rules
consisted of advice and information ana could not be con¬
sidered as conferring rights. Certain other rules
provided for liability to penalties and dismissal for a
wide variety of offences and the departmental enquiries
2 ■
into charges made against members of the force.
Affirming that these rules also, in no way conferred legal
rights upon the policeman, His Honor stated (at 67):
^ At 65.
2See at 66-67. "They will be liable to punishment or dismissal
for disobedience, neglect or omission of duty, incompetency,
intemperance, disrespect to any person in authority, insolent
or indecorous behaviour or any words or actions subversive of
discipline or calculated to impair the efficiency of, or
bring discredit upon, the police service or any misconduct
punishable by law" or contrary to rules and instructions."
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"Ix's according to the true construction
of the Act, a constable holds his office
only during pleasure, no rule made under
the Act can alter the conditions of his
tenure of office ..."
The construction of the statute, particularly the
section providing that lack of reciprocity would not annul
the agreement between the constable and the Grown,
indicated, in the opinion of the learned Chief Justice, that
the contract was a unilateral one, determinable at the will
of the Crown. No rule could alter this and any rule which
attempted to do so "would be inconsistent with the Act and
would therefore be invalid. "
As has been mentioned above, there are grounds for
doubting the interpretation of the statutory provisions
under consideration in Ryder v. Foley, and the same
criticisms are applicable in the instant case. But two
further observations on the legal effect of the rules are
pertinent.
First, in deciding that the rules conferred no legal
rights and that their existence was not inconsistent with
a power to dismiss at pleasure, the Chief Justice laid
great importance on the case of R. Venkata Rao v. Secretary
of State for India."1 But two factors in that case weighed
'Hi 937] A.C. 2I4.8. At 69 His Honor stated: "Thus it is recog¬
nised by the highest judicial authority that there is no
necessary inconsistency between an otiicer of the Grown
holding his appointment at pleasure, and the existence ox
rules, either" contained in a statute or made under a statutory
rrh-i r-h nnroort to regulate the manner in whicn an oi j ice:power, whicn purpoi 0 w 1q„o11,. limit the mower or
is dismissed. Such rules do no 0 legally limit the power or
manner of dismissal.
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heavily with the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council:
the existence of an express statutory reservation of the
power to dismiss at pleasure and the express assertion that
the Secretary of State for India in Council was "the
supreme authority" over the Indian civil service.^
Neither of these provisions existed in the legislation
considered in Pletcher v. ffott and, it is arguable, there¬
fore, that Venkato Rao does not really assist the decision
in that case.
Second, the rules expressing the policeman's liability
to punishment and dismissal can be regarded as merely
2
informative and explanatory. It is at least doubtful,
however, whether the inclusion of such terms in a contract
of service impliedly excludes dismissal or punishment on
grounds other than those expressed.^
The Chief Justice then turned to the Police Regulation
(Appeals) Act of 1923 which provides for an appeal against
k
disciplinary decisions of the Commissioner of Police.
^ibid, at 256, 257»
2See LATHAM C.J. at 68 and EVATT J. at 78.
^See the divergent views expressed in McClelland v. Northern Ire¬
land Hospital Board [ 1957] 2 All E.R. 129 at 136, 138 and 11+1-2.
^■s.6(i): "Any person who ... is a member of the police force,
if dissatisfied with any decision of the Commissioner made or
given after the commencement of this Act, in regard to ... any
punishment where such punishment consists of the infliction of
a fine, suspension or induction, whether in rank or pay, ais—
missal, discharge or transfer, may give notice oi appeal from
such decision in the prescribed manner.
- 18U -
Appeal lies to an appeal "board consisting of a District
Court judge with,, if necessary, two assessors. The report
of the "board and all the evidence are to "be sent to the
Commissioner who is then to forward these documents to¬
gether with his own report and recommendations to the
Minister whose decision is final. lio appeal lies from the
"board or Minister to any other court or tribunal and no
prerogative writ will lie in respect of decisions of the
i
"board or Minister.
Having regard to the terms of this statute, His Honor
decided that it did not regulate "the whole subject matter
of dismissal from the police force" but gave no more than a
right of appeal from the Commissioner, leaving untouched the
basic right of the Governor in Council to dismiss at
pleasure from which no appeal could lie. Before saying
anything further on this interpreation of the Act, something
must be said of the judgment of EVATT J. who concurred in
the decision and for the same r easons as the Chief Justice.
His Honor, however, in concurring, made some strong
comments on the practice that had been adopted in the
Fletcher Case and his remarks are of importance in demon¬
strating the manner in which the public interest would best
be served in cases of the kind under consideration. Borne
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ox' these remarks are for this purpose worth quoting in
detail.
"It is plain that this Act [Police Regulation
(Appeals) Act 1923] is of fundamental importance
in the good government of the roolice force of
New South Wales ... The scheme ... seems to
contemplate that, in the first instance, the
commissioner should himself give a decision
and that ... the jurisdiction of the minister -
whose decision is final - should "be appellate
and not original ... and ... it is expected
that the minister will not intervene until
after the appeal hoard has heard all parties
concerned - including the commissioner - and
pronounced its decision. Of course, the
appeal hoard's decisions are not made binding
upon the minster. None the less it would he
a most serious responsibility for the minister
to refuse to act upon the decision of the
appeal hoard.
Referring to the importance of a proper public and
judicial hearing, the learned judge remarked: "By such
means administrative action is controlled by open
investigation before a judicial officer." And of the
action of the Minister, he added:
"In the present case the device of direct
ministerial intervention set at nought the
scheme of the Police Regulation (Appeals) -act
... by reference to the Royal Commission
report officers like the plaintiff were
deprived of the benefits [of the Act]. The
minister directed the commissioner to dismiss
instead of allowing the commissioner to
exercise his own discretion in each case. By
these means the commissioner accepted no
^At 80. Cf. the statements made by both Government and
Opposition members during the debates on the bill: New South
Wales Parliamentary Debates Vol 9k, Cols. 2837-29-1 8; 3295-3298.
The emphasis on removing the police from unfettered political
control is evident throughout the debates.
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responsibility for the dismissals.
Consequently when the police officers
sought to appeal ... the absence of any
"decision" of the commissioner was held
fatal to the jurisdiction of the board
... it is very regrettable that ...
neither the Commissioner of Police nor
the appeal board was allowed to fulfil
the functions specified in the Act of
1923 and intended to be exercised in
accordance therewith.
Nevertheless His Honor reached the same conclusion
as the Chief Justice that the Act of 1923 did not "preclude
the Minister or the Executive Government from terminating
the plaintiff's services" ana added, at 32:
"The fact that the Act of 1923 preserves
ministerial control only by way of final
resort is not sufficient to warrant the
inference that the pre-existing power of
primary ministerial control by dismissal
has disappeared."
It is suggested, with respect, that as the Minister
is the instrument by which the Crown in fact operates -
2
as the High Court itself had stressed in Ryder v. Foley -
there are reasonable grounds for assuming that the right
"*At 81-32. Cf. the remarks of Lord ROCHE L.C. in R.
Venkata Rao v. Secretary of State or India ] 1937[ A.C. 2i+8
at 25k on the subject of the government's failure to adhere
to a procedure specifically provided for by statutory rules.
2(1906) k C.L.R. I4.22 at k32: "The Crown, that is, the head of
the Executive Government, in whose name everything is done,
does not act in person; it acts through responsible officers,
to whom the powers of Government are delegated, and, as a
matter of fact, ninety-nine hundredths of the work of the
Executive Government is done by those responsible officers on
their own individual responsibility without consulting the
Governor in Council."
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to dismiss was to "be exercised only after certain
formalities had "been observed and not capriciously and
without reasonable enquiry. The fact that an appeal is
given only from the decision of the commissioner is just
as likely to be evidence of a presumption that the
commissioner alone would exercise disciplinary powers as
it is evidence of a reservation to the Grown (i.e. the
Minister) of a concurrent power to dismiss at will. By
making the decision of the Minister final;, the statute
ensured that the Crown's ultimate jurisdiction was preserved
and it could be exercised in a way contrary to the findings
of either the commissioner or the appeal board. This
interpretation of the statute is tenable and would have
afforded greater protection to the public interest in the
-i
sound administration of the police force.
The two cases just discussed suggest that Australian
courts will maintain "the implied term" in Grown contracts
in the absence of an express statutory provision which
2
specifically negatives the term. The difficulty of
^This case has an interesting political sequel. In October 1939
a bill was passed in the New Couth Wales legislature providing
for the reinstatement of four constables on the basis of the
findings of a second Royal Commission which had been established
on the exhortations of the Police Association. This commission
found that the four constables had been unjustly dismissed.
See New South Wales Parliamentary Debates (l939) Vol.160 pp.
711 2-7116.
2Cf. DIXON J. as he then was, in Fletcher v. Hott (1938) 60
C.L.R. 55 at 76-77.
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attempting to prove that the terms has "been negatived "by
statutory implication is even more apparent in the most
recent of the police cases.
In ii^ye v. Attorney-General for Tasmania^ the appellant
who had "been dismissed from the police force of Tasmania by
the Governor in Council sought to prove that the provisions
of the Police Regulation Act 1898-19U5? as amended by the
Poxice Regulation Act 1955 which established a system of
appeals, abrogated the right of the Crov/n to dismiss at
pleasure,
o
Apart from the provisions of ss.i6-19,'" the statute of
1898-19U5 contained four other sections which were mentioned
in the case: by s.8 the Governor was to appoint a
commissioner who would control the force; s.10 provided that
the Governor "may appoint such officers of police^ as are
necessary;" by s.11 it was provided that the Governor could
"at any time suspend, reduce, discharge or dismiss" any
officer of police including the commissioner; and s.12
V(1956} 9U- C.L.R. 193 affirming decision of Tasmanian Supreme
Court [ 1955] fas. L.R.
2These ss. contained the usual conditions about the oath, the
absence of the need for reciprocity and resignation.
^The Act distinguished "officers of police" and "sergeants,
constables and junior constables." But, rather confusingly,
included both classes in the generic term "police officers. "
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empowered the commissioner, with the approval of the
minister, to appoint and dismiss such sergeants and
constables as he thought fit, the Governor to have the
right to disallow any such appointments.
In the opinion of the High Court there was nothing
in these provisions which in any way abridged the right
to dismiss at pleasure and on the basis of their decisions
in the Ryder and Fletcher cases, considered that ss.1b-i9
clearly indicated a reservation of the implied term and a
unilateral contract.
Further, the provisions of the Act of 1955 which
established an appeals board were held, so far as the
appellant was concerned, not to be inconsistent with the
existence of the implied term. The most important
section was 50D which by its various subsections provided:
any police constable or sergeant to have the right of
appeal against disciplinary decisions of the commissioner;
the appeal board's decision to be final with an appeal to
the State Supreme Court on points of lav/ only and a simi¬
lar right of appeal to be given to "officers of the police"
from decisions of the Governor.
The court agreed that the subsection proving that
officers of the police should have an appeal from decisions
of the Governor qualified the Crown's right to dismiss at
pleasure, 'Hqut to give a right of appeal against a dismissal
by the Crown is a very different thing from taking away the
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right of the Grown to dismiss." (at 202). A right of
appeal does imply, however, that the dismissal Toy the
Crown will "be subject to review "by a judicial "body whose
decision is final - this certainly negatives the implied
term and seems to justify the conclusion that the rule in
Gould v. Gtuart applies to officers of police under the
Tasmanian legislation.
But the appellant -was not an officer of police. He
was appointed Toy the commissioner and appeals in cases of
policemen other than officers lay only in respect of
decisions of the commissioner. As the appellant had Been
dismissed "by the Governor "it follows that he was subject
to the unqualified right of the Grown to dismiss a police
officer at pleasure." (at 202).
With respect, this interpretation sets at nought what
was the obvious intention of the statute - the protection
of all police officers against arbitrary and capricious
treatment. Sections 8-12 of' the Act of 1 898-1 9U5 obviously
contemplate that senior members of the force will be
appointed,disciplined and dismissed by the Governor, while
the junior ranks will come under the jurisdiction of the
commissioner. The existence of these two separate
disciplinary systems is at least a strong implication that
1
no other residual power or implied term exists. And even
*^Tt ahould be observed that almost identical provisions
existed in the statutes considered in the Byaer and Fletcher
caseSj to which the ssine reinarks spp 1 y.
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it sections 16-19 make it difficult to adopt such a view
the provisions of the 1955 Act seem clearly to imply that
every member of the force would "be given a right of appeal
against the appropriate authority, Governor or commissioner,
statutorily charged with his discipline,"1
These cases contrast sharply with the decision of the
New Zealand Supreme Court in Kilgour v. Gummings and another2,
particularly as to the emphasis placed on the oath and the
existence of a unilateral contract not voidable for want of
reciprocity. The legislation in this case was identical with
the statutes discussed above and of the effect of such legis¬
lation, FAIR J. stated (at 982):
"... the view taken by theCrown was
apparently to some extent influenced by
the impression that the Police Force was
a semi-military body, and that its members
should properly be regarded as serving on
much the same basis as those of the Array.
For many years past none of these have been
able to resign during his term of service ...
Seamen and merchant ships ... have been
subjected to similar compulsion. But these
departures from the general rule governing
the relationship of master and servant ...
require to be expressed either by an
established practice, or in clear and
unmistakable language. Neither of these
A
The decision results in the two classes of servant in the
police force of Tasmania being treated differently, officers
having a right to appeal from theCrown's actions and the other
policemen being denied such a right. It is difficult to
reconcile this result with the views expressed by the High
Court in Ryder v. Foley at 1+52-3 where one of the grounds on
which the appellant's claim failed was that it would result in |
"giving a right to police constables and sergeants but not to
officers." See supra p.'73
2[191+1 ] N.Z.L.R. 972.
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conditions are fulfilled in respect of
the Police force and the provision ...
that on taking and subscribing the
oath a person 'shall be taken to have
entered into a written agreement to
serve' indicates an approximation to a
civil contract. "
The High Court's reluctance to limit the Crown's right
in the case of the police force seems, with respect, to be
based on a mistaken conception of public interest - a con¬
ception inherited from one or two cases in the late nine¬
teenth century which are based on assumptions of at least
doubtful validity."' That there is nothing inherently
difficult in postulating tenure rights for members of the
police force can be seen from the British practice by means
of which the basic statutory right of a ChM* Constable to
2
dismiss at pleasure has been abrogated by the establishment
3
of a system of appeals to the Home Secretary. Indeed in
^For a brief but critical judicial survey of the development
of the doctrine of the implied term, see Bertrand v. The King
[i 91+9 ] V.L.R. US especially at 51-56.
2See, for example, County Police Act 1839; County and Borough
Police Act 1 859 s.191(U)•
■^Police Appeals Act 1927 and see wallwork v. Fielding [i 922]
2 K.B. 66 C.A.
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the case of the police forces in Britain the tenure at
pleasure was statutorily expressed. In the cases dis¬
cussed aloove the right depended upon an implied term"'
which should have "been less difficult to negative.
The iniluence of the doctrine of the implied term
is apparent throughout governmental employment. In
statutes concerning public corporations and local governing
bodies it is common for a right to dismiss at pleasure to
2 3be reserved either by express provision or by implication .
And although there is judicial authority for saying that the
right to dismiss at will has been abrogated by statute like
the Commonwealth Public Service Act *1922-57, it is apparent
that certain sections of that statute ana others of a simi¬
lar kind could operate in such a way as to retain a power
^ In Kaye v. Attorney-General for Tasmania (l95b) 1+ C.L.R. 193
at 201+5 WILLIAMS J. said that the right to dismiss at will
was a. prerogative right. 'With respect, this does not seem
to be in accordance with the usual view taken by the High
Court that dismissal at pleasure is an implied term of the
contract bet?veen Crown and servant.
^Titterton v. Railway Commissioners (1895) 16 L.R. N.S.W. 235;
Williarnes v. Victorian Railway Commissioners (1903) 29 V.L.R.
566; Cilento v. South Australian Railway Commissioners [1927]
S.A. 3.R. 305; Ex parte Wright"7l95U) 31+ 3.R. N.S.W. 5b6:
.Stepto v. Railway Commissioners (1925) 1+2 N.S.W. W.N. 181.
And in local government, see South Australian Local Government
Act 1938-57 s. 157(2).
^See: N.S.W. Local Governmetn Act 1919-51 s.95(l)(a); Victorian
Local Government Act l9k& s. 158(2); Mansfield v. Blenheim B.C.
(1923) N.Z.L.R. 81+2 where the plwer "to remove" was held to
mean "to remove at pleasure." Cf. McManus v. Bowes [1938]
1 K.B. 98.
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in the Grown of dismissing a servant without observing
the normal statutory procedure.
It is clear, for example, that by s.8A of the Common¬
wealth Public Service Act 1922-57? the Governor-General
could by an order made under the section deprive any officer
or class of officers from the benefits of the Act including
a right to a properly constituted enquiry before dismissal."''
This section of the Act is intended to provide for the
determination of conditions of employment of employees who
could not readily come within the normal public service
conditions - cleaners, timekeepers, domestic staff at
government hostels as well as pharmacists, airport fire
captains and other technical workers. But there is
nothing in the section which would prevent its being used
to remove a public servant from the operation of the Act
and to this extent the section could render nugatory the
3
entire statute.
^s.8A(l): "The Governor-General may, on the recommendation
of the Board, by order in writing under his hand, declare
that the provisions of this Act and of the regulations
specified in the order shall not apply to an officer or
employee, or to the officers or employees included in a
class of officers or employees, specified in the order."
2A list of such "exempt employees" is published regularly
in theCommonweaith Gazette.
3ri'he section bears a strong resemblance to that included in the
Western Australian Public Service Act in 1902 as a result of
the decision in Qonld v. Stuart by which it was provided that ;
the Crown could at any time declare that it woiud no longer be
controlled by the provisions of the principal Act. oee uughes
v. The Grown (l903j 6 W.A.L.R.21 at £6. It is interesting to
notice that'section 8A is being used. to . avoid the.provisions
of s.33 of the Commonwealth Public Service Act wnich prohibits
employment of aliens in a permanent capacity.
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Moreover, 'by s.29(l) of the same statute, the
Governor-General has the power, on the recommendation of
the Public Service Board, to abolish an office in a depart¬
ment and that this will not give a right to damages for
wrongful dismissal is clear from Young v. Waller"1 in which
the Privy Council held that although the New South Wales
Civil Service Act of 1881. had abrogated the right to dismiss
Q
at pleasure, yet it did not take away the right of the
Crown to abolish an office. And sections similar to
s.29(l) of the Commonwealth Public Service Act are contained
in the relevant State statutes.
Finally, it is at least open to question whether the
3
form in which ss.55-57 of the Commonwealth Public Service
Act 1922-57 are stated completely precludes the operation
of the dismissal at pleasure rule as far as most Common¬
wealth public servants are concerned. In the two early
In¬
cases in which the High Court have stated that the rule
in Gould v. Stuart is applicable to those serving under
the Act, the point had not been specifically raised but
had been assumed by the court without discussion. But in
1[i898] A.C. 661. And see also Edwards v. Commonwealth (1935)
5k G.L.R. 313 at 32k-
^The statute in question in 'Gould v. Stuart.
^These sections specify the offences for which an officer may
be punished and provide for an appeal body.
^Bridges v. Camnionwealth (1907) U C.L.R. 11 95J v*
Commonwealth (190 7) 5 C.L.fi. 1
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Gould v. Gtuart the ultimate authority responsible for the
punishment o±' offending servants was the Governor and it
was clear that the enquiry procedure in the statute was a .
condition precedent of the Governor's action. In the
Commonwealth Public Service Act. on the other hand, the
responsibility for punishment rests with the Governor-
General only in respect of the First and Second Divisions"'
of the service ; for the other two divisions the ultimate
authority for punishment by dismissal, is the Public
Service Board from which no appeal lies. On the basis of
decisions of the High Court in the police cases, it is
arguable that the rule in Gould v. Stuart is not applicable
to the Third and Fourth Divisions of the Commonwealth
Public Service because the intention was to make the Public
Service Board the final authority for their dismissal and,
at the same time, to retain a concurrent power of dismissal
exercisable by the Governor-General.^" As has been said
"'The Commonwealth Public Service is divided into four
divisions of which the First and Second comprise the top-
level officials, including heads of departments.
2S.56(2).
3S.55(U).
^•And see s.92(l) which provides that: "Every appointment,
promotion, transfer, retirement, or dismissal of an officer
made by the Board, a Permanent Head or a Chief Officer, as
the case may be, under this Act, shall for all purposes have
the same force and effect as if made by the Governor-General."
This implies that the-authority of the Governor-General is
required for the execution of the acts mentioned in the
section and it is arguable that this autnority, persists
concurrently with that of the Board.
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above, this argument should "be rejected as contrary to
the scheme ox the Act "but on the existing' High Court
decisions it is possibly good law.1
The doctrine of implied term, therefore, is "by no
means completely absent in Australian government employ¬
ment. In many cases it has been made explicit by statu¬
tory provision; in other cases it may still be invoked
because of the terms in which the relevant statutes have
been expressed. The courts in Australia have been just
as ready to imply the "dismissal at pleasure" term into
Crown contracts as their English counterparts - a practice
greatly at variance with that obtaining in the realm of
2
private law - and the employment contract of the govern¬
ment employee is, in this respect, a peculiar one.
That the government servant works under a contract,
the terms of which are, in the main, determined by statute,
3
has been emphasised by the Australian courts. Some dis¬
cussion is now required of the importance placed by the
courts on the enforceability of those rights.
^Though contrast Bradshaw v. Commonwealth (1925) 36 C.L.R. 585
where the High Court held that the power of dismissal for the
causes mentioned in the Act was vested in the Board. This
need not, on the basis of the police and railway cases,
preclude a gubernatorial power to dismiss at will. Of.
Edwards v. Commonwealth (-1935) 5U C.L.R. 313 at 323«
2gee the remarks of SCEUTTON L.J. in Reigate v. Union Manu¬
facturing Co. (Ramsbottom) (l) [l9l8] 1 K.B. 592 at 605.
3gee for example, Evans. v. Williams (1911) 11 C.L.R. 550 ao
566.
CHAPTER VIII - Rights against the government
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The importance in Australia of statutory rights
which can be enforced "by the public servant against his
employing authority has already "been mentioned. This
is well illustrated "by the cases concerning civil
servants transferred to the Commonwealth government from
the different States on the formation of a Federation at
the 'beginning of this century.
The Australian politicians who debated the proposed
federal c onstitution in the conventions of 1891, 1897 and
1 898, gave little thought to the formation of a new and
integrated Commonwealth public service. Instead they
assumed that the soundest method of establishing such a
service was by transferring the necessary departments and
A
officials from the States. Little discussion on the
administrative structure of the new service followed.
Something was said about the legal problems involved in
A
This is in contrast to the American convention at Phila¬
delphia in which the principle of a new and independent
Federal service was accepted without considering whether
or not the new service would be recruited from the States.
See: L.D. Vlhite - The Federalists, Macmillan (191+8) pp.389-
39b; and for an interesting account of the early formation
of the Commonwealth public service, see V. Subramaniam -
"The integration of the Commonwealth Public Service,"
Public Adminis t ration (Sydney) Vol. XVI, p.138 et. seq.
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transferring the assets of the State departments concerned
"but the main discussion centred on the rights of the
transferred officers. ^ After some argument as to the
form which the preservation of these rights would take,
the formula "all existing and accruing rights" was finally
2
agreed upon and duly appeared in the Constitution.
The problems inherent in this formula became at once
apparent when the classification of the new Commonwealth
Public Service into grades, classes and divisions began.
In the words of the first Public Service Commissioner:
"The most pronounced difficulty so far
experienced in administering the Common¬
wealth Public Service arose from the fact
that S.8I4. of the Constitution preserves
to transferred officers all the existing
and accruing rights enjoyed by them while
they were State officers ... [and] the
majority of the Commonwealth officers have
been transferred from the States with
essentially differing Public Service laws
and rights of officers supported by these
laws, in many instances being not only in
conflict with one another but also with
the letter and spirit of the Commonwealth
Public Service Act."3
1See: Official Reports of the National Australian Convention
Debates. Adelaide 1897; Melbourne 1898, especially the
former at pp. 886-106-9.
2s. 86-; see supra p. l$l n.t
3Commonwealth Public Service Commissioner: first Annual Report
p.6. The extent of the claims of the transferred officers
can be judged by the fact that one Queensland official
objected that raising the percentage of marks for a pass in a
departmental examination from 33 to 60 was a violation of "an
existing right".'
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Whatever the administrative effects of the "existing
and accruing rights" clause, the legal effects were
unmistakable and the High Court over the next forty years
was to demonstrate the full extent of the rights which a
"transferred" governmental employee could enforce against
the government.
2
Bond v. Commonwea1th the High Court refused to
accept the view that the rights deferred to in s.8i| of the
Constitution did not include a. right to a certain and
fixed remuneration and GRIFFITH C.J. declared (at 23) that
the rights of an officer in the public service were no
different from "the rights of any other person who is in
the service of another, except so far as a difference is
made by statute." The public servant, like any other, was
entitled to receive payment for his services at the rate
fixed when the employment contract was made. This clearly
''The Constitutional provision for the preservation of existing
and accruing rights was repeated in the Commonwealth Public
Service Act of i902 s.60 (now Commonwealth Public Service Act
1922-58 s.i+5).
2(1903) 1 C.L.R. 13.
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implied that the government, as such, had no peculiar
rights as an employer.
The Bond decision was, however, limited in its effect
"by the decision in Cousins v. Commonwealth^ in which the
High Court held that the section of the State statute
involved'" was merely a provision passed to give a salary
determination on transfer and did not confer a right to a
fixed salary which would he unalterable. The salary could
have been reduced at any time by the state legislature and
it followed, therefore, that a similar power to reduce the
salary 'belonged to the Commonwealth Parliament. The
provisions of the Public Service Act which provided for the
classification and salary ranges of the service applied to
all public servants, transferred officers not excepted and
the Court rejected the claim that s.toO of the Public
Service Act, which preserved existing and accruing rights,
could be construed as excepting transferred officers from
the salary fixing provisions of the Public Service Act.
The decision in Cousins was welcomed by those in con¬
trol of the Commonwealth Public Service and the Public
Service Commissioner stated that "the decision besides
saving the Commonwealth thousands of pounds for many years
1 (1906) 3 C.L.R.. 529.
2'Victorian Public Service Act 1900 s.19 (this was the section
considered in Bond).
- 202 -
to come has declared the competency of the Federal
Legislature to establish a consistent and symmetrical
system of civil service administration."'' Indeed,, had
the reasoning in the decision been adhered to by the High
Court in subsequent cases, "the competency of the Federal
Legislature" would have been such as to render almost
nugatory the Constitutional and statutory preservation of
the rights of the transferred officers.
2In Le Leu v. Comatonwealthf however, the High Court
held that a section of the Commonwealth Public Service Act
providing for compulsory retirement on attaining the age
of sixty-five could not be used to terminate the employment
contract of a transferred officer unless that had been one
of the terms of his contract with the State government
before transfer. Disapproving the decision in Cousins,
the court decided that the relevant section of the Common¬
wealth statute could not be read as applying to all public
servants as this would be inconsistent with s.bO of the
same Act which specifically preserved the rights of trans¬
ferred employees.
1 Commonwealth Public Service Commissioner: Second Annual
Report (i907) p.30.
2(1921) 29 C.L.R. 305.
^HIG-GrlNS J. merely distinguished Cousins on the ground that it
turned on the intended imperrnanence of the Victorian statute;
that case assumed "that if the [Victorian] Act were meant to
be permanent or indefinite ... the salary could not have been
reduced."
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The readiness of the c ourt to uphold the public
employee's rights against the government is implicit in the
\
cases just mentioned. The case of Lucy v. Commonwealth
demonstrates even more explicitly the real extent of the
existing and accruing rights of the transferred employee.
The implications of this case, which set the tone for a
number of subsequent decisions, are of major significance
in the field of Australian government employment.
kucy "the Commonwealth government had compulsorily
retired a transferred employee formerly employed in the
South Australian public service who had attained the age
of sixty-five. The retirement was admitted to be unlawful
in view of the decision in Le Leu and the action had been
brought merely to decide the plaintiff's proper remedy and,
if it were damages, how the damages were to be measured.
The High Court held that the remedy was damages for
unlawful termination of his contract of service and that
the measure of damages was the same as that in an action
2
for wrongful dismissal. In dismissing the plaintiff? the
Commonwealth Government had committed a breach of the
contract of employment into which it had entered. And by
1 (-1923) 33 C.L.E. 229-
2Contrast Vine v. National Dock Labour Board [-1957] A.C.i+88.
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virtue of s.8!|. of the Constitution and s.60 of the Public
Service Act the plaintiff had acquired "the right to remain
in the Public Service during his life or until dismissal or
removal for some cause specified in the South Australian
i
Acts. "
The position of the plaintiff was similar to that of a
servant of a private person who had been dismissed before
the expiration of the period specified in his contract.
The question arose as to whether, in estimating the
damages, the relevant salary should be taken as at the date
of the employee's transfer to the Commonwealth, at the date
of the retiral or on the basis of the maximum salary which
the employee would have received had he remained under the
South Australian Statutes. Dissenting from the remainder
of the High Court, ISAACS J. held that the plaintiff retained
only those rights which he brought over on transfer.
"Those rights 'existing and accruing' were fixed
when the Departments were transferred, and could
have been there and then stated in writing. They
neither increased nor diminished as the years
went on ... Those rights if invaded, must be
fully compensated for; but I am quite unable to
see why, by reason of those rights which the
country has guaranteed, these officers should in
still other respects stand in a better position
than any other officers in the Service, or that
the guarantee should be enlarged beyond the terms
of the compact in the Constitution. The Consti¬
tution itself certainly does not give these
added rights, and the whole intendment of the
^at 237; see also at 238-239»
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Commonwealth Public Service Act,is against
it. Anci justice is against it."
This view was not accepted, however, by the rest of
the Court. HIGGflNS J. stressed that the plaintiff entered
the Commonwealth Service with a right to enjoy the terms of
the contract he made with the Commonwealth and, in addition,
to enjoy such rights as he possessed while in the service of
the State government. The Constitution enacted that a
transferred officer should preserve all existing and
accruing rights but did not say that he had to remain subject
to whatever burdens or disadvantages the law of the State
public service had imposed upon him. "It is a one-sided
arrangement - the officer is to take all the advantages
which the Commonwealth gave him, plus any rights which he had
under the State and to which he would not be entitled under
an ordinary contract with the Commonwealth." (at 250).
8TAEKE J. shared this view. The transferred officer,
while possessing certain rights under his contract with the-
Commonwealth government, retained other additional rights
by virtue of the Constitution. The whole weight of con¬
tractual rights was with the employee. Parliament could
no doubt change many of these rights, but others had been
guaranteed by the Constitution. Parliament had not altered
the plaintiff's rights under the contract with the Common¬
wealth; until it did so the Commonwealth government could
1at 2Li.3~2Lf.k-
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not interfere with these rights:
"The King cannot, "by a mere executive act,
alter that law or vary the rights of the
plaintiff; he cannot "by any such act,
dissolve or vary the contract . . .
These statements in the Lucy case contrast sharply with
the attitude of the court in the police cases discussed in
the last chapter. But their importance is unmistakable.
Crown employment need not mean an absence of rights. The
State, as employer, can be held to the terms of the con¬
tracts it makes with .its employees. Indeed there is a
remarkable resemblance in the contracts involved in the
transferred rights cases to the unilateral contracts so
frequently mentioned in the police cases - except that in
2
the former the advantage lies with the employee.
3
The High Court in Bradshaw v. Gornmonwealth later
placed certain restrictions on the extent of the "existing
and accruing rights" guaranteed by the Constitution. Under
a South Australian statute public servants who were
incapacitated could be required to resign, failing which
1 at 256-. This seems a clear rejection of any notion that
prerogative right is a controlling force in Australian Crown
employment. See at 26-9 and 253 for the emphasis on the
existence of an ordinary contractual relationship between
the Crown and its employees.
2Cf. McTIEKNAil J. in his dissenting judgment in Pember ton v.
Commonvvealth (1933) 49 C.L.R. 382 at 397.
-^(l925) 3b C.L.R. 585-
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they could "be removed. By a majority decision (three to
two) the court held that the provision relating to
resignation "before removal was not an existing and accruing
right such as s. 81+. of the Constitution was intended to
preserve. In the words of the Chief Justice at 590: "the
object of the section is rather to impose a disability on
the officer "by authorising his removal ... in the event of
his incapacity." The object of the Constitutional
protection "was not to provide for a pedantic compliance
with forms ... but to preserve the substantial rights of
[transferred] public servants." RICH J. agreed (at 597)
that the South Australian Act related to the ending of a
substantive right? but "the method of formally effecting
this ending? e.g. by resignation or dismissal ... had no
effect on such ending." The procedure regarding the
request to resign mentioned in the South Australian statute,
therefore, was not a substantial right to be protected by
the Constitution. STARKE J. also adhered to this view and
thought that the section in question gave no right to the
plaintiff; on the contrary "it is a power vested in the
''south Australian Civil Service Act ■\Q~lk s.28: "The Governor
may require any officer who has "become incapacitated for the
performance of his duties, to resign his office, and, in the
event of non-compliance, may remove such officer, who shall
thereupon be entitled to the compensation provided by the
Act. "
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jixeeutive authority of the Statewhich left the Common¬
wealth free to prescribe the manner in which the power of
removal would he exercised.
The majority of the court was influenced mainly by the
fact that they thought it possible to draw a distinction
between "substantial" rights, protected by the Constitution,
and other rights, not so ijrotected. With respect, this
distinction does not seem to be supported, by the terms of
s.8i| of the Constitution and in this particular case the
right in question, namely to be allowed to resign, is
probably much more substantial than at first sight appears.
In their dissenting judgments, ISAACS and HIGG-INS
discussed these factors at length and, in their opinion,
there was no justification for distinguishing substantial
and other rights; whether great or small, the rights in the
South Australian Act had to be accorded to the plaintiff.
Further it was not for the court "to weigh for itself the
comparative importance of any right that is secured by
S.81+ [of the Constitution]," (at 592). The provision of
the South Australian statute made the request to resign "a
^This, with respect, could be said of any section of a statute
dealing with, for example, causes for which dismissal could
take place. The subject matter is a disability of the
employee but. the procedure laid down is a right which limits
the effect of that disability. This has been the inter¬
pretation of dismissal sections like s. 55 of the Commonwealth
Public Service Act - see Williamson v. Commonwealth (1907)
5 C.L.R. 17k at 179.
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condition precedent to the power of removal." To say that
the right to resign was not substantial was to ignore the
fact that "it would he better in seeking future employment
to say 'resigned' rather than 'removed,'" (at 596). In
the words of ISAACS J: "When we are cutting down what is
held to he a life interest [sic.' ] the conditions of
defeasance must he adhered to."
The minority view in Bradshaw seems more in accordance
with the previous decisions and this is supported by Edwards
1
v. Commonwealth. the decision in which turned on the
provision of a South Australian statute which permitted the
removal of public servants where "the total number of
officers in a department" was excessive. The plaintiff
had been dismissed from the Commonwealth service on the
ground that there were too many employees of his particular
category in the service. The High Court held that this
dismissal was an infringement of the plaintiff's existing
and accruing rights and that there must be "a strict
adherence to the conditions upon which his employment in
the Civil Service of the State could have been determined"
(at 320). And the importance placed on this strict
adherence is apparent from the statement, at 321-2, that:
1 (1935) 51+ C.L.R. 315.
- 210 -
"... when an officer's employment is liable
to defeasance if it is found that the number
of persons of the classification to which he
belongs, is excessive and no other position
is available for him,his tenure is not the
same as if his employment is liable to
defeasance if it is found expedient to reduce
the total number of officers in a department.
The appellant's tenure was liable to the
latter defeasance, not to the former. "
The phrase "existing and accruing rights" was clearly
vague and imprecise and made it impossible to determine
with any exactitude the extent of the rights to which
governmental servants transferred between State and
Commonwealth public services. The same situation might
have arisen with regard to the rights of government
employees transferred between the Commonwealth public
service and various Commonwealth statutory authorities,
the Acts establishing which provided for the protection
of the "existing and accruing rights" of transferred
-1
employees.
The experience, however, of the litigation over S.8I4.
of the Constitution taught the wisdom of defining in clear
terms exactly what rights were to be protected and by the
Officers' Rights Declaration Act 1928-53 it is provided in
s.5 that the "existing and accruing rights" referred to in
the statutes of the type just mentioned:
''See, for example, Commonwealth Bank Act 1911-27 SS.16A, 35Q;
Development and Migration Act 1926 ss.11, 15; Science and
Industry Research Act 1920-26 s.lUA.
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"are hereby declared to "be rights in respect of -
(a) leave on the ground of illness
(b) long service leave or pay in lieu thereof. . .
(c) superannuation
(d) child endowment
(e) in the case of female officers, payment
on marriage..."
It should "be observed that s.8h of the Constitution
does not apply to these cases because that section refers
only to state government departments taken over by the
Commonwealth government. There are, however, still a
number of Commonwealth public servants to whom s.81+ does
apply - namely those transferred on Federation. And it-
is possible that the terms of the Income Tax (War-time
Arrangements) Act 191+2-1+6 could be interpreted so as to
give State taxation employees who Y/ere transferred under
that Act to the Commonwealth service, the benefit of the
Constitutional preservation of their rights.
It is now standard practice to insert, in statutes
setting up new Commonwealth authorities, a section providin
that the Officers' Eights Declaration Act 1928-53 shall
apply,2 thus placing limitations on the rights of those
transferred. The most recent example of this is the
"'see: ss. 11,12. These are tantamount to a transference o
a department which would bring those transferred under s.8
of the Constitution.
2Cf. Snowy Mountains Hydro-Electric Power Act 19U9-52 s.3^.
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Commonweal til Police Act of 1957, assented to on 1 2th
December, 1957? "but at the date of writing (April 1959)
not yet proclaimed. By s.6 of that statute it is
provided that if a member of the Commonwealth Public
Service should transfer t o the Commonwealth Police "he
retains his existing and accruing rights;" it provides
also that the Officers' Eights Declaration Act 1928-53
shall apply. The effect of this will he that a public
servant who transfers to the Commonwealth Police may lose
the security of tenure he formerly enjoyed, since the
Officers' Eights Declaration Act does not mention rights
connected with tenure of office; and the police cases
already discussed make it clear that police tenure is "at
pleasure. "
In the cases just discussed the rights protected by
the courts owed their origin to statute. There is also
ample evidence that in Australia the righrs of the govern
mental employee, even where they stem from contract, will
just as zealously enforced.
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The plaintiff in Evans v. Williams'^ was appointed
under a New South Wales statute "by the provisions of which
he could "be removed only 'by a "bench of magistrates for
cause. By the same statute he was remunerated in part hy
fees and in part "by a salary paid "by the Grown for
services rendered in another capacity. At a later stage
the plaintiff agreed to give up his fees to the appropriate
government department and accept an increased and fixed
salary. Some years later the plaintiff was dismissed "by
order of a magistrate sitting as a Court of Petty Sessions;
2
the order was set aside "by the High Court hut the plaintiff
was .de facto excluded from his office and, thus, from
earning the fees due to him under his appointing statute.
He accordingly brought an action claiming damages for
breach of an implied contract.
The High Court (ISAACS J. dissenting) held that the
terms which had to be implied into the plaintiff's agree¬
ment with the Crown were that he would faithfully perform
his duties in exchange for the salary agreed and that in
the event of the Crown terminating the agreement, the
plaintiff would be left free to receive his statutory
11 (1911 ) 11 C.L.R. 550
^Evans v. Donaldson (1909) 9 C.L.R. li|0
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fees. The Chief Justice, discussing the argument that
the whole agreement, express or implied, could Ice terminated
"by the Crown at pleasure, thought this immaterial. The
agreement contained an implied term that if terminated
(whether at will or with notice) the opportunity would
"be restored to the plaintiff of earning his former statu¬
tory fees. Of the Crown's action, the learned judge
commented at 565: "A party cannot, while retaining the
"benefit of an agreement, refuse to "bear the "burdens and
it is a mistaken use of language to speak of such a
refusal as a termination of the agreement. It is properly
described as a "breach. "
Nor could it 'be argued that the relationship 'between
the plaintiff and the Crown was not a contractural relation¬
ship. "By what right," asked the Chief Justice, "did the
Government receive and retain the emoluments payable to
the plaintiff? The only possible answer is ... under an
agreement that they should do so," (at 566). The relation
between the government and a government servant "as in
every other case of employer and servant" is a contractual
relationship. In the normal case of public service
^ISAACS J. held that on acceptance of a fixed salary the
plaintiff had become liable to the New South Wales Public
Service Acts and the Crown could therefore lawfully
terminate his employment at any time. He did not appear
to doubt, however, that such a contract could be made and
enforced, see at 577«
-2-15-
employment the only consideration given "by the employee
for his salary is his services; in this case a further
consideration was the plaintiff's surrender of his
statutory emoluments. !'3o long as that consideration
existed ... and the Government took the "benefit of it, I
am disposed to think that the obligation, on their part to
pay the salary could not "be terminated. But if it could
the action will still lie for "breach of the implied contract."^
The same willingness to concede rights against the
2
government to the employee is apparent in Siebert v. Hunkin.
The Grown could dismiss or suspend a servant at pleasure
under the Public Service Acts of South Australia; "but the
terms of the contract "between Crown and servant are binding
3
on the Crown in the period "between appointment and dismissal.
There was no justification, therefore, for the denial of
salary during suspension from office - the contract of
employment had not "been terminated and until this took place
^On the ability of the Crown to make such a contract, see
remarks of BARTON J. at 568-9 where he mentions dilljams v.
0'Keefe [ 1 9*10 ] A.C. 186. And for an interesting example of
statutory rights operating to the employee's disadvantage,
see Parker v. Attorney-General L"195S] N.Z.L.R. 108.
2(d 93U) S.A.S.R. 3W7; affd. (193U) 51 O.L.R. 538.
3cf. Lord ATKIN in Reilly v. The King [193U] A.C. 176 at 179-
180. See Geddes v. Magrath, Morgan v. Geddes (1933) 50 C.L.R.
520, especially at 530-531 where the High Court refused to
accept the view that the existence of a power to remove without
cause should reduce the amount of compensation statutorily
payable for abolition of office.
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the terms of the contract subsisted.1
*
Thus, as with any other employer, the Crown, or other
governmental instrumentality, can be compelled to meet
obligations incurred towards its employees. "Public interest"
is no justification for many of the special privileges which
governments seek from time to time, particularly if the test
of public interest is to be satisfied merely by upholding
the interests of the Crown as representing the community.
When, furthermore, the interests of the Commonwealth
government clash, for example, with those of a State govern¬
ment then the employee cannot be refused rights on the basis
of some vague notion of government sovereignty - it is
impossible to say in such circumstances wherein it lies.
Rights can be granted against the government as an
employer; this is demonstrated by the cases mentioned above.
1With regard to local government, see: Wilson v. Central
Illawarra Municipal Council (1 93*1 ) 10 L.G.R. iOi ; Chadwick
v. St. Mary's Municipal Council (191|8) 17 L.G.R. 39; Webb
v. Sydney City Council (j956) 20 L.G.R. 3k0.
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Furtherj the existence, in Australia, of a highly
developed system of public service arbitration imposes
severe limitations on governments as employers and the
operation of this system shews that such limitations are
no more detrimental to the "public interest" in govern¬
mental employment than they are in private enterprise.
CHAPTER IX - Arbitration
- 21 8 -
Industrial arbitration in Australia "began early and
developed fast. Arbitration courts and tribunals of
ail kindsj created under both Federal and State authority,
have produced a large amount of law relating to industrial
employment generally and to public service conditions in
particular. The decisions of these bodies, together with
the multiplicity of statutes and regulations enable certain
important conclusions to be drawn, of which possibly the
two most important for this study are: that governmental
employment, as such, has not placed public employees out¬
side the ordinary processes of industrial arbitration and
that the concept of the State as a "sovereign" employer is
The history of arbitration in Australia is an interesting
commentary on the essentially empirical nature of
Australian politics and law. Theories of social philosophy
have not been conspicuous; but the underlying social and
political assumptions which succeeded .in removing most
franchise restrictions before the end of the nineteenth
century were no less implicit in the creation of a system
of compulsory industrial arbitration. See, generally:
L.F. Crisp: The Parliamentary Government of the Common¬
wealth of Australia, 2nd ed. Longmans (195^+) pp. 19-21.
R.J. Hawke: "The Commonwealth Arbitration Court," Annual
Law Review (University of Western Australia), Vol. Ill,
p. I4.22. On public service arbitration in particular, see:
E.E.Crichton: "The Development of Public Service Arbitration,'
Public Administration (Sydney), Vol. XV, pp.150, 21U and 319;
L. Blair: "Arbitration in the Federal Public Service," Public
Administration (London) Spring, 1956, p.61.
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dij.iicu.lt to sustain in Australia where the conditions of
service of so many governmental employees are determined
"by bodies over which the employing government has no con¬
trol whatever.
*
By placitum XXXV of sec. 51 of the Australian Constitution
the Parliament of the Commonwealth is given the power to
make laws with respect to:
"Conciliation and arbitration for the prevention
of industrial disputes extending beyond the
limits of any one State"
andj under this power, the Commonwealth Parliament has
ioassed legislation which provided, inter alia, for the
constitution of a Commonwealth Court of Conciliation and
Arbitration with power to determine industrial disputes
1
where more than one State is involved.
^See Conciliation and Arbitration Act of 1901+. The High
Court in the Boilermakers' Case (1956) 9k C.L.R. 25k
(affirmed by the Privy Council) decided that the Arbitration
Court could not constitutionally exercise, together with its
arbitral functions, the judicial power of enforcement; this
has made necessary amending legislation which was passed in
1957. This legislation established two new bodies - the
Commonwealth Conciliation and Arbitration Commission and the
Commonwealth Industrial Court - the former being given the
arbitral functions proper and the latter all the judicial
powers necessary to enforce awards. As these internal
arrangements do not affect the law considered in this chapter,
the term "Arbitration Court" will be used throughout.
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In interpreting the word "industrial" "both the High
Court and the Arbitration Court have given ample
illustrations oi their view that governmental employees
can "be "brought witnin the ambit of the Conciliation and
Arbitration Act, and that the Crown, no less than any
other employer, is subject to its provisions.
The High Court in Federated Municipal and Shire
Council Employees' Union of Australia v. Melbourne
1
Corporation was of the opinion that the Crown was bound
by the Arbitration Act of 1902| and that the intention to
so bind the Crown had been clearly expressed in sec. I4. of
that statute which included in the term "industrial
dispute":
"Any dispute in relation to employment in an
industry carried on by or under the control
of the Commonwealth or a State, or any public
authority constituted under the Commonwealth
or a State. 1,2
The Crown, therefore, could not claim for its disputes
with its employees, an immunity from the operation of the
arbitration legislation unless it could show that the
dispute was not "industrial." The government was not to
be exempt where a private individual or company would not
1 (19-19) 26 C.L.R. 508.
2See, HIGGINS J. at 537-8;; also Amalgamated Society of
Engineers v. Adelaide Steamship Co; Ltd. (1920) 28 C.L.R.
129 at 163.
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"be and work that is industrial, if privately performed,
is no less so because it may happen to be carried out by
a government instrumentality.
The Sydney Harbour Trust, for example, is closely
directed by the government of the State of New South Wales
and subject to the latter's financial control. Further¬
more, ports and harbours are among the matters over which
the monarch in former times exercised the prerogative; it
might be argued, therefore, that a dispute between the
Trust and its servants cannot properly be termed an
"industrial" dispute since the ordinary relationship of
employer and employee does not appear to be present.
This argument was, however, rejected by the High Court
in Merchant Service Guild of Australasia v. Commonwealth
Steamship Owners' Association [No. 2] ; the prerogative
2
was limited in extent and on the basis of the decision
3
in Mersey bocks and Harbours Board v. uucas, the Court
held that the Sydney Harbour Trust was essentially an
industrial concern, the employees of which were within the
scope of the Arbitration Act notwithstanding the govern¬
mental nature of their employer. The words "industrial
1(l920) 28 C.L.R. hyo at 1+1^9.
2Cf. Blacks tone Comm. I, 26i+.
^8 App.Cas. 891-
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dispute" did not "in their natural and ordinary meaning"
exclude disputes in which one party was a State government
even when it was exercising executive powers for the "bene¬
fit of the public and financed "by Parliamentary
■1
appropr iat i ons.
Acceptance of the justice and feasibility of this is
implicit in the legislation governing Commonwealth Public
Service arbitration. Originally, Commonwealth public
servants were excluded from the benefits of the Arbitration
Act of 1904. This was not, it should be observed, because
they were governmental employees and Crown servants, but
simply because, as defined in the Act, the word "industry"
did not apply to the functions performed "by members of the
2
public service. Agitation on the part of public service
groups of various kinds, however, led to the passing of
legislation which secured for public servants the right of
access to the Arbitration Court.^ It was argued by
^ Cf. HIGGINS J. at 2+52: "What would the man in the street
say when there is a strike of officers or engineers on a
government dredger, if he were told that there is no
industrial dispute?"
2See: Conciliation and Arbitration Act, 1 902+, sec.2+.
3Arbitration (Public Service) Act 1911. By this statute
public servants working under the Commonwealth Public
Service Act of 1902 were deemed to be employees in an
industry within the meaning of the Conciliation and
Arbitration Act of 1902+.
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opponents of this legislation"' that it would undermine
the discipline of the service not only "by superimposing
on it an additional authority capable of fixing conditions
2
of servicef hut by encouraging the formation of staff
assocations. This view was not accepted; however, "by the
Arbitration Court in the first public service litigation
under the new statute, the case of Australian Postal
Electricians' Union v. Postmaster-General.^ HIGGINS J.
here refused to apply different principles to a claim for
higher "wages by public servants than he would have done in
the case of ordinary private employees:
"... the idea of this Act ... is peace -
peace in the service of the King, which is
the service of the people; and I conceive
it to be my duty to apply the same principles
as I apply in other arbitrations - that is
to say I have to see that provision be made
for securing to the employee the satisfaction
of his normal essential needs ..."
And, on the same page (7), His Honor asserted that:
"it certainly makes for the dignity and efficiency of the
public service that the remedy of strike for grievances
^Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, Vol. LXII, pp.3562-
70; Vol. LXIII, pp. 3627-8.
Then the task of the Public Service Commissioner.
3(1913) 7 G.A.R. 5.
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should "be forever abandoned in favour of the remedy of
discussion before an impartial arbiter."
Among the "normal essential needs," wage claims
present the most difficult problems in public service
arbitration. Money must be appropriated by Parliament
which will obviously examine closely additional calls on
public funds; advantageous conditions of service like
security of tenure and pension schemes, it is arguable,
p
ought to be taken into consideration in fixing salaries;
and because of the public nature of their employment, it
might be suggested that governmental employees should be
more "patriotic" in time of national economic crises and
refrain from claiming higher wages.
These arguments, however, are, it is submitted, based
on the false assumption that the government as an employer
of labour is inseparable from the government as governor.
What an increase in the salaries of government employees
is going to cost the nation should be a factor in deciding
whether or not to grant such an increase only insofar as
it is part of a national wages policy. To single out the
salaries of public employees for restriction on the ground
of the additional cost to public funds is inequitable and
^See, supra p. 43
2Supra, pp. 4-5-4#
"W. Li9*1 hi-] A.R. (New South Wales) 298 at 299.
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rests on a misunderstanding of the1 nature of the govern¬
mental employee's "allegiance" to the state as his employer.
"What an increase will cost Parliament is not for the court
to consider in making an award; nor should it "be for the
government in its role as employer.2 HIGG-IiJS J. refused
to accept the argument that the privileges of public service
employment "be taken into account in making a wage award"-* and
in Australian Public Service Clerical Association^ v. Public
Service Commissioner,^" POWERS J. (at 536) rejected a
suggestion that for patriotic reasons governmental employees?
as such5 should not make claims for higher wages during a
national emergency and expressly disapproved of the con-
R
sideration of such a doctrine by the court.
^(1916) 10 C.A.R. 578 at 587-
p
In Australian Telegraphetc. Maintenance Union v. Public
Service Commissioner (191R) 8 C.A.R. 119s the Arbitration
Court also rejected the argument that public service
salaries could not be tied (as were the salaries of all
private employees) to a cost of living index because of
the alleged political difficulties which would be
encountered should public service salaries have to be
reduced. In this respect the government was like any
other employer and could not plead "politics" tc justify
special consideration. See at 131«
3(1913) 7 C.A.R. 5 at 13.
^(1918) 1 2 C.A.R. 531•
5rfhe argument here rejected seems closely analogous to that
which would classify strikes by governmental employees as
"insurrection" (see supra pp. (oO~bp) and is based on the
same fallacious reasoning.
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Moreover, since 1920 the Commonwealth Public Service
has had a separate Public Service Arbitrator-^ from whom
an appeal lies go trie Aroitration Court ir the Arbitrator
thinks that it would be in the public interest to grant
the appeal.^ Both the Arbitrator and the Arbitration
Court have made it clear that they will interpret
"public interest" not as mere departmental or even govern¬
mental interest, but as the wider interest of the community
in the satisfaction of which an important part is played by
•5harmonious relations in the government service.
In a dispute with its employees, therefore, the Grown
can claim immunity from Federal arbitration legislation
A
Public Service (Arbitration) Act 1920-58 provides in
details for the "settlement of matters arising out of
employment in the Public Service."
2
ibid. sec. 15A(i); should leave to appeal be refused
an appeal lies to the Chief Judge of the Arbitration
Court against the refusal.
3Cf. Professional Officers' Association v. Public
Service Board (1952) 72 C.A.R. A5 at I4.6; Small Arms
Factory Employees' Association v. Linister for
Defence (19i 5) 9 C.A.R. 97 at 101+; Australian Letter
Carriers' Association v. Public Service Commissioner
(1 926) 1 k C.A.R. UD at 53-
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only if the dispute is not an "industrial dispute.
Few terms have given rise to more constitutional liti-
2
gation, and it is far from clear -precisely what govern¬
mental activities are "industrial" so as to make the
conditions of service therein subject to the jurisdiction
of the Arbitration Court.
In Australian Workers' Union v. Adelaide Milling.Co.
x
Ltd. the High Court had to decide whether a dispute
between an association of employees engaged in wheat
lumping and stacking operations and the State governments
controlling these operations was an "industrial dispute."
A
In each state there is also industrial arbitration legis¬
lation which applies to the Crown in varying circumstances
from state to state: in New South Wales, the Industrial
Arbitration Act of 191+0 gives limited powers to specified
tribunals to determine conditions of employment in the
State Public Service, the main control over these
conditions being exercised by the State Public Service
Board in accordance with collective agreements negotiated
between the Board and the staff assocations concerned;
in Western Australia, although public servants do not
have a separate system of arbitration, Part X of the
Industrial Arbitration Act of 19*12 refers exclusively to
them; in Queensland, government employees have the right
of access to the State Industrial Court set up by the
Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration Act of 1932; a
similar right exists in Victoria and South Australia,
while in Tasmania a Public Service Tribunal Act of 1958
has set up a separate tribunal to determine employment
conditions for all government servants in that state.
2See: "The Jubilee of Industrial Arbitration in the Federal
Sphere," (1951) 25 A.L.J. 360.
^(1919) 26 C.L.R. 1+60.
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Deciding that the operations were "governmental" and not
industrial in their nature, the court placed great emphasis
on the absence of profit in the scheme and on the exigencies
of war-time defence (the Crown alleged that the purpose of
the scheme was to ensure adequate supplies of wheat for the
United Kingdom at a reasonable price).
. , 2But in the case of the Shire Employees, the High Court,
"by a majority, held that employees of a municipal corporation
engaged in road making and maintenance could "be involved in
an industrial dispute notwithstanding the absence of profit-
making ana the obvious public purposes of the work in
question.^
It was pointed out in this case that the element of
"trading" was not necessarily the discrimen used in
deciding whether or not functions were industrial as
HIGGINS J. dissenting, rejected (at Li.7Li.-5) the Crown's
contentions as to war-time exigencies and pointed out
that the relevant Victorian legislation under which that
State government operated was expressed to be enacted
"on behalf of the growers." But he thought that, in any
case, the terms of sec.Lj. of the Commonwealth Conciliation
and Arbitration Act were wide enough to give the
Arbitration Court jurisdiction.
2(j919) 26 G.L.S. 508.
It had already been decided that "so far as it engaged
in a trading occupation," a municipal corporation was
subject to the jurisdiction of the Arbitration Court -
Federated Engine Drivers' etc. Association v. Broken
Hill Proprietary Co. [No.2] (1 91 3) 1 6 C.L.R. 2i(-5.
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opposed to governmental.^ The criterion of profit is
not, therefore, an accurate one.^ It may "be doubted
if airy suitable criteria can be found. The Public
Service Gase-^ decided that "ordinary government deicart-
ments are not part of the industrial system of the
country" and that, therefore, employees of such depart¬
ments could not engage in an industrial dispute. Simi¬
larly, the decision in Federated School Teachers'
Association of Australia v. Victoria and Others^" as'sumed
that the "primary and inalienable functions of government"
are not industrial.
These cases therefore do not provide a satisfactory
solution to the problem of deciding which governmental
activities come within the scope of industrial arbitration.
The term "ordinary government departments" is not an
immutable nor an exhaustive one; as the tasks of govern¬
ment change, so new departments and agencies are created -
Of. at "... there are municipal functions which are
neither [governmental nor trading]. The case of parks and
the establishment of free libraries could not properly be
brought under either head."
^See, for example, Merchant Service Guild of Australasia v.
Commonwealth Steamship Owners' association jHo,2~l (1920)
28 C.L.E. ijjio where it was stated that in order to be a
party to an industrial dispute it was not necessary that
an undertaking be carried on for profit.
•3r. v. Commonwealth Court of Conciliation and Arbitration
ex parte Victoria (*19^2) 66 C.L.R. i+88
^(1928) M C.L.R. 569.
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and whether the new creation is an "ordinary" department
or a "quasi-governmental" "body is often a matter of chance,
even if the distinction was, in any important sense, a
valid one. So, too, what constitutes "primary and
inalienable" governmental functions is now well-recognised
to he a matter of political predilection. In the Teachers'
Case mentioned above, the High Court took the view that
education was a governmental function, the nature of which
could not secure for those engaged in it the protection
of the Arbitration Court. Nevertheless, it is unlikely
that even at' the present time public education would be
consdered to be "an inalienable function" of government by
all shades of political oxoinion and the assertion by the
court (at 575) that "a private person could no more carry
on this system of public education than he could carry on
His Majesty's Treasury" underestimates, it is suggested,
the powers of a private corporation to undertake large-
1
scale educational functions.
1The numerous correspondence schools - some with inter¬
national "student populations" - are obvious examples. The
dissenting judgment of ISAACS J. in this case contained an
interesting attempt to limit the scope of the "inalienable
governmental functions" by dividing the educational
activities of government into two separate'parts. The first
was "governmental regulation" which makes education compulsory
and authorises expenditure from public funds - departmental
officials connected with this are "representative of regal
functions only and outside the industrial power." The other
part was the "educational service" which is undertaken by the
government, "just as a company would, if authorised, underta e
i Qt q+p yfli lwflv or othsr industrial sntsipriss© is£ this latter group should not, His Honor asserred,
be exempt from the industrial power.
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Even so, while it is not clear to which governmental
activities the industrial arbitration legislation applies,
there is no doubt that such legislation can apply to the
Grown in a wide range of its operations and Crown employ¬
ment alone will not exclude public employees from the
benefits of the industrial power.
Further, two ways in which Australian constitutional
lav/ has developed make it almost impossible to advance
doctrines like that of the "sovereign" employer which even
1
yet continues to bedevil American administrative law.
In the first place, the original exclusion of State-
regulated employees, both public and private, from the
jurisdiction of the Arbitration Court, necessitated by an
early interpretation of the Constitution, was later
abandoned. Secondly, the general principle of the
supremacy of Commonwealth law over State law has been
held to apply to a wide variety of arbitration legislation
and awards.
^See suora p. n. !
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The doctrine of the immunity of instrumentalities
,1formulated in the United States "by McCulloch v. Maryland
2
and Collector v. Day came "before the High Court very
early in the history of Australian federation. In D'Emden
3
v« fodder the court held that the doctrine should apply to
prevent State legislative or executive interference with
the Commonwealth government's activities and. shortly after¬
wards in the Railway Servants' Case^ the doctrine was held
to "be reciprocal so as to prohibit Commonwealth interference
with State instrumentalities. Inter-governmental immunity
"became, therefore, part of Australian constitutional law.
5In 1920, however, in the celebrated Lngineers Case,
the High Court reversed the former acceptance of the
doctrine and laid down that:
"States,and persons, natural or artificial
representing States, when parties to
industrial disputes ... are subject to
Commonwealth legislation under pl.xxxv of
Sec.51 of the Constitution if such
^(1819) k Wheat. 316 (in favour of the Federal government).
2(l870) 11 Wall. 113 (in favour of the States;
3(190/4.) 1 C.L.R. 91«
^(1906) k C.L.R. 2+88.
5Amalgamated Society of .Engineers v. Adelaide Steamship Co.Ltd,
(1920) 28 C.L.'R. 129.
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legislation on its true construction
applies to them. "
ihe legislation, therefore, of "both States and Common¬
wealth were to "be given "full operation within their
respective areas and subject matters" and previous decisions,
so far as they rested on the doctrine of the mutual immunity
of the various governments, were overruled."" But an express
constitutional provision that in the event of a conflict
between a Commonwealth law and a State law, the former
• 3snould prevail, at once put the Commonwealth into a more
favourable position than the States.
Employees in the States, therefore, both public and
private, insofar as they were "industrial," could be
subject to the industrial power possessed by the Common¬
wealth government by virtue of the Constitution; furthermore,
enactments of the State governments which attempted to
regulate employment conditions within their own territories,
'at 155» Eor the wider constitutional implications of this
important case and subsequent developments, see: A. Wynes,
Legislative, Executive and Judicial Powers in Australia,
'2nd ed. ("*1956) PP» 521 -524 j 3. Else-Mitchell (Ed. ), Essays
on the Australian Constitution (1952) pp. 1-16; G. Sawer,
Cases on the Constitution, 2nd ed. (1957) pp.14-23. All
published by Law Book Co. of Australasia,
The notion of inter-governmental immunity has also, of course,
undergone great modification in the United States. See, for
example, Hew York v. United States (1946) 326 U.S. 572.
^sec.109: "When a law of a State is inconsistent with a law
of the Commonwealth, the latter shall prevail and the former
shall, to the extent of the inconsistency, be invalid.
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"but which conflicted with Commonwealth laws were, to that
extent, invalid.
This general principle of the supremacy of Common¬
wealth law was still further strengthened in respect of
the system of arbitration "by the decision of the High Court
in Clyde Sngineering Co- Ltd. v. OoWburn^ that an award
made "by the Arbitration Court has the "force of a law of the
Commonwealth" and thus prevails over conflicting State
legislation in accordance with sec.i09 of the Constitution.
The implications of the developments just described for
the doctrine that a government is, in any real sense, a
"sovereign" employer are obvious and have been illustrated
2
in a number of cases. In H.V.McKay Pty Ltd. v. Hunt it
was held that a minimum wage rate determined by a Common¬
wealth tribunal nullified a different award made by a State
tribunal; in R. v. Commonwealth Court ex parte Engineers'
3
State Conciliation Committee, the High Court unanimously
held as valid a section of the Commonwealth Conciliation
and Arbitration Act providing' that the appropriate Common¬
wealth arbitration tribunal might make an order restraining
a State authority from dealing with an industrial dispute
^(l93o) 37 C.L.R. /466. In this case it was held that a State
Parliament could not prevent the operation of an existing
federal award; in Ex parte McLean (1930) U3 C.L.R. U12, the
principle of the supremacy of a Commonwealth award was
extended to cover State legislation even where the latter was
first in point of time.
2(i926) 28 C.L.R. 308.
3(1927) 38 C.L.E. 563-
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where the former considered that the dispute fell within
its jursidiction. Again, in Australian Railways Union v.
1Victorian Railways Commission, the High Court rejected
the contention that the State railways were exempt from
the operation of federal arbitration awards, a contention
based, inter alia, on the ground that these railways
occupied a special position in relation to the States which
was recognised by the Constitution.
Hence a federal body may interfere with State
employees, public as well as private, even where this may
run contrary to the desires of the State government and the
latter can claim no special "sovereign" privileges which
would leave it in sole control of the conditions of employ-
2
rnent of all its servants. Furthermore, as pointed out
above, various State and Commonwealth enactments have given
government employees (even those engaged in the "inalienable
functions of government") the right to have their conditions
of service determined by tribunals whose awards will further
1 (l 930) L|i+ C.L.R. 319.
2In the Engineers' Case (1920) 28 C.L.R. 129, the disad¬
vantages of excluding State governments from the federal
industrial power were strongly emphasised (see at 155;
163-I1); and in the Shire Employees' Case (i 919) 26 C.L.R.
508, HIGGIHS J. (at 536-7) expressed the view that any
interference in State employment disputes by the
Arbitration Court "was not a burden like taxation, but
primarily ... meant to aid ... parties to the dispute."
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J- 1limit the "sovereignty" of the employing government.
There is nothing in Australian experience to suggest
that these limitations and the consequent inapplicability
of the "sovereign" employer doctrine have unduly
inhibited the operations of government bodies, and the
practice from the point of view of the employee seems to
have much to recommend it.
■A
For a good example of how widely these tribunals are
able to interpret their jurisdiction, see the wide
definition of "industrial dispute" in R. v. Industrial
Court ex parte Brisbane City Council [19 57] Que en sland
State Reports 553«
CHAPTER X - Conclusion
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The main conclusions of this survey may he briefly
re-stated thus: first, restrictions on conduct appear in
a wide range of employment, public and private, and the
justification for these is the public interest, ascertainable
by reference to the duties involved; second, there seem
to be no valid reasons, legal or political, why the govern¬
ment employee should be denied rights against the govern¬
ment as his employer, enforceable either in the ordinary
courts or otherwise; and finally, there are strong grounds
for asserting' that government employment is not, as such,
sui generis and invariably subject to fundamentally
different considerations from those arising in private
employment. Some final remarks must now be made on these
conclusions, in the light of the comparisons made possible
by this study.
To suggest that conditions of employment and
restrictions thereon be related to duties raises two
important problems. Can one, in fact, separate the
employer and the duties of the employee, or is one no more
than a function of the other? And, again, is the "duties"
test here proposed compatible with a stratified service




It is clear that certain functions carried out "by
the government are truly "governmental" in the sense that
it is difficulty if not impossible, to visualise their
performance "by any other agency - foreign affairs and
defence, for example. Thus it may seem correct to say
that it is the "governmental" nature of these functions
which necessitates the imposition of certain conditions and
restrictions on the government employees performing duties
in connection with them. In-other words, duties and
emp 1 oye r ar e in s ep ar ahle.
But not all functions performed 'by the government are
"governmental" in the sense that the state alone can carry
them out. The authorities concerned with the provision
of various public utilities, for example, may be now
1
private, now governmental, or even a mixture of both.
In such cases it would seem to be incorrect to "base con¬
ditions of service on the nature of the employer - it is
the tasks undertaken which are germane to the degree of
control to be exercised over the mployees concerned. The
nature of the employer and the duties to be performed are
not necessarily conjoined. To base conditions of service
on the former and not the latter prevents the drawing of
distinctions between different classes of employee, having
^See, supra , p.
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different duties "but the same employer.^ And, for this
reason, even where the truly "governmental" functions are
2
concerned in which duties and employer are inseparable,
it is important to retain as a yardstick the duties
involved, if unnecessary "blanket" restrictions based on
the nature of the employer are to be avoided.
At first sight it might seem impossible to relate
conditions of service to duties in a modern bureaucracy.
The necessarily stratified structure of classes and grades
in such an organisation clearly call for a high degree of
uniformity of employment conditions. The whole of certain
classes may require to be restricted in some way, because
such restriction is needed in respect of certain members
of those classes.
It is clear that a modern public service, by its very
size, cannot be run on the basis of individual cases; one
duty might involve one type of restriction, another type
of duty, another restriction, and so on. Closer
examination of the duties test advanced in this survey,
'Crown servants of all grades are thus dismissibie at pleasure
because of the long-established peculiarities associated with
the legal position of the Grown. See, supra, p. 3 n. I For
the effect of the same approach in American public employment,
see, supra, p. U
2The scope of "inalienable functions of government" is, of
course, by no means certain.' Ci. supra, pp« 22.©— 2.31
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however, suggests that there is here no necessary
incompatibility. To relate conditions of' service and
restrictions to duties, as here proposed, does not preclude
uniformity; it does allow individual distinctions to "be
made where this is desirable in the public interest.
Thus the duties performed by a particular employer -
civil service department, local authority or public
corporation - may require the imposition of special con¬
ditions and restrictions on a wide number of employees
based not only on the duties those employees at any given
time may be performing, but also on those that they may
be called upon to perform, on promotion or transfer, for
example. That is, an employee because he may be moved
from a "non-restricted" position to a "restricted" one is
subjected to "restricted" conditions throughout his
service because of the duties he may have to perform later in
his career. It is, nevertheless, the duties that are
2
important.
Gf. Report of the Masterman Committee on the Political
Activities of Civil Servants, Cmd. 7718, p.23.
2Thus, for example, a clerical officer in the Ministry of
Labour who takes, or seems to the public to have the dis¬
cretion to take, decisions affecting their personal well-
being is precluded from participating in various political
activites; the Post Office counter cleric, on the other
hand is not. See, Cmd.8783? white Paper on the Political
Activities of Civil Servants, p.8.
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Furthermore? when the basic conditions of service
such as tenure? salary and superannuation are considered?
there is good ground for asserting that the duties test
would in no way impair the application of uniform conditions -
indeed the practice of the various arms of the xpublic service
seems to recognise the indispensahiiity of such a test.
As far as superannuation is concerned? there seems no
valid reason for treating different classes of public
employees in different ways. The whole trend of public
service superannuation legislation has "been towards
uniformity of superannuation conditions, a fact which is
home out by the wide range of "transfer provisions" now
A
in operation. The legal anomaly of the denial of
enforceable pension rights to the civil servant is difficult
to justify; the official reasons for such denial are not
2
very convincing and the practice of the service indicates
that basically the civil service scheme is no different
from other public service pension systems. At any rate?
what is clear is that the duties test would not call for
the making of distinctions as to conditions governing
superannuation between different classes of the public
service. !i'he test would not? therefore? affect uniformity.
^See? supra, p.!39~fc
^Cf. supra, p. 5o-£|
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So too with the right to salary and restrictions
governing, for example, its alienation. Only in the
service of the Crown does any doubt arise as to the
legal right to salary and this does not now look like
remaining even a legal problem; nor are restrictions
on alienation of civil service salaries as extensive as
-1
formerly. Again, however, the application of the
duties test would not require different classes within
the public service to be given different rights regarding
2
salary; and the rare exceptions - the Auditor-G-eneral,
for example - are obvious applications of the, test suggested.
Similarly, there is no problem in applying the duties
test to tenure of office. Indeed, its operation appears
to be accepted, to some extent at least, within the public
service; the particular duties involved make it necessary,
for example, to give special terms of tenure to certain
local government officers.^ The rule of dismissal at
pleasure applicable to Crown servants seems, as has
4
already been said, an unjustifiable legal anomaly in
^See, supra p. 4- and p.UXn.M-
2a permanent officer of Parliament, not of the Crown, whose
salary, because of the nature of his duties, is a charge on
the Consolidated Fund. For a local government example, see,
supra p.lol
3cf. supra p. Similarly, in Australia the terms of the
Federal Public Service Act does not apply to certain specified
appointments e.g. the Public Service Arbitrator, see supra
n, |
~,LSee, supra p. 3J
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present times. The internal law of the British civil
service which provides adequate administrative safeguards
in respect of dismissal, coupled with the long-established
security of office enjoyed hy the civil servant, suggest
that no such rule is required "by the public interest.
Australian experience and practice, particularly in the
Commonwealth public service, lend strength to this view.
At any rate, the application of a uniform system of
tenure would not be vitiated by the duties test and where
certain public service posts might seem to require the
full power of dismissal at pleasure, the test would
provide a reasonable and justifiable criterion by which
such posts could be selected.
Moreover, in the cases involving security and loyalty,
uniformity is impossible. Each individual case must be
dealt with on its merits and the practice of the public
service in this difficult field of employment conditions
demonstrates complete acceptance of the duties test. So
much is at stake for both employer and employee in these
cases that an individual approach is imperative - sensitive
key positions may occur in the lower ranges of the public
service as well as in the higher and only by reference to
the duties of" each employee can one determine whether or
not he is a "risk."
"'cf. supra p. n. I
Thus two positive advantages seera to follow from
the use of the test proposed. Extension of anachronistic
doctrines of "sovereignty," "privilege" and of the
peculiarities associated with Grown employment can "be
avoided. And where restrictions and special conditions
are required they are placed on a logical and acceptable
oasxs•
It is submitted, therefore, that to justify condition
of employment and special employment restrictions one
must determine how far they are required by the public
interest. This will, in turn, be determined by the
duties of the employees involved. There do not seem to
be any formidable obstacles in the way of applying this
concept to public service conditions; difficulties may
be more apparent than real. Furthermore, there is at
least good ground for asserting that the test here
suggested is in practice regularly adopted.
Reluctance to concede to the. public employee
enforceable rights against his employer has been
a not unnatural result of political and legal theories
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of the state and sovereignty. It has long been con¬
sidered an infringement of the supreme power of govern¬
ment to grant legal rights, the enforcement of which
implies limitations On the sovereignty of the state.
The peculiar position of the Grown in tort and contract
j
and American cases like McAuliffe v. Mayor of Mew Bedford
are manifestations of this attitude.
True, the exercise of such rights may, on occasion,
2
prove administratively inconvenient hut that is far from
saying that their existence is an impossible infringement
of governmental sovereignty. In any case, sovereignty
is a concept, the political and legal antecedents of which
are, to say the least, vague and imprecise. It is a
concept scarcely capable of supporting a general theory of
public employment.
Moreover, it is difficult to believe that public
interest demands the imposition of a state of virtual
rightlessness on government employees. Australian
experience indicates that there is no need to suppose that
even extensive rights granted to government employees are
necessarily incompatible with the effective functioning of
governmental agencies. A comparison of Australian and
British practice in this connection enables certain
Mass. 216, 220 N.E. 5*17 (l892).
^Cf. supra p.
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observations to "be made of some importance for this
survey. Some reference1 to these observations would now
seem appropriate.
A
as previously shewn, legally enforceable rights
play a major part in public employment relations in
Australia. This is but a reflection of the general
pattern of Australian industrial relations and the reasons
for this emphasis on legal rights are at once apparent
from an examination of the history of labour relations and
p
public employment in Australia. Such rights based
3 i_Leither on statute or contract are not, of course, unknown
in governmental employment in the United Kingdom. They
are, however, (with few exceptions) almost completely
absent in the British civil service and when contrasted
with other public service systems such as the Australian,
the position in the United Kingdom may appear to be in
need of some reform.
"^Gh. VIII, supra
^See, supra, pp.
-'Cf. for example, Local Government Act, 191+8 sec. 11+0;
Minutes of Evidence to Franks Committee on Administrative
Tribunals, Iviemorandum I, p. 20 and also days 1-2, pp. 27-29«
%or examples in local government, see supra p. et. seq;
in public corporations, supra pp. 2^-3!
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Tliis situation has not escaped notice and the
suggestion that the British Grown servant's conditions
of service should "be "legalised" either by incorporation
in statute or in some form of administrative contract has
found favour with a number of critics.
But this legal formalising of civil service rules
may be unnecessary and perhaps undesirable, for the very
practical consideration that the staff associations do
not appear to desire that the Crown-servant relationship
be "legalised."
The staff side of the National Whitley Council have
at different times over the past few years considered the
suggestion that the civil servant's conditions of service
be put on a legal basis. The most recent discussion-of
the topic took place in 1952 when there was a full-dress
debate on the proposition that staff associations should
try "to secure for civil servants the same rights vis-^-vis
the State employer as are available to persons, other than
2
employees of the Crown, against their employers." The
main case against the proposition was accepted by the
staff side and was put by one of the principal speakers
thus:
"1 See: Mitchell, op.cit. pp. 21+0-21+1 ; Beinart, loc. cit. , p. 71;
Street, op. cit. pp.114-11 5; Yvilliams, op. cit. p.66.
^Quoted from the records of the staff side of the National
Whitley Council and made available to the author by
courtesy of the Chairman, to whom grateful acknowledgement
is mad e.
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''I Yi/oulcl want to see many more "bad cases
"before I could agree that there was a prima
facie case for even considering the idea of
a contractual relationship. ... A civil
servant without a contract had a life career
[sic.' ] lout under a contractual system his
period of service might well he for a fixed
period, not for life. An established civil
servant was possibly in a stronger position
without a contract of service than he would
he with one since the existence of a con¬
tract meant that it was open to legal.argu¬
ment, [sic.'] whereas the security of tenure
which was not traditional was rarely
threatened.
"further, trade union action might he preju¬
diced if officers had individual contracts.
In the case of unestahlished officers, for
example, a contract might he a protection
against discharge and would complicate the
application of any agreed order of discharge
of staff on redundancy, for this reason,
against others the staff side pressed no'jt
long ago - successfully - that arrangements
made with certain established officers
should he clearly indicated to he only
gentlemen's agreements and not contracts."...
The legal correctness of some of the statement made
by the speaker quoted above may he open to question hut
the import of the argument is clear. The civil servant's
representatives do not feel that he is inadequately
protected under the existing system of "extra-legal"
rules and regulations; nor that legally formalising the
^ibid.
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1Crown-servant relationship would "be to his advantage.
Furthermore, the highly legalistic structure of
employment relations in Australia has, in recent years,
"become the subject of criticism both by employers' and
employees' associations. Critics of the public service
systems of statutory rights have suggested that they
result in a spirit of constant litigiousness in which
enforceable rights are exercised often without any




The civil servant might well be excused a certain degree
of scepticism towards the common law whose "protection" so
far has consisted in (a) making, him a "tenant at will" of
the Crown - Dunn v. The ^ueen [1896] 1 Q.B. 116; (b) denying
him a right to salary - kiulvenna v. The admiralty, 1926
S.C. 8*4-2; (c) refusing legal recognition to his system
of collective bargaining - Kodwell v. Thomas [i9*-4] K.B.
596. Cf. "Because of the courts' reluctance to interfere
with government action taken against his employees, their
protection lies largely with the President, and, to some
extent with Congress." "Rights of Federal Employees,"
i+7 Col. h.R. (19-U-7) p. 1188; see also: "Termination of
Civil Service Status," Brooklyn Law Review Vol. XX, No.2.,
April 195*4-, pp. 258-263.
2See, for example, -the statement of the Secretary of the
South Australian Trades and Labor Council that Australia
would do well to abandon compulsory arbitration and that,
because of the "voluntary"system, disputes in Britain were
discussed in a much better atmosphere than in Australia
("Adelaide Advertiser" of 21 August, 1956); see also the
letter in the "Times" of 13 January, 1958, complaining of
the "excessive legality" of the Australian system.
3gee, for example: F.A. Bland, Government in Australia
(19*44) Government Printer, Sydney, p. xxvii; Report of
Auditor-General for South Australia, 1955, p.2; and see
also Beinart, 1 oc. cit. pp. 6I4-—65.
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It is possible, therefore, that the absence of
rights, enforceable in the ordinary courts, may be of
little importance in the public employee's employment
relationship. What is important is that rights are
not denied. In Australian governmental employment
generally these rights will be legal in the sense of
their being incorporated in statute; in the local govern¬
ment service and in the public corporations in the United
Kingdom this is also true, to some extent. The virtual
absence of statute or individual contract in the British
civil service does not mean an absence of rights, nor
need it mean that the civil servant is unprotected. He
has the protection afforded by the influence and standing
of the staff associations; by the well-entrenched and
universally accepted system of collective negotiations
and by the fact that those who staff Establishment
Divisions are not unaware of the needs of the employee.
This may seem rather shifting sand, on which to build
a sound edifice of harmonious staff relations but the
ethos of the civil service provides the civil servant
with a protection which may well be stronger than that
which the letter of the law could provide.
^Cf. Borchard: "The protection of the individual against
the Administration depends less upon the tribunal than on
the mores of a particular community as reflected in the
political instrument it creates." Quoted by Dicey, saw
of the Constitution, 9th ed. , App. p. 1+77.
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An American administrator has remarked that the crux
of employer-employee relations "is more than passing laws
and writing regulations ..• these contribute little and
often actually stand in the way.Legal rights, either
statutory or contractual, can mean little in reality; the
spirit of the la?/ is of greater practical importance than
2the letter. The few cases involving civil servants which
come before the courts may perhaps be due to the employee's
knowledge that he has little chance of success against the
Grown. But this dearth of civil service lawsuits could
■]
H.L.Case, Director of Personnel, Tennessee Valley Authority,
in Public Administration review, Vol. XV, ho.2, 1955, p.101.
p
^Discussing the right of the American employee to organise.
Professor A. Dotson says: "In private enterprise this
right is now generally conceded to be 'fundamental.' It
is only protected, not given, by legislation. But the
public employee's right, when it exists at all, is given
by statute and is subject to peremptory restriction."
Public Administration .Review, Vol. XV, No. 2, 1955, p. 82+.
This suggests that the reality of practice is often more
reliable than the legal "right." Of. also: Royal
Commission on Industrial Disputes, Fifth and Final Report,
House of Commons Papers 1 892-1-, Vol. XXXV, p. 120: "We
desire to say in conclusion that, in our opinion, many of
the evils to which our attention has been called are such
as cannot be remedied by any legislation, but we look with
confidence to their gradual amendment by natural forces
now in operation.;... Powerful trade unions on the one side
and powerful associations of employers on the other have
been the means of bringing together in conference the
representatives of both classes enabling each to appreciate
the position of the other... ana it has been found possible
to devise articles of agreement... which have been loyally
and peacefully maintained for long periods."
3gee Street, op. cit., pp.115-116.
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"be evidence of a healthy state of employer-employee
•1
relations.'
One final observation on rights. Where the duties
of the employee demand a high degree of restriction - as,
for example, in the case of the civil servant, it may he
that status and not contractus a more accurate description
p
of the employment relationship. Such a status, it should
he stressed, does not arise hy virtue of the special
character of government service, as such, hut from the
duties undertaken or likely to he undertaken hy those to
whom the special conditions and restrictions are applied.
It is clear from the cases of Vine v. national hock
Labour Board^ and Barber v. Manchester Regional Hospital
Board^" that the courts will he willing to concede status
only where the regulation of the employee is, in the
<5
strictest sense, statutory.v This would not apply to
the British civil servant, hut the possibility of a
1 Cf. Kahn-Freund, op. pit., p.i+U: "Reliance on legis¬
lation and on legal sanctions for the enforcement of
rights ana duties "between employers and employees may
he a symptom of an actual or impending breakdown and,
especially on the side of the unions, frequently a
sign of weakness, certainly not a sign of strength."
2See, L. Blair: "The Civil Servant - a Status Relationship?"
21 M.h.R. (1958) p. 265.
3[1957] A.C. 1+88.
^[1958] 1 All E.R. 322.
^See, supra p.^f
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status governed "by "che internal "law" of the service
should not he ignored. And, clearly, because of the
importance of the element of statutory control, there
is good ground for suggesting that many public employees
in Australia stand in a status relationship to their
A
employers.
The concept of status, if adopted where appropriate,
would not imply an absence of rights2 and, as far as the
Grown servant is concerned, the difficulties associated
with the "implied term" and the dismissal at pleasure
3
rule where these have on occasion caused hardship, could
perhaps have been avoided.
Nevertheless, it is difficult to believe that the
point here raised is anything more than a mainly academic
one; in practice, as previously suggested, the safeguards
implicit in the existing systems of collective bargaining
are probably adequate and neither the public lawyer nor
the public servant has much cause to doubt their efficacy.
^Though this has been rejected by the Australian courts, it is
submitted, with respect, that the view here expressed is
probably more in accordance with the true position. See: 33
Canadian Bar Review (1955) p.
2:See: Mitchell, pp.pit., pp.52 and 211; Allen op.cit. p.286.
In Yme the value odT~the protection given by tEs status to
the dock worker was strongly emphasised by their Lordships.
Gf. at 501-505.
3cf. Chap. VII.
^This point could, of course, be of real practical importance
in the United States Where the influence of collective
bargaining systems is weaker. See, supra p. *7"? n-S
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It has been suggested in this survey that the
dichotomy of public and private employment may be a
false classification which has survived mainly because
of the legal and political confusion surrounding such
terms as "the Crown," "the State," "sovereignty" and so
on. Two important questions are raised by this
assertion. Does not the element of expenditure of
public funds imply that public service is necessarily
different from private employment? Is not the
existence of the constitutional doctrine of ministerial
responsibility a factor which prevents application of the
same principles to both public and private employees?
lit first sight the argument that public service is
essentially different from private employment, because
the former involves the use of public monies, is an
attractive one. It has had no little influence on both
the lav/ and practice of public employment. It is, how¬
ever, necessary to distinguish two separate ways in which
governmental employment involves the use of public
expenditure. First, public funds are used to pay for the
engagement, salary, superannuation and related conditions
of employment of public employees. Second, some, but not
all, public servants are, because of their duties,
involved in the handling of public monies.
^Cf. Roberts v. Hopwood [i925j A.0.578; ana see supra p.
for examples of ministerial interference in collective
bargaining.
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With regard to the latter, it is clearly desirable
and necessary that certain restrictions must he imposed
on those whose duties require that they he entrusted
with the management of public funds; restrictions of
•1
this nature are commonplace in public employment.
Such conditions and restrictions may vary from severe
penalties incurred, in certain cases, by failure to dis¬
close an interest in a government contract, to uniform
bans on the private use of official stationery and tele¬
phones. Public monies must be handled circumspectly and
must not be employed for purposes other than those for
which Parliament appropriated them. Control in this
sense is obviously in the public interest where certain
(but not all) public employees are concerned.
In a different category, however, comes the use of
public funds to pay to government employees their salaries,
superannuation and the like. To suggest that this
requires that special conditions and restrictions be
attached to tenure, wages and pension allowances,
seems not only unjust but unreal. Many public employees,
civil servant, for example, who becomes bankrupt or
insolvent must, under pain of instant dismissal, report
the fact to the head of his department: Treasury Circular
3 September 1923« See also 21 M.L.R. (1953) pp.272-3;
Atomic Energy Authority Act 195U, First Schedule, para 5(i );
Local Government Act, 1933? sec. 123. The parallel of
trustees and the funds administered by them is clearly
analogous.
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paid from public funds, are not more restricted than
their counterparts in private enterprise - industrial
employees for example. Moreover, many non-government
organisations now spend public monies at least partly
in paying staffs and no restrictions are'suggested on
those staffs, although the taxpayer's funds are involved.1
The public, or the state, like any other employer,
must pay for services rendered. If, because of
national need, reductions in public expenditure are
required, then this should affect wages and allied
payments to public servants only insofar as such cuts
are part of a general wages policy, not because it is
administratively more convenient or on the vague ground
that the public employee is less "entitled" to his
•+ 2emoluments•
The constitutional doctrine of ministerial
responsibility in some form or another permeates all
3
governmental employment. It is, of course, absent
in private enterprise and this difference may seem to
require that basically different conditions of employ¬
ment must be imposed on the public employee. In fact,
''Universities seem to belong to this category. Quaere also
those firms that are subsidised by such bodies as the Export
Credits Guarantee Department.
2of. Australian Postal Electricians' Union v. Postmaster-
General (1913) 7 C.A.8. 5 ; see supra p. Xll
^See supra p. 13$
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however, this does not seem to "be the case.
It is difficult to see what effect the doctrine
of ministerial responsibility might have on "basic con¬
ditions like salary and superannuation, for example.
That it does not demand the dismissal at pleasure rule
seems to follow from the practice of the service.
Indeed, it is probably fairly accurate to say that the
doctrine, insofar as the employee is concerned, means,
in effect, that he must maintain certain high standards
of impartiality and integrity in his dealings with the
public, and, where appropriate, in his advice to the
minister. This seems to have little to do with tenure
salary and superannuation; it is certainly germane to
conditions of employment concerning political conduct
and financial rectitude. But this means merely that
some public employees will be affected by the doctrine
it does not call for restrictions on all.
Implicit in tne assertion that governmental employ
ment does not necessarily differ in nature from private
employment is the proposition that within the former,
legal differences - relating to tenure, for example -
between the different branches of government service
are often needless anachronisms. The growing number
of transfers between those branches serves to emphasise
the unified character of modern public administration.
That a legal right to superannuation or salary should
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depend on whether a government employee is on the staff
of the Ministry of Health,, a regional 'board or a local
health authority is difficult to defend, when so much
of the work done (as far as public interest is concerned)
is the same whether the executive authority "be local,
1
regional or central.
The argument that public interest must necessarily
"be of greater importance the near one moves to the
"centre" of government and that, therefore, the Grown
servant must ipso facto "be more restricted and regulated
than his local authority counterpart, is not easy to
appreciate. The degree of public interest will depend
upon a wide range of circumstances - access to public
funds, the need for a high degree of judicial
impartiality, the opportunity to interfere with the
liberty of the subject, and so on - and whether the
Grown or any other public body be the employer, should
1
Moving the second r eading of the National Insurance Bill
in the House of Commons, the Minister of Pensions and
National Insurance, referring to the "contracting out"
provisions (by means of which an employer may contract
out of the national scheme) stated: "The special
provisions for certain statutory superannuation schemes
are designed to deal with the situation of certain
public services where there was one service 'but many
employers. Local government was an example. It would
be plainly inconvenient to the work of that service if
some employers contracted out and others did not. It
was proposed that the Minister concerned with the service
should, after consultation with those affected, make
regulations talcing unto himself the power to act as the
the employer simply for the purpose of contracting out
and matters connected jmth it. This would oe a con-
method. " Hangara,, (i 959) OAs. fc{3-Avenieni rn i
"be for the employee
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immaterial.
The eternal conflict of liberty and authority has
"been, for the public employee, more than usually acute.
lie is both a citizen of the state and a servant of it
and, as such, he has been subject, more than the
ordinary private employee, to the exigencies demanded
by the public good:
"If the Good of the Community requires a
Diminution or Annihilation of the Business
of his Office, or the transferring of it
elsewhere, the Officer cannot oppose the
regulation, the Diminution or Annihilation
of his Profits; because not the emolument
of the Officer, but the Advantage of the
Public is the object of the Institution:
to suppose in him a Right to make such an
Objection would be to suppose the Office
created for his Benefit, that is to suppose
it to originate in a Violation of public
Trust, an Abuse of Power, and an Offence
against the State." ^
(1974)
1 Of. COGKBUKN J. in Purcell v. Sowler (2 G.P.D. 2j 5 at 213):
"The Court below seems to have distinguished between the
general and local administration of the poor law, holding
that the general administration was a matter of national
concern while the administration in a particular district
was not. But it seems to me that whatever is a matter of
public concern when administered in one of the Government
Departments, is a matter of public concern when administered
by the subordinate authorities ox a particular cistrict. ..
^Eleventh Report of the Commissioners on Public Accounts
(1780), Vol. ii, pp-133-U-
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Even at the present time the views thus expressed
are not entirely without relevance., 'but the sentiments
implicit in them appear to have unduly coloured the
a11i bude o.l the state i>o ios emo 1 oyees•
To hold that public employment is a privilege or
that the public employee can resign if he does not like
the conditions imposed is an outmoded viev/ and scarcely
consistent with modern ideas of the dignity of the
employee. Public interest is a consideration to which
all employment, private no less than governmental, must
be subject and, in certain circumstances, high national
importance may be as much a characteristic of the former
as of the latter.
Governments have, from time to time, paid great
attention to employment relations in private enterprise
where "the Good of the Community" so required; they
have, however, been singularly reluctant to concede that
the relationship of the state to its own servants is not
basically different from that of the private employer to
his employees.
The legal anomalies which have arisen because of
this attitude to government employment have been discussed
in this study and the public lawyer has, on occasion,
been not a little perturbed by the obvious injustice of
^ Of. Merchant Shipping Act 189U-? ss.22j-23U.
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cases like iiuivenna v. The Admiralty and Lucas v.
2
juucas and the High Oornmissloner for India.
Fortunately, the understandable concern of the lawyer
can "be tempered 'by an examination of the practice of
the public service. The struggle between the common
law and the law merchant over the legal difficulties
posed by commercial practice, is an interesting
example of how law and reality can be at variance.^
That struggle culminated in the Factors Acts which
legalised what the lawyer had hitherto refused to
accept. As has been suggested in this study, it
could perhaps be unfortunate if the lawyer's refusal
to appreciate the practice, as distinct from the law,
of public employment were to have a similar result.
What appear to the lawyer to be matters of acute
concern do not seem to trouble those one would expect
to be most affected by them and it is submitted that
this, for reasons already mentioned, is reason enough
i(l926) S.C. 8A2.
2[19*1-3] P- 68.
3"Lawyers see only the pathology of commerce and not
its healthy physiological action and their views,
therefore, are apt to be warped and one-sided."
Ohaimers on Sale- of Goods, 12 th Ed., p.182.
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to "let well alone." This is, however, far from saying
that the lawyer can play little or no part in an
examination of public employment. The lawyer's role
in any analysis of employer-employee relations is a
strictly limited one. It is, however, "by no means
unimportant. Legal anomalies must he shown as such
to he legally and logically indefensible. To demon¬
strate this may prevent their being accepted without
question on the few occasions when it is found necessary
to resort to litigation or legislation. This, alone,
is a valuable contribution towards the difficult task -
so often encountered in public law - of reconciling
public interest and private right. It is one which
only the lawyer can properly make.
